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Medicare, the federal health insurance program, plays an important role in providing 
health and financial security to older Americans. The role of private plans has become 
increasingly important now that nearly one third of beneficiaries in Medicare is enrolled 
in these private, risk-bearing, capitated health plans, currently known as Medicare Part C 
or Medicare Advantage (MA). In this set of thesis papers, we use several approaches to 
examine the care received by Medicare beneficiaries, with a particular focus on Medicare 
Advantage enrollees, in postacute and nursing home settings.   
 
The first study explores the relationship between geriatric risk factors, defined as factors 
pertinent to frail older adults, and postacute utilization and quality among hospitalized 
Medicare beneficiaries in Florida from 2010-2014. The paper also describes the 
differences in postacute utilization and quality between traditional fee-for-service (FFS) 
Medicare and Medicare Advantage patients. The paper concludes that geriatric risk 
factors, independent of traditional measures of comorbidity and patient demographics, are 
highly predictive of postacute utilization and quality. Current administrative claims data 
can be used to identify additional high-risk patients and predict their healthcare 
utilization. The paper also finds that there are differences in postacute utilization and 
quality between FFS and MA hospitalized patients, after accounting for patient 
characteristics and geriatric risk. As payment reform continue to change toward risk-
bearing models, monitoring access, cost, and quality of care among this group of high 
geriatric risk will become increasingly important.  
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The second study examines the effect of Medicare Advantage enrollment on postacute 
utilization in a geographic market. Using Florida 2010-2014, the paper describes county-
level effects of MA enrollment on the postacute experiences of fee-for-service Medicare 
hospitalized patients. Analogous research done in the inpatient and outpatient setting 
describe significant positive spillover effects of MA into FFS, finding that increased MA 
enrollment decreased rates of inpatient and outpatient spending and utilization. This 
paper concludes that MA enrollment has little effect on postacute utilization and quality 
both within the overall Medicare market and separately within FFS and MA. Further 
payment policy changes to the MA program should not only monitor inpatient and 
outpatient utilization and outcomes but also other types of healthcare utilization and 
quality.  
 
The third study shifts the focus to analyze the care received by Medicare Advantage 
enrollees in nursing homes. The paper explores the association between quality and 
staffing levels and the percentage of MA patients in a nursing home facility. Using 
national data on nursing homes, the paper finds that high percentage of MA facilities are 
more likely to have greater registered nurse hours on staff but worse clinical quality. 
Even when national policies required the public reporting of quality measures in nursing 
homes to help patients select providers, there were minimal associations with changes in 
percentage of MA patients and quality metrics. The paper concludes that MA patients in 
nursing homes may be receiving differential care compared to other Medicare 
beneficiaries and that public reporting of quality may not have great influence on where 
MA patients receive their care. As MA plans continue to attract a larger share of the 
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Medicare population, understanding how MA enrollees and plans decide providers and 
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Medicare, the federal health insurance program, plays an important role in 
providing health and financial security to 60 million older people and younger people 
with disabilities. In 2017, Medicare spending accounted for 15% of total federal spending 
and 20% of the total national health spending (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 
2018). As an alternative to traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare program, private 
managed care plans have been widely available since the 1980s to Medicare 
beneficiaries. The main policy goal of this program, currently known as Medicare 
Advantage (MA) or Medicare Part C, was to compete with traditional fee-for-service 
Medicare to provide the same or expanded Medicare benefits at a lower cost. The role of 
private plans in Medicare has become increasingly important since nearly one third of 
beneficiaries is now enrolled in Medicare Advantage (Jacobson, Damico, Neuman, & 
Gold, 2017). 
Older adults on Medicare live with many health problems, including multiple 
chronic conditions and functional impairments. In 2016, nearly one third of beneficiaries 
had limitations to at least one activities of daily living and a quarter reported being in fair 
or poor health (Kaiser Family Foundation [KFF], 2019). As the population ages, the 
number of patients whose conditions necessitate complex and continuous management 
will likely increase within the Medicare program. For example, long-term care (LTC) 
services cover a continuous spectrum from infrequent informal care provided by family 
members to institutional care at nursing home facilities. Nursing homes provided mainly 
custodial care to long-stay residents in the 1970s and early 1980s (Grabowski, 2007). A 
series of policy changes resulted in an expansion of this sector, and by 2004, Medicare 
3 
paid for 14% of all nursing home expenditures through postacute services (Grabowski, 
2007). At the same time, the proportion of Medicare Advantage enrollees in nursing 
homes doubled between 2000-2013, reflective of the growth in the number of Medicare 
beneficiaries enrolled in MA plans (Jung, Li, Rahman, & Mor, 2018).  
For many of these medically complex Medicare beneficiaries, the need for 
postacute services generally precedes the need for long-term care services (Coleman, 
2003; Coleman & Boult, 2003; Grabowski, 2007; Murtaugh & Litke, 2002). Postacute 
care offers important rehabilitation and recuperation services after an acute care hospital 
stay. In 2015, traditional FFS Medicare outlay for these services, which includes skilled 
nursing facilities (SNF), home health (HH) agencies, inpatient rehabilitation facilities 
(IRF), and long-term care hospitals (LTCH), exceeded $60 billion (Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission [MedPAC], 2017). Discharges to postacute care facilities rose 
nearly 50% over the 15-year period between 1996-2010 and was the fastest growing 
major spending category for Medicare (Burke et al., 2015a, 2015b; Burke et al., 2016; 
Chandra, Dalton, & Holmes, 2013). As new payment models shift financial responsibility 
to include entire care episodes, there is now much interest in how capitated private MA 
plans incentivize care coordination and cost control in postacute contexts. 
Despite rapid growth in MA enrollment and the parallel phenomenon of increased 
demand for postacute care and nursing home services, little is known about use and 
quality of postacute and nursing home care within those Medicare beneficiaries enrolled 
in HMOs and other MA private plans. The goal of this thesis is to undertake three inter-
related policy relevant analyses to add to the knowledge base in this domain. 
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The first manuscript (Chapter 2) identifies risk factors associated with postacute 
utilization among approximately 3 million aged 65 and older hospitalized Medicare 
Advantage and Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries in Florida. We also go on to 
control for these risk factors to examine differences across the cohorts. This chapter relies 
hospital discharge data abstracted from inpatient billing claims from the state of Florida 
between the period 2010 and 2014.  
The second manuscript (Chapter 3) explores the impact of MA enrollment on 
postacute utilization within geographic markets across the state of Florida. By expanding 
the lens to examine market level relationships that may exist between MA and FFS 
Medicare at the county, an aim of this analysis is to explore the broader implications of 
capitated at-risk payment programs on care delivery. The main data source for this paper 
uses hospital discharge data from Florida (above) combined with MA and FFS 
administrative data publicly available from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
The third manuscript (Chapter 4) explores the potential impact of Medicare 
Advantage on overall nursing home care for its enrollees, including both postacute and 
long-term stay care.  This study explores the potential relationship between MA selection 
and use of nursing homes by staffing and quality levels before and after national nursing 
home quality reporting programs. The main source of data for this analysis is nursing 
home level datasets for almost 7,000 US nursing homes for the period 2000-2010 that 
includes facility characteristics and resident characteristics.   
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Review of Relevant Policy and Research Literature  
 This section reviews the relevant policies and literature but is not intended to be 
comprehensive or systematic review. The goals are to describe the current policy contexts 
and the emerging issues in health services research relevant to the thesis.  
 
Public and private health insurance 
The US healthcare system contains a complex array of public and private entities. 
Most notably, the public insurance program that covers older Americans, the Medicare 
program, contains privately administered insurance plans for seniors. The original 
Medicare program began its origin in 1965 through the Social Security Act as the federal 
health insurance program for people aged 65 and over, regardless of income, medical 
history, or health status. By the 1980s, private managed care organizations entered into 
the Medicare market through the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act. It authorized 
Medicare to contract with risk-based private health plans in exchange for a prospective, 
monthly, per-enrollee payment. The program’s current name, Medicare Part C or 
Medicare Advantage, currently enrolls one in three Medicare beneficiaries, and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections show Medicare Advantage (MA) 
enrollment on track to increase steadily through 2028 and to remain as a popular choice 
among Medicare beneficiaries.  
One premise of these privately administered managed care plans is to compete in 
containing health care costs by stimulating price and quality competition among plans, 
and studies have shown premiums and benefits to have a significant effect on plan 
selection in Medicare Advantage (Atherly, Dowd, & Feldman, 2004; Enthoven, 1993). 
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However, substantial favorable selection exists in MA plans that cause higher payments 
by Medicare to cover MA enrollees (McGuire, Newhouse, & Sinaiko, 2011). Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) estimated that Medicare paid 102% more to 
MA for the same beneficiary had they been in FFS in 2016 (MedPAC, 2017). To combat 
these high costs, enrollment restrictions and more substantial risk adjustments were 
implemented to reduce selection. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) also implemented 
payment cuts to MA plans in order to rein in spending. However, there is mixed evidence 
to suggest that favorable selection has disappeared from the MA program and unexpected 
increases in enrollment into these plans occurred after payment cuts (Brown, Duggan, 
Kuziemko, & Woolston, 2014; Landon et al., 2012; Mello, Stearns, Norton, & Ricketts, 
2003; Morrisey, Kilgore, Becker, Smith, & Delzell, 2013; Newhouse, Price, Huang, 
McWilliams, & Hsu, 2012; Newhouse, Price, McWilliams, Hsu, & McGuire, 2015).  
By joining MA, beneficiaries typically avoid the substantial cost-sharing that 
exists in traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare and additional premiums paid for 
supplementary coverage. MA beneficiaries not only enjoy the same hospital (Part A) and 
physician (Part B) benefits offered in FFS Medicare albeit with limited networks and 
utilization review, they also enjoy additional services. For example, in addition to 
generating savings for the Medicare program, plan costs were expected to be sufficiently 
low to also support supplemental benefits, such as dental and vision benefits. 
Furthermore, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) continue to propose 
increased flexibility in MA and redefine health-related supplemental benefits, such as 
coverage of non-skilled in-home supports and assistive devices (CMS, 2018).  
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Caring for older adults 
The Medicare program, in particular, bears the burden of caring for a growing 
percentage of older adults with multiple chronic conditions, functional limitations, 
disabilities, and cognitive impairments (Anderson, 2010; Joynt et al., 2017). For example, 
ninety-nine percent of Medicare expenditures are for beneficiaries with at least one 
chronic condition, and the frail elderly are forty-six percent more likely of being in the 
top ten percent of Medicare spending than disabled or chronically ill patients, largely 
driven by inpatient and postacute spending (Joynt et al., 2017). While the rise in 
postacute use and spending in the past decade can be attributed to the underlying need for 
these services among a growing chronically ill and frail Medicare cohort, financial 
incentives also play a large role, especially when there are unclear clinical rules 
concerning the legitimate use of postacute services. Traditional FFS Medicare’s payment 
system for hospitals and postacute care offers little incentive for judicious use of these 
services (Chen et al., 2017; Huckfeldt, Sood, Escarce, Grabowski, & Newhouse, 2014; 
McCall, Komisar, Petersons, & Moore, 2001; McCall, Korb, Petersons, & Moore, 2003). 
Whereas, comparatively, risk-based capitated Medicare Advantage plans have 
demonstrated some constraints in its use (Huckfeldt, Escarce, Rabideau, Karaca-Mandic, 
& Sood, 2017; Kumar et al., 2018; Waxman et al., 2016).  
Although Medicare has borne out the majority of the responsibility to care for an 
aging population, custodial nursing home care, a large expense for many seniors, is not 
covered by Medicare. Instead, for enrollees that meet low-income and resource eligibility 
thresholds, it is covered by Medicaid. The bifurcated coverage of acute and long-term 
care under Medicare and Medicaid, respectively, creates narrow interests in limiting each 
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program’s share of costs and management of high quality care. There has been relative 
little policy attention to risk-based capitated care models that serve a frail, chronically ill, 
and institutionally based population (Eng, Pedulla, Eleazer, McCann, & Fox, 1997; 
Grabowski, 2009; Hirth, Baskins, & Dever-Bumba, 2009; Kane, Flood, Bershadsky, & 
Keckhafer, 2004; Kane, Flood, Keckhafer, Bershadsky, & Lum, 2002). Examples of 
these programs from the past few decades include Programs of All-Inclusive Care for the 
Elderly (PACE), EverCare model, and Medicare special needs plans (SNPs). Many of 
these models struggle to receive enough federal support and to expand. For example, fifty 
years after PACE began in the 1970s, the program still grapple with efforts to serve more 
of the nursing home-eligible population nationally (Hirth et al., 2009). The EverCare 
demonstration model concluded in 2002 without further expansion by CMS, and MA 
SNP enrollment are concentrated among a small number of states (KFF, 2008). As 
Medicare Advantage continues to be a popular choice, and as costs continue to rise in the 
current form of care delivery, a series of new financing and delivery models should 
integrate health and long-term care services that better serve a growing cohort of older 
Americans.  
 
Emerging issues in health services 
This dissertation addresses emerging issues of risk adjustment and quality 
reporting that exist under the contexts discussed. The role of risk adjustment is important 
in health services research for three particular reasons. First, it can identify need for 
disease management. This is especially pertinent when twenty percent of the population 
accounts for over eighty percent of healthcare spending (Berk & Monheit, 2001; CBO, 
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2005). Second, risk adjustment ensures appropriate payment when research and policy 
outcomes of interest are based on utilization and cost. Finally, risk adjustment can close 
quality gaps by normalizing the underlying health status of patients being cared for across 
providers. While there has been significant advancement in recent decades to use 
administrative-based data to identify clinically high-risk patients (i.e. Charlson 
comorbidity index, Elixhauser comorbidity index, Hierarchical Conditions Category), 
there is now a greater push on the systematic documentation, identification, and 
adjustment of “social risk factors” to ensure equity and fairness (National Academies of 
Sciences, 2016b). New and emerging data sources and the creative use of existing data 
are needed to accurately and reliably collect and incorporate into risk measurement and 
payment ((National Academies of Sciences, 2016a). The recognition is that, beyond the 
traditional clinical characteristics found in medical billing data, other patient 
characteristics may affect healthcare outcomes and costs.  
The second emerging issue that the dissertation addresses is the growing need for 
transparency in healthcare. In particular, the use of publicly reported quality measures to 
direct consumers to the most appropriate care. The phenomenon is not new (Epstein, 
1995; Marshall, Shekelle, Leatherman, & Brook, 2000; Sinaiko, Eastman, & Rosenthal, 
2012). New York and Pennsylvania developed the first reporting systems for mortality 
rates after coronary-artery bypass surgery in the early 1990s. The National Committee for 
Quality Assurance, which develops quality measures and accredits health plans, also 
began in the early 1990s. Since then, several nonprofit and coalition based groups, along 
with the federal government, have emerged to develop, standardize, and promote public 
reporting of quality measures (i.e. National Quality Forum, Leapfrog Group, CMS). 
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Nursing home quality have been the inquiry of many federal and state investigations and 
regulations, mostly as a result of state and federal facility licensure and certification 
requirement and funding (Castle & Ferguson, 2010). In 2002, CMS began a national 
Nursing Home Quality Initiative (NHQI) as a mechanism to give consumers information 
and to encourage nursing homes to improve their quality. Since NHQI, there has been a 
proliferation of national public reporting programs; examples include health insurance 
plans in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) exchanges and Medicare Advantage offerings, 
physicians, hospitals, and long-term care providers using Medicare Compare websites, 
Health Employer Data Information Set (HEDIS), and Consumer Assessment of 
Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS). The increasing level of public disclosure of 
healthcare performance is inevitable and will continue to reflect greater demands for 
information and accountability in the field.  
The growing cost of national healthcare expenditures has brought forth payment 
reform and new financing structures as top priorities in public policy debates. The shift 
from volume-driven services to value-driven services is demonstrated by the recent 
proliferation of various value-based programs such as pay-for-performance, bundled 
payments, accountable care organizations, and global budgets. Under these types of care, 
risk adjustment and quality programs play prominent roles in advancing healthcare 
delivery and ensuring equitable design of healthcare policies and programs. Capitated 
systems, such as the Medicare Advantage program, can elucidate key learnings on how 
these types of value-based programs deliver and influence care. 
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Overview of Dissertation and Analytical Approach 
The subsequent chapters of this dissertation examine the nature of Medicare 
Advantage on postacute and nursing home use and outcomes. Drawing upon a range of 
methodologies to assess how the MA program utilizes postacute and nursing home care, 
the following chapters explore if MA differentially utilizes postacute care from 
traditional fee-for-service Medicare, if that differential care pattern influences FFS care 
delivery, and if MA plans respond to quality reporting. 
Chapter 2 examines the postacute experiences of Medicare patients discharged 
from an inpatient hospital stay in Florida hospitals from 2010-2014. Florida represents 10 
percent of all Medicare Advantage enrollees nationally, and 42 percent of Florida 
Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in MA. We conceptualize measures of geriatric risk, 
which represents factors pertinent to frailty, functional limitations, and other risk factors 
in older adults, and explore the role of risk adjustment on postacute utilization. Using 
these additional factors in multivariate regressions to control for selection into MA plans, 
we find that MA discharges are more likely to be discharged to home and home health, 
are less likely to be discharged to skilled nursing, and are less likely to be readmitted 
within 30 days than FFS discharges. We propose that non-traditional comorbidity factors 
should be included in payment policies and conclude that MA plans may be utilizing less 
resource intensive services for their patients than traditional FFS Medicare.  
In Chapter 3, using methods to combat potential endogeneity between healthcare 
utilization and Medicare Advantage insurance entrance and enrollment in these plans, we 
explore relationships that exist within geographic markets using the same Florida dataset. 
We use instrumental variables estimation to model the effect of MA enrollment at the 
12 
county level on FFS postacute utilization. We find weak relationships between MA 
enrollment on FFS postacute use. This result suggests that MA practice patterns may not 
influence FFS delivery in postacute services, unlike findings in inpatient and outpatient 
services. Additional payments to MA plans should carefully consider the types of 
beneficial spillover effects the program has on medical services.  
Chapter 4 uses a separate dataset on nursing homes at the national level from 
2000-2010 to explore longitudinal relationships of quality and the type of residents 
nursing homes serve.  
Leveraging policy changes occurring in the study period, we use a pre-post design and 
multivariate linear regression models to investigate whether nursing homes receiving 
high quality scores experienced higher enrollments by MA patients after scores were 
publicly reported. We find that there are no changes in the share of MA nursing home 
residents post public reporting, suggesting that MA plans may not be contracting with 
nursing homes based on publicly reported quality.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and discusses the limitations and strengths of 
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THE ROLE OF GERIATRIC RISK ON POSTACUTE UTILIZATION AND 






Background: Postacute care represents important rehabilitation and recuperation services 
delivered to Medicare beneficiaries after an acute care hospital stay. Of particular interest 
within the cohort of postacute users is the frail elderly and other vulnerable populations 
with disabilities and multimorbid conditions associated with high cost and need. The 
impact of different payment incentives on postacute utilization and outcomes in this high-
risk cohort has not been fully explored. This study helps address this gap by 1) assessing 
the impact of geriatric risk factors on postacute utilization and outcomes among 
hospitalized Medicare patients, and 2) examining whether differences in postacute 
utilization between Medicare Advantage and fee-for-service Medicare patients persist 
after controlling for geriatric conditions.  
 
Methods: Hospital discharge abstract data from Florida from 2010 to 2014 is used for 
this study. Geriatric risk concepts are conceptualized and step-wise multivariate linear 
regressions are used to study the associations of geriatric risk on postacute utilization and 
readmissions among Medicare Advantage and fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries. 
 
Results: The study found that geriatric risk concepts are independently associated with 
postacute utilization and quality in addition to patient demographics and traditional 
measure of comorbidity. High geriatric risk patients are less likely to be discharged home 
or to home health care. There are also differences between MA and fee-for-service 
Medicare postacute use, after accounting for patient demographics, comorbidity, and 
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geriatric risk. Hospitalized Medicare Advantage patients are more likely to be discharged 
home or to home health services than fee-for-service Medicare patients and less likely to 
be readmitted within 30 days of hospital discharge.  
 
Conclusion: As services are increasingly bundled and paid for on the basis of achieving 
quality targets, this study’s results can be applied to help optimally match high risk 




The Affordable Care Act included provisions designed to reduce hospital 
spending and increase value. Programs such as the Hospital Readmissions Reduction 
Program (HRRP), Hospital Value Based Purchasing (VBP) Program, and bundled 
payment programs all focus on the hospital stay and associated transition periods. 
Postacute care (PAC) offers important rehabilitation and recuperation services for 
Medicare beneficiaries after an acute care hospital stay. Recent efforts aim to bring 
postacute providers under the same payment incentives as current acute care programs 
(i.e. home health VBP and skilled nursing facility VBP). Postacute spending is one of the 
key drivers of geographic variation in per capita fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare spending 
(Hussey, Huckfeldt, Hirshman, & Mehrotra, 2015; Newhouse  & Garber 2013). In 2015, 
traditional Medicare outlay for these services, which includes skilled nursing facilities 
(SNF), home health (HH) agencies, inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRF), and long-term 
care hospitals (LTCH), exceeded $60 billion (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
[MedPAC], 2017). Discharges to PAC facilities rose nearly 50% (1.2 million more 
discharges) over the 15-year period between 1996-2010, making it the fastest growing of 
Medicare’s major spending categories (Burke et al., 2015a, 2015b). Despite this rapid 
increase in postacute spending, there is little improvement in reductions of Medicare 
discharged patients’ mortality during the same period (Chandra, Dalton, & Holmes, 
2013).  
Of particular interest within the cohort of postacute users is the frail elderly and 
other vulnerable populations with disabilities and multimorbid conditions (Joynt et al., 
2017; Long, 2017). Fifty-one percent of patients discharged to PAC facilities are aged 80 
24 
years and older and 40% of hospitalizations in this age group end with a postacute stay 
(Burke et al., 2015a). The prevalence of frailty among adults aged 65 years and older is 
estimated at 15%, with the highest prevalence at 38% in those aged 85 years and older 
(Bandeen-Roche et al., 2015). Much of the care delivered to this cohort of medically 
complex elderly is inadequate, particularly during care transitions, where studies have 
shown patients are often unprepared for self-management roles. Furthermore, safety 
issues arise because of medication errors and incomplete information transfer across 
settings (Coleman, 2003). Despite recent research that suggests that functional status and 
frail factors outperform comorbidity in predicting outcomes of acute care (Greysen, 
Stijacic Cenzer, Auerbach, & Covinsky, 2015; Johnston, Wen, Hockenberry, & Joynt 
Maddox, 2018; Meddings et al., 2017; Shih et al., 2015), only a few studies have directly 
examined the relationship between postacute use for Medicare beneficiaries and geriatric 
risk factors, such as frailty or functional impairment (Burke et al., 2016; Greysen, Stijacic 
Cenzer, Boscardin, & Covinsky, 2017; Kumar et al., 2017; Middleton et al., 2016). None 
examine nor compare postacute use within a capitated financial system for this high need 
population.   
As an alternative to FFS Medicare, private managed care plans, known as 
Medicare Advantage (MA), have become increasingly important; nearly one third of 
beneficiaries are now enrolled in MA. In contrast to traditional FFS Medicare, MA plans 
negotiate contracts with providers of PAC and pay for their services out of the monthly 
capitated payments the plans receive for each covered enrollee. Capitated MA plans 
benefit financially from avoiding unnecessary postacute care, and thus may have a 
greater interest in carefully selecting and coordinating post-discharge care than do 
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providers who are not at risk. Previous studies have shown that MA plans often require 
prior authorization and the use of a preferred network of PAC providers (MedPAC, 2015; 
Meyers, Mor, & Rahman, 2018). MA enrollees also experience higher cost sharing for 
skilled nursing facilities and hospitalizations compared to FFS Medicare beneficiaries 
without supplemental coverage (Keohane, Grebla, Mor, & Trivedi, 2015). For a 
medically complex cohort of enrollees, these restrictions may be a deterrent for MA 
enrollment or once enrolled, an impediment for necessary postacute use. Studies have 
examined differential postacute use between MA and FFS patients, finding that MA 
patients utilize less PAC and lower intensity of these services (Huckfeldt, Escarce, 
Rabideau, Karaca-Mandic, & Sood, 2017; Kumar et al., 2018; Waxman et al., 2016).  
The impact of MA payment incentives on postacute utilization and outcomes for 
higher risk patients has not been explored. To help address this knowledge gap, this study 
assesses the impact of geriatric risk factors on postacute utilization and outcomes in 
hospitalized Medicare patients. The study also examines whether differences in postacute 
utilization between MA and FFS patients persist after controlling for geriatric related 
risk. Understanding how MA plans manage the hospital to postacute transitions for this 
high-cost and high-need population may also provide insights on whether capitated 
systems provide care for this population more efficiently and appropriately compared to 
FFS Medicare.  
 
Background  
Accounting for social risk factors 
26 
As policy goals move toward incentivizing high quality and efficient healthcare 
systems and reducing disparities, payment strategies should also align with those 
incentives. In a 2017 report “Accounting for Social Risk Factors in Medicare Payment,” 
the National Academy of Science found compelling reason to include various risk factors 
in Medicare quality and measurement programs (National Academies of Sciences, 2016).  
An expanding stream of literature examines the role of social risk factors on 
various VBP programs in the acute setting and find that without accounting for these 
social factors, providers serving disproportionate share of low-income patients would be 
unfairly penalized under such programs (Calvillo-King et al., 2013; Kind et al., 2014; 
Shih et al., 2015). For example, social characteristics such as dual eligible status and 
area-level socioeconomic status such as educational attainment, poverty rates, household 
income, and proportion of residents living alone accounted for 54% of the difference 
estimated with current Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) clinical risk 
adjustment in the HRRP (Roberts et al., 2018).  
Beyond these social factors, other research also specifically examines the role of 
functional limitations and cognitive risk factors not captured by traditional comorbidity 
measures on readmissions and other healthcare utilization in FFS Medicare cohort 
(Greysen et al., 2015; Johnston et al., 2018; Meddings et al., 2017). Self-reported 
neuropsychological and functional impairment are common in Medicare beneficiaries 
and are associated with $900-$3,000 higher Medicare total annual cost of care, even after 
accounting for comorbidities (Johnston et al., 2018). Both Meddings et al. (2017) and 
Greysen et al. (2015) find that functional impairment, disability and social determinants 
of health is associated with increased readmission risk for pneumonia, heart failure, and 
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acute myocardial infarction hospitalized FFS Medicare patients beyond current CMS risk 
adjustment.  
Studies that examine the role of these functional and cognitive indicators in FFS 
Medicare postacute users find that they are prevalent and lead to higher healthcare 
utilization and costs (Burke et al., 2016; Greysen et al., 2017; Kumar et al., 2017; 
Middleton et al., 2016). For example, functional impairment has been associated with 
greater Medicare costs for postacute users that cuts across clinical conditions (Greysen et 
al., 2017). Cognitive and motor functional status are some of the strongest predictors of 
30-day readmissions following postacute (Burke et al., 2016; Middleton et al., 2016). 
Shih et al. (2016) examine all inpatient rehabilitation users from 2002-2011 and find that 
functional impairment models outperforms demographic and comorbidity models in 
predicting 30-day readmissions. However, no research examines the role of these 
conditions in the Medicare Advantage population and its impact on postacute use. 
Further, no comparison has been done between a capitated system and fee-for-service 
system to test if postacute utilization and outcomes differ among this vulnerable cohort of 
older adults. 
 
Differences in MA and FFS postacute utilization 
Current studies that examine differences in postacute utilization and outcomes 
between MA and traditional FFS Medicare enrollees do not control for these functional 
and geriatric conditions, which may bias results if MA patients are less functionally 
dependent or frail (Huckfeldt et al., 2017; Waxman et al., 2016). Previous studies have 
suggested that there is favorable selection into MA plans from FFS Medicare, and while 
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new risk adjustment models instituted in 2004-2007 may have tempered some of the 
original selection, the CMS hierarchical condition categories (HCC) model do not adjust 
beyond demographic and clinical diagnosis (McWilliams, Hsu, & Newhouse, 2012; 
Newhouse & McGuire, 2014; Shimada et al., 2009). In self-reported health, beneficiaries 
who rate their health as “fair” or “poor” are less likely to be enrolled in MA than 
beneficiaries in “good” health (Shimada et al., 2009). Beneficiaries in fair and poor health 
tend to be associated with less positive Consumer Assessment of Health Care Providers 
and Systems (CAHPS) ratings than better health beneficiaries, and differences in these 
scores between fair/poor health patients versus better health patients tend to be larger in 
MA patients than in FFS suggesting there may be opportunities for improving 
experiences of vulnerable beneficiaries within MA plans (Elliott, Haviland, Orr, 
Hambarsoomian, & Cleary, 2011).  
Studies that do control for cognitive and physical functioning examine limited 
clinical cohorts and postacute destinations, and only examine discharges from hospitals 
receiving disproportionate share (DSH) payments (Huckfeldt et al., 2017; Kumar et al., 
2018; Waxman et al., 2016). For example, Kumar et al. (2018) examine rehabilitation use 
of MA and FFS Medicare patients with hip fractures from hospitals receiving DSH 
payments. They find that MA patients are less cognitively impaired upon postacute 
admission than FFS patients, and that after adjusting for activity of daily living (ADL), 
pain, body mass index (BMI), and cognitive scores, MA patients are more likely to be 
discharged to the community successfully after rehabilitation and have shorter course of 
rehabilitation. Waxman et al. (2016) compare home health utilization between MA and 
FFS patients, controlling for median household income in the zip-code and proportion of 
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households with one resident, and find that MA beneficiaries use less home health but 
regional factors affect utilization independent of insurance coverage. Huckfeldt et al. 
(2017) examine cohorts of joint replacement, stroke, and heart failure from hospitals 
receiving DSH payments discharged to SNF and IRF, controlling for dual eligible status, 
Part D Low-Income subsidy status, and diagnoses-based clinical characteristics (i.e. 
Elixhauser and condition-specific severity measures). They find that MA patients are less 
likely to be admitted to IRFs and have shorter lengths of stay in SNFs than FFS patients, 
while finding no differences in observable characteristics between the two cohorts. These 
limitations restrict our understanding of payment incentives on postacute use because 
specific clinical cohorts to limited postacute destinations from DSH hospitals may not be 
representative of the broader Medicare context nor do they provide context on possible 
substitution of services (i.e. low-cost home health services) by capitated systems.  
  
New contribution 
 This study expands on previous work through two mechanisms. First, it tests for 
administrative claims-based geriatric characteristics prevalent in older adults that may not 
be captured by disease characteristics assessed in previous studies. Prior studies that 
examine frailty and other types of functional status indicators use survey and assessment 
information, which are difficult to obtain and to apply to a large population. Recent 
studies have advanced the use of administrative claims datasets to examine frailty and 
other conditions prevalent in frail and disabled older adults (Kan et al., 2018; Kim et al., 
2017; Segal et al., 2017). The ability to use readily available administrative claims data to 
capture these conditions would prove useful categorizing large cohorts of patients not 
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subject to in-person clinical assessments (i.e. MDS, OASIS, IRF-PAI) or Medicare 
surveys (i.e. MCBS, HRS, NHATS). For case managers and post discharge facilities with 
limited assessment information, the ability to target high risk patients using inpatient 
claims data for postacute use may prove useful to coordinate care transitions.  
Second, this study expands similar analyses beyond only hospitals that receive 
disproportionate share payments, which are potentially biased toward safety-net and 
urban hospitals (Jha, Orav, & Epstein, 2011; Joynt & Jha, 2013), to all hospitals located 
in a large state with Medicare beneficiaries to capture the variability in hospital practices 
and quality. We also expand the population studied to all four types of postacute facilities 
covered by Medicare and examine all postacute users and for several common disease 
cohorts. The expansion to cover all postacute facilities may provide insights as to whether 
patients are transitioned to PAC differentially based on risk categories, or by payor, to 
lower or higher cost facilities. This study’s assessment of the impact of payment coverage 
on postacute utilization and outcome will be useful to policymakers who may be 
interested in evaluating MA relative to the FFS Medicare program.  
This study examines the role of various geriatric characteristics in predicting 
postacute utilization and outcomes in hospitalized MA and FFS Medicare patients. To 
determine a potential explanation for differences in use of postacute care and patient 
outcomes, the study investigates whether these geriatric characteristics could explain 
some of the differences in postacute use between MA and FFS hospitalized patients. 
Specifically, hospital discharge data in Florida from 2010 to 2014 is used to describe and 
compare MA and FFS hospitalized beneficiaries in terms of their discharge to postacute, 




Healthcare cost and utilization project’s (HCUP) state inpatient databases (SID) 
includes the universe of all discharges, including information on insurance provider and 
discharge destination. The study uses data for Florida 2010-2014. There are several 
advantages to using Florida. First, Florida accounts for 10% of all Medicare Advantage 
enrollees nationally (Kaiser Family Foundation [KFF], 2017). Second, 42% of Medicare 
beneficiaries are enrolled in Medicare Advantage in Florida in 2017 (Jacobson, Damico, 
Neuman, & Gold, 2017). Third, Florida SID reports whether Medicare enrollees are in 
FFS or an MA plan and their discharge destination, including postacute facilities. Finally, 
Florida datasets include visit links to allow for identification of readmissions to inpatient 
hospitals.  
The study focused on Florida hospitals 2010-2014 for Medicare beneficiaries with 
an inpatient hospital stay who were either discharged to home or to a postacute facility. 
All other discharges were excluded (i.e. left against medical advice, died, discharged to 
hospice care), as well as patients who did not reside in Florida, who were less than 65 
years of age, and observations from hospitals with less than ten postacute discharges each 
year by Medicare patients. First, the overall sample was examined, and then the sample 
was restricted to those Medicare beneficiaries receiving inpatient care for three common 
conditions receiving postacute care: stroke (DRG 61-66), joint replacement (DRG 469, 
470), heart failure (DRG 291-293) to create a more homogenous clinical cohort receiving 
postacute service. Because there is large variation in receiving postacute services, 
restricting to common disease cohorts receiving postacute care can potentially isolate 
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further utilization differences as a result of payment incentives and patient characteristics 
(Kane, Lin, & Blewett, 2002). Beneficiaries were determined to be enrolled in traditional 
FFS Medicare or in Medicare Advantage for the inpatient stay through the state inpatient 
discharge data by primary payer type. In the Florida sample, more than 45% of all 
inpatient discharges are attributable to Medicare patients, and 31% of those were in MA. 
Of these Medicare discharges, 89% are to home and postacute facilities, with hospice 
care as the next most popular discharge destination (4%) and inpatient death as next most 
prevalent discharge status, accounting for 3% of discharges.  
 
Study variables and measures 
Geriatric risk 
The geriatric risk measure was constructed from diagnoses and procedure codes 
from the inpatient hospitalization. The original measure was developed in Medicare 
cohort to predict healthcare utilization (Weiner et al., 1996) and has been since adapted 
by clinicians and geriatricians to capture concepts prevalent in frail older adults and 
adults with disabilities and other multi-morbid conditions. This geriatric risk measure has 
been shown to predict higher healthcare utilization and outcomes beyond traditional 
comorbidity measures (Wu et al., 2019), and it is a modified version of capturing frailty 
in administrative claims dataset (Joynt et al., 2017). In comparing this claims-based 
measure against a validated survey-based frailty measure on health utilization and 
functional outcomes, claim-based model performed as well if not better as measured by 
c-statistics (Wu et al., 2019). These conditions include vision problems, urinary and fecal 
incontinence, difficulty walking, history of falls, pressure ulcers, dementia/cognitive 
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impairment, lack of social support, weight loss, and malnutrition (Health). Based on the 
distribution, we categorize the cohort into non-risk (meeting 0 conditions), moderate risk 
(meeting 1 condition), and high risk (meeting 2+ conditions). The distribution of these 
concepts is presented in Appendix Tables 1-2.  
 
Risk adjustment 
Patient-level adjusters include age, race, and sex, derived from the HCUP hospital 
discharge file. In addition to demographics, Charlson comorbidity index was constructed 
from diagnoses codes of the inpatient hospitalization (Deyo, Cherkin, & Ciol, 1992). The 
Charlson was used because of the feasibility of its calculation using only inpatient claims 
codes compared to other comorbidity measures that utilize both outpatient and inpatient 
information (i.e Elixhauser, HCCs, ACGs), given that we do not have outpatient 
information (Charlson, Pompei, Ales, & MacKenzie, 1987). Condition–specific severity 
measures indicators were also derived and included for each disease specific cohort 
(Buntin et al., 2005; Huckfeldt, Mehrotra, & Hussey, 2016). For clinical cohort models, 
joint replacements have indications whether the patient had morbid obesity; stroke has 
indication if it was hemorrhagic; heart failure has indication if it was chronic or acute.  
Finally, socioeconomic factors from the Area Health Resource File (AHRF) and 
the American Community Survey (ACS) were used to merge to the patients’ county of 
residence. The number of skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies, and physicians 
per capita were used as supply-side controls to control for potential access to postacute 
facilities and intensity of hospital care. Controls for socioeconomic status were also used 
and include county’s % poverty, % unemployment, median income quartile, and an 
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indicator for metropolitan status. These controls are used because MA plans tend to 
operate in urban counties with higher FFS spending. Family composition was also 
controlled by using the county’s percentage of adults older than 65 years of old who are 
married as literature has suggested family support may influence discharge destinations 
(Kane et al., 2002).  
 
Outcome variables 
Postacute utilization. Several outcome measures are constructed using the HCUP 
data. First, the probability of discharge home (versus a postacute facility) was constructed 
using the discharge destination information. Among the PAC users, the probability of 
entering each of the four types of postacute facilities (skilled nursing, home health, 
inpatient rehabilitation, and long-term care hospital) was also examined.  
Inpatient utilization. Second, both the length of stay and total cost of the inpatient 
hospital stay were examined for postacute users to measure the severity of patients 
receiving postacute use care. The HCUP data reports total inpatient facility charges, 
which can be converted to costs by multiplying the hospital’s cost-to-charge ratio 
obtained from HCUP. The cost-to-charge ratio is calculated annually for each hospital 
using information from the hospital’s Medicare Cost Reports.  
Postacute outcome. The HCUP data also allow for the calculation of hospital 
readmissions as a measure of quality of care through revisit links. This quality measure is 
constructed by first excluding planned inpatient readmissions, and then linking revisit 
variables within the year to calculate 30-day readmissions from the inpatient hospital 
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stay. Thus, the fourth outcome measure assessed is the all-cause unplanned inpatient 
readmission within 30-days after a discharge to postacute care.  
 
Statistical method 
Cross-sectional within hospital analyses were performed, comparing episodes of 
care following hospital discharges for patients with Medicare Advantage and FFS 
Medicare coverage. First, differences in patient composition were investigated by 
comparing both groups of patients in their demographic characteristics (sex, age, race and 
ethnicity), Charlson comorbidity index, condition-specific severity measure, geriatric risk 
categories, and socioeconomic factors as described above.  
Then, the association of geriatric risk on postacute utilization and outcomes was 
assessed for MA and FFS separately using multivariate linear regressions. For binary 
outcomes, the coefficients indicate the predicted probabilities of each outcome. 
Goodness-of-fit test are reported for each type of model specification (R2, root mean 
squared error, and c-statistic). First, base models of age, race/ethnicity, race, Charlson 
comorbidity index, and socioeconomic status were run in predicting outcomes of 
discharges home, 30-day readmissions, inpatient lengths of stay and cost, and postacute 
destination. Then, geriatric risk categories were added to test if these factors are 
independently associated with utilization and outcomes. All models also adjusted for the 
discharging hospital, year of the hospital discharge, and clustered error terms at the 
hospital level to account for correlation of model within hospitals. These results are 
presented in Table 2 and 3 for MA and FFS patients. Results for each of the three distinct 
disease specific cohorts is presented in Appendix Tables 3-4.  
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To compare postacute utilization and outcomes between MA and FFS 
hospitalized patients, multivariate linear regressions were run to test for differences after 
adjusting for geriatric risk factors. In the main analyses, the full Medicare hospitalized 
sample was compared on the same series of outcomes as described above. All models 
adjusted for demographic characteristics (age, sex, race/ethnicity), clinical status 
(condition specific severity, Charlson comorbidity index), geriatric risk, and 
socioeconomic factors. To account for differences in the hospitals from which the two 
groups of patients were discharged, the main regression specifications also adjusted for 
the discharging hospital; thus, the estimated differences again reflect within-hospital 
differences in postacute care received by hospitalized patients. The year of the hospital 
discharge was also adjusted to account for yearly differences. Finally, error terms are 
clustered at the hospital level to account for correlation of model within hospitals. 
Subsequently, models are also run in each disease specific cohort of stroke, joint 
replacement, and heart failure. 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
For total cost outcome, multivariate linear models using log costs were also run as 
sensitivity analyses given the heavily skewed distribution in inpatient costs (Appendix 
Figure 1, Appendix Tables 5-6. Postacute destinations are also modeled using 
multinomial logit models to account for categorical outcomes. The relative risk ratios of 
these estimates are presented in Appendix Tables 9-10. Logistic models were run for 
outcomes of discharge home and 30 days readmissions to confirm linear probability 
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models (Appendix Tables 11-12). Outcomes of 30 day readmissions are also tested for 




3,098,369 Medicare discharges to home or postacute facilities occurred during 
2010-2014 in Florida. Fifty-two percent of these discharges were to a postacute facility. 
Thirty-one percent of all discharges to home and postacute were covered by MA, whereas 
27% of all discharges to postacute were covered by MA (Table 1). Of postacute 
discharges, patients with FFS coverage were older and more likely to be female and 
white. Additional clinical characteristics indicate that FFS patients discharged were not 
sicker as measured by the Charlson comorbidity index, but they were more likely to be 
categorized as high geriatric risk than MA discharges based on geriatric risk categories. 
Eleven percent of postacute FFS patients discharged were categorized as high risk 
compared to 8% of postacute MA discharges. Compared to MA discharges, discharges 
covered by FFS were also less likely to be discharged home (44% vs. 56%) and more 
likely to be readmitted to the hospital within 30 days after a postacute stay (21% vs. 
18%). FFS postacute discharges were also more likely to be in skilled nursing facilities 
(SNFs) (49% vs. 45%) and inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs) (7% vs. 4%) and less 





Geriatric risk is a robust predictor of postacute utilization (Table 2). When the 
measure of geriatric risk categories is added in addition to demographic, comorbidities, 
and socioeconomic factors, geriatric risk categories are independently associated in a 
dose response fashion. In the MA population, discharges with high geriatric risk are 40% 
less likely to be discharged home compared to non-risk discharges; discharges that are 
categorized as moderate risk are 26% less likely to be discharged home. Similarly, in the 
FFS population high risk discharges are 35% less likely to be discharged home than non-
risk discharged patients, and moderate risk patients are 24% less likely compared to those 
with no risk. In both MA and FFS discharges, high geriatric risk postacute patients stay 
longer in the inpatient setting and cost more than non-risk patients (MA: 1.25 days, 
$1,892, p<0.01; FFS: 1.23 days, $1,433 p<0.01, respectively). Moderate risk postacute 
discharges also stay longer and cost more than non-risk discharges but the effect is 
attenuated. There are smaller effects of geriatric risk on 30-day readmissions, where the 
association predicts <1% likelihood between high and moderate risk discharges to non-
risk discharges. These results remain robust in disease specific cohort models (Appendix 
Table 3) and in corresponding logistic models (Appendix Table 11). We found 
improvements in corresponding goodness-of-fit tests throughout geriatric risk models. 
In addition, high geriatric risk discharges are discharged to postacute destinations 
differentially than non-risk discharges (Table 3). Compared to non-risk discharges, high-
risk discharges are more likely to go to SNFs (26%-28%; p<0.01) and less likely to go to 
HHA (28%-30%; p<0.01) in both MA and FFS. The association is attenuated in moderate 
risk discharges. High and moderate risk discharges are also slightly more likely to go to 
IRFs and LTCHs than non-risk discharges though the association is small. These results 
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remain robust in disease specific cohort models (Appendix Table 4) and in multinomial 
logit models (Appendix Table 9). For discharges to home and home health, high geriatric 
risk is associated with increased probability of being readmitted within 30 days compared 
to non-risk discharges across MA and FFS discharges, though the effect is small at 1-2% 
(p<0.01) (Appendix Table 7). For discharges to more care intensive facilities, such as 
SNFs, high risk discharges are less likely to be readmitted within 30 days compared to 
non-risk discharges across MA and FFS, though again the effect is small at 1% (p<0.01).  
 
Postacute utilization and outcomes between MA and FFS 
Differences in postacute utilization and outcomes persist between MA and FFS 
patient discharges after controlling for geriatric risk (Figure 1 and Table 4). MA patients 
are 6% more likely to be discharged home than FFS counterparts (6%, p<0.01). MA 
postacute discharges have similar inpatient lengths of stay but are more likely to cost 
more for their inpatient stay than FFS postacute discharges and less likely to be 
readmitted in 30 days ($585, p<0.01; 4%, p<0.01). These results remain robust in 
corresponding logistic models (Appendix Table 12). Compared to FFS postacute 
discharges, MA postacute discharges are more likely to use HHAs (5%, p<0.01) and less 
likely to use IRFs (4%, p<0.01) and LTCHs (1%, p<0.01). In multinomial logit models 
(Appendix Table 10), MA discharges are less likely to use these resource intensive 
destinations (SNFs, IRFs, and LTCHs vs. HHAs) compared to FFS discharges. Among 
all discharge destinations, MA patients are less likely to be readmitted within 30 days 
compared to FFS discharges (Appendix Table 8). MA home, SNF, and HHA discharges 
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are 1% less likely to be readmitted compared to FFS (p<0.01). MA IRF and LTCH 
discharges are 14%-16% less likely to be readmitted compared to FFS (p<0.01).  
Differences in postacute utilization and outcomes in specific disease cohorts were 
also examined (Table 5). For stroke discharges, MA discharges are more likely to go 
home (2%, p<0.01), less likely to be readmitted (10%, p<0.01), and differ in their 
postacute destination than FFS discharges. They are more likely to go to SNFs (9%, 
p<0.01) and HHAs (4%, p<0.01) and less likely to go to IRFs (13%, p<0.01) than FFS. 
For joint replacement discharges, there are fewer differences. MA discharges are less 
likely to be readmitted (5%, p<0.01) and go to IRFs (6%, p<0.01) and more likely to go 
to SNFs (5%, p<0.01). There are no differences in the probability of being discharged 
home and in lengths of stay and cost of the hospitalization between MA and FFS joint 
replacement discharges. Finally, for congestive heart failure discharges, MA discharges 
are less likely to go to SNFs (4%, p<0.01) and more likely to go to HHA (7%, p<0.01) 
compared to FFS discharges. MA discharges are also less likely to be readmitted (2%, 




We find that geriatric risk factors that can be measured using administrative 
claims are associated with higher postacute utilization among hospitalized Medicare 
patients. Further, we find postacute utilization and outcome differences persists between 
Medicare Advantage and FFS Medicare patient discharges after controlling for 
demographic, comorbidities, socioeconomic, and geriatric risk factors. High geriatric risk 
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patients are less likely to be discharged home or to home health care, more likely to have 
longer lengths of inpatient stay, cost more, and more likely to be discharged to skilled 
nursing facilities. Hospitalized MA patients are more likely to be discharged home than 
FFS patients. Furthermore, hospitalized MA discharges who utilize postacute are less 
likely to be readmitted within 30 days and are more likely to be discharged to home 
health agencies than FFS discharges. However, MA inpatient total cost exceeds their FFS 
counterparts. This may suggest that MA plans may be managing their patients better than 
FFS in that those who are truly sick (i.e. higher IP costs) are the ones more likely to be 
utilizing postacute services.  
For specific disease cohorts, MA also utilize postacute destinations differently 
than FFS. For heart failure patients, MA discharges are less likely to be discharged to 
SNFs and IRFs and more likely to be discharged to HHA. For joint replacement patients, 
MA discharges are more likely to utilize SNFs and less likely to utilize IRFs. For stroke 
patients, MA discharges are more likely to be discharged to SNFs and HHA, but less 
likely to be discharged to IRFs.  Despite differential discharge destinations, MA 
discharges do not have worse outcomes (as measured by 30 day readmissions) by 
different discharge destinations. Monitoring where FFS patients are discharged to provide 
high quality care at lower costs may be needed to provide efficient care.  
 
Implications for policy and practice 
These findings suggest that adjusting for geriatric risk measures beyond 
traditional comorbidity measures may be helpful for hospitals, postacute facilities, and 
case managers to assess the appropriateness of postacute services for hospitalized patients 
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without the need to conduct time-intensive clinician-completed assessments. 
Administrative-based frailty indices and geriatric concepts may be able to categorize 
larger cohorts of hospitalized patients. For example, rather than waiting for assessments 
to be completed after discharge to postacute through MDS, OASIS, or IRF-PAI, case 
managers and postacute facilities could utilize inpatient claims information to help assess 
appropriate discharge destinations and patients’ level of risk and guide discharge 
planning. Hospitals and postacute facilities could also focus on these high-risk patients 
during the transition period to ensure proper medication management or prioritize 
information transfer across facilities.  
Further, the added predictive value of geriatric risk measure indicate that these 
factors may be important to measure and incorporate into risk adjustment for payment 
policies or quality reporting. While this study does not answer the debate whether to 
include ‘social risk factors’ in risk adjustment for Medicare payment models, it does 
demonstrate that certain non-clinical factors can be conceptualized using existing 
administrative data, are predictive of utilization, and do narrow differences across 
payment models when assessing utilization and costs. Payment policies that do not 
currently incorporate these predictive factors of utilization and cost may be hurting 
providers who care for a large cohort of these patients. Quality reporting that do not 
account for these measures may also be underestimating the quality of care provided.  
Persistent postacute utilization and outcome differences (after accounting for 
measurable and observable patient characteristics) between MA and FFS discharges 
suggest that MA may be managing their high cost and high need patients better than FFS. 
MA plans appear to manage postacute differently than FFS Medicare with no observable 
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negative consequences. For example, MA patients are more likely to utilize home health 
care, which is less expensive than skilled nursing or inpatient rehabilitation facilities. 
However, care should be given to these interpretations given that there might be 
unobservable patient characteristics not captured by current risk adjustments. Policies 
should first work to incorporate these measurable and observable characteristics in 
evaluations and second consider the value add of the Medicare Advantage program, and 
other types of risk-bearing and capitated programs, in Medicare. For example, it will be 
important to monitor how these vulnerable high geriatric risk patients fair under FFS 
postacute VBP and other payment structures (i.e. bundled programs) in order to ensure 
that postacute facilities and capitated programs do not cherry pick low risk patients and 
the type of care they provide for this high risk group is appropriate.  
 
Limitations 
 There are several limitations of our study to note. Postacute use or long-term use 
cannot be differentiated in the HCUP dataset. For example, if a patient was admitted to 
the hospital from a nursing home because they are long-stay nursing home residents and 
are discharged back to a skilled nursing home, we are unable to exclude this patient from 
our postacute analyses. Second, MA plans have institutional special needs plans (i-SNPs) 
that may especially target frail elderly patients. While we were unable to distinguish these 
plans from the dataset, we still find that our sample of MA patients have less geriatric 
risk than FFS patients. In 2014, 2,706 beneficiaries were enrolled in i-SNP plans in 
Florida out of 1.3M Medicare Advantage enrollees (<1%) indicating they represent a 
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very small fraction of beneficiaries (KFF, 2014). Geriatric risk measure was also built on 
inpatient claims only; further modeling should examine the addition of outpatient claims.  
Third, previous literature has suggested that the availability and access to 
postacute facilities and providers is an important factor in utilization levels. While we do 
not have information on the patients’ available choice of postacute facilities, we do 
attempt to control for the supply of each postacute provider in the patients’ county of 
residence. Fourth, we also do not have information about mortality outside the inpatient 
setting. This may explain why prediction for readmissions is lower than we expect: 
patients are not returning to the inpatient hospital setting due to death. We test for the 
association of geriatric risk on readmissions each discharge destination cohort to test if 
high-geriatric risk patients who are discharged home or home health (presumably 
healthier and thus less likely to experience death) are more likely to be readmitted and 
find that high-risk and moderate discharges are more likely to be readmitted than non-risk 
discharges in both MA and FFS (Appendix Tables 7-8).  
We assume that we have sufficiently captured differences in patient compositions 
with our observed characteristics to test for utilization and outcome differences between 
MA and FFS discharges. While we examine characteristics pertinent to older adults 
beyond the traditional comorbidity measure, we cannot infer causality from MA coverage 
on postacute utilization if we have not captured all differences in patient composition. In 
particular, we might be concerned with the cohort of inpatient stay patients. Prior 
research has suggested that MA enrollees are less likely to be admitted to the inpatient 
setting in the first place, suggesting that those who are less healthy may be captured by 
our MA inpatient sampling (Afendulis, Chernew, & Kessler, 2017). Finally, the current 
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data is also limited to Florida during 2010-2014; while it is a large state with a large 
proportion of Medicare beneficiaries, we cannot generalize these results to the current 
full Medicare program. 
 
Conclusion 
 Despite these limitations, this study expands our existing knowledge of the role of 
non-traditional comorbidity factors on healthcare utilization and outcomes and on how 
Medicare Advantage utilizes postacute services compared to FFS Medicare for 
hospitalized Medicare beneficiaries. We do this on a particularly vulnerable cohort of 
high geriatric risk hospitalized patients. This study suggests that high risk hospitalized 
patients, as measured by a claims-based risk measure, utilize postacute services 
differently. As services are increasingly bundled and paid according to the quality of care 
they provide, it is important to optimally match high risk patients to appropriate postacute 
services. Further research is needed to evaluate the efficiency of the MA program on 
postacute service delivery compared to that of the FFS program, especially among a 
cohort of high risk Medicare beneficiaries.  
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of hospitalized Florida Medicare discharges to home and 
postacute facilities (2010-2014) 
  All Discharges 
Postacute 
Discharges 
  MA FFS MA FFS 
Number of episodes 975,134 2,123,235 434,084 1,179,792 
Demographic Characteristics     
Female 54.6% 56.5% 57.5% 59.8% 
Age 
77.0 
(7.8) 78.7 (8.3) 
78.6 
(8.0) 80.3 (8.3) 
Race     
White 65.7% 81.7% 67.0% 82.1% 
Black 12.1% 7.2% 12.0% 7.6% 
Hispanic 20.5% 9.7% 17.5% 8.9% 
Asian/PI 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 
Native American 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Other 1.2% 0.9% 1.1% 0.9% 
     
Clinical Characteristics     
Charlson comorbidity 2.0 (2.0) 2.1 (2.1) 2.2 (2.1) 2.2 (2.1) 
Geriatric risk category**     
0 78.4% 71.6% 65.9% 59.9% 
1 17.3% 21.5% 26.1% 29.1% 
2+ 4.3% 7.0% 8.1% 11.0% 
Condition specific severity 
(of clinical cohort)     
Hemmorhagic 8.2% 7.9% 8.9% 8.4% 
Morbid obesity 3.5% 3.0% 3.5% 3.0% 
Acute HF 9.7% 11.1% 9.6% 10.7% 
     
Socioeconomic Characteristics     
Unemployment rate 8.9% 9.0% 8.8% 9.0% 
Poverty 16.7% 16.1% 16.5% 16.1% 
Median household income     
1 (Poorest quartile) 30.3% 26.4% 29.3% 26.8% 
2 29.4% 28.2% 29.9% 28.4% 
3 22.9% 24.9% 23.0% 24.7% 
4 (Wealthiest quartile) 17.5% 20.6% 17.8% 20.2% 

























  All Discharges 
Postacute 
Discharges 
  MA FFS MA FFS 
Number of episodes 975,134 2,123,235 434,084 1,179,792 
% >65 years married 52.5% 54.9% 52.5% 54.7% 
Metropolitan area 99.1% 96.7% 99.2% 97.2% 
     
Outcome     
Discharge Home 55.5% 44.4%     
LOS of IP stay  4.7 (4.7) 5.4 (5.5) 6.5 (5.8) 6.9 (6.3) 








30-day Readmissions 14.9% 17.4% 18.2% 20.7% 
Discharge to PAC     
SNF 20.0% 27.1% 44.9% 48.8% 
HHA 22.4% 24.0% 50.4% 43.2% 
IRF 1.6% 3.7% 3.7% 6.6% 
LTCH 0.5% 0.8% 1.0% 1.4% 
*All significant at the p<0.01 level. 
 
Notes: Medicare discharges to home and postacute services in FL 2010-2014; excluded 
discharges in hospitals with <10 postacute discharges each year, discharge from patients who did 
not reside in Florida and who were less than 65 years of age. **Geriatric risk markers are from 
the Johns Hopkins ACG risk adjustment methodology.   
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Table 2.2: Association of comorbidity and geriatric risk on postacute utilization and outcomes in MA and FFS hospitalized 
patients (FL, 2010-2014) 
  All discharges Postacute discharges only 
  Discharge Home IP LOS (days) IP Cost ($) Readmissions 30 
 MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS 
n 975,134 2,123,235 434,084 1,179,792 434,084 1,179,792 434,084 1,179,792 
          
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index 
-0.0228*** -0.0206*** 0.548*** 0.470*** 747.3*** 518.0*** 0.0162*** 0.0161*** 
  (0.000929) (0.000840) (0.0152) (0.0121) (48.02) (36.05) (0.000498) (0.000427) 
R2 0.07 0.093 0.126 0.239 0.103 0.105 0.017 0.024 
RMSE 0.479 0.473 5.468 5.523 13066 11907 0.383 0.4 
          
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index 
-0.0229*** -0.0208*** 0.556*** 0.478*** 702.3*** 519.4*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.000990) (0.000879) (0.0152) (0.0122) (40.79) (36.11) (0.000503) (0.000425) 
Geriatric risk = 1 -0.257*** -0.241*** 0.624*** 0.643*** 1,008*** 608.1*** 0.00812*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.00352) (0.00407) (0.0625) (0.0497) (94.58) (82.42) (0.00196) (0.00258) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ -0.404*** -0.352*** 1.254*** 1.226*** 1,892*** 1,433*** 0.00353 0.00766*** 
 (0.00502) (0.00617) (0.0826) (0.0720) (152.4) (136.8) (0.00237) (0.00252) 
Geriatric risk = 0 (ref)                 
R2 0.125 0.149 0.131 0.244 0.102 0.106 0.017 0.025 
RMSE 0.465 0.458 5.455 5.508 13070 11903 0.383 0.4 
Notes: Medicare discharges to home and postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All models adjusted for patients’ demographic 
information (age, sex, race/ethnicity) and patients’ county of residence information (poverty, median income, unemployment, married, 
metropolitan status, # of SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). Hospital-level and year fixed effects, robust SE clustered at hospital level. 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Abbreviation key: inpatient length of stay (IP LOS), inpatient cost (IP Cost), root mean squared error (RMSE) 
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Table 2.3: Association of geriatric risk on postacute destination in MA and FFS 
hospitalized postacute users (FL, 2010-2014) 
 
 Postacute facility destination 
  SNF HHA 
  MA FFS MA FFS 
n 434,084 1,179,792 434,084 1,179,792 
     
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index -0.00110 6.24e-05 -0.000736 -0.00278*** 
  (0.000982) (0.000772) (0.00124) (0.000862) 
R2 0.054 0.079 0.046 0.069 
RMSE 0.484 0.480 0.489 0.478 
     
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index 0.00104 0.00205*** -0.00303** -0.00497*** 
 (0.000961) (0.000764) (0.00124) (0.000825) 
Geriatric risk = 1 0.190*** 0.174*** -0.208*** -0.202*** 
 (0.00446) (0.00460) (0.00475) (0.00407) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 0.283*** 0.259*** -0.301*** -0.281*** 
 (0.00582) (0.00536) (0.00579) (0.00545) 
Geriatric risk = 0 (ref)         
R2 0.094 0.116 0.092 0.116 





 Postacute facility destination 
  IRF LTCH 
  MA FFS MA FFS 
n 434,084 1,179,792 434,084 1,179,792 
     
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index -0.000575 0.000298 0.00241*** 0.00242*** 
  (0.000566) (0.000410) (0.000282) (0.000266) 
R2 0.031 0.059 0.013 0.023 
RMSE 0.185 0.241 0.1 0.117 
     
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index -0.000482 0.000424 0.00248*** 0.00250*** 
 (0.000571) (0.000414) (0.000290) (0.000274) 
Geriatric risk = 1 0.0125*** 0.0228*** 0.00556*** 0.00577*** 
 (0.00168) (0.00263) (0.000842) (0.000828) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 0.00730*** 0.00970*** 0.0103*** 0.0118*** 
 (0.00162) (0.00245) (0.00153) (0.00144) 
Geriatric risk = 0 (ref)         
R2 0.032 0.061 0.014 0.024 
RMSE 0.185 0.241 0.1 0.117 
 
Notes: Medicare discharges to postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All models 
adjusted for patients’ demographic information (age, sex, race/ethnicity) and patients’ county of 
residence information (poverty, median income, unemployment, married, metropolitan status, # 
of SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). Hospital-level and year fixed effects, robust SE 
clustered at hospital level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Abbreviations key: skilled nursing 
facility (SNF), home health agency (HHA), inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF), and long-term 




Figure 2.1: Estimated differences in utilization and outcomes between Medicare 




Notes. Differences higher than 0% indicate that MA discharges are more likely to experience 
outcome compared with FFS discharges. Differences in which the 95% CI does not cross 0% are 
statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. See Table 4 for more description.  
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Table 2.4: Estimated differences in utilization and outcomes between Medicare Advantage vs. FFS Medicare hospitalized 
beneficiaries (FL, 2010-2014) 
  
All 









Readmissions SNF HHA IRF LTCH 
Medicare Advantage 
(vs. FFS) 0.0648*** -0.0402 584.7*** -0.0378*** -0.00930 0.0508*** -0.0361*** -0.00540*** 
 (0.00344) (0.0516) (82.47) (0.00378) (0.00686) (0.00567) (0.00408) (0.000790) 
n 3,098,369 1,613,876 1,613,876 1,613,876 1,613,876 1,613,876 1,613,876 1,613,876 
         
Notes: Medicare discharges to home and postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All models adjusted for patient characteristics (age, race, 
gender, geriatric risk categories, condition specific severity & Charlson comorbidity index) and patients’ county of residence information 
(poverty, median income, unemployment, married, metropolitan status, # of SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). Hospital-level and year 
fixed effects, robust SE clustered at hospital level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Abbreviations key: inpatient length of stay (IP LOS); inpatient 





Table 2.5: Estimated differences in utilization and outcome between Medicare Advantage vs. FFS Medicare hospitalized 
beneficiaries by clinical cohort (FL, 2010-2014) 
  
All 











Readmissions SNF HHA IRF LTCH 
Stroke         
MA (vs. FFS) 0.0195*** 0.100 98.29 -0.103*** 0.0897*** 0.0382*** -0.126*** -0.00146 
 (0.00512) (0.0759) (92.33) (0.00984) (0.0113) (0.00579) (0.0107) (0.00100) 
n 64,308 46,195 46,195 46,195 46,195 46,195 46,195 46,195 
         
Joint 
Replacement         
MA (vs. FFS) 0.0110 0.0246 34.10 -0.0542*** 0.0492*** 0.0122 -0.0607*** -0.000681*** 
 (0.00769) (0.0222) (47.99) (0.00848) (0.0121) (0.00814) (0.00842) (0.000203) 
n 140,406 133,562 133,562 133,562 133,562 133,562 133,562 133,562 
         
Congestive 
Heart Failure         
MA (vs. FFS) 0.0734*** -0.102 -139.7 -0.0239*** -0.0432*** 0.0744*** -0.0249*** -0.00622*** 
 (0.00515) (0.0730) (98.04) (0.00412) (0.00825) (0.00814) (0.00383) (0.00108) 
n 145,609 79,232 79,232 79,232 79,232 79,232 79,232 79,232 
Notes: Medicare discharges to home and postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All models adjusted for patient characteristics (age, race, 
gender, geriatric risk categories, condition specific severity & Charlson comorbidity index) and patients’ county of residence information 
(poverty, median income, unemployment, married, metropolitan status, # of SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). Hospital-level and year 
fixed effects, robust SE clustered at hospital level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. Abbreviations key: inpatient length of stay (IP LOS); inpatient 




Appendix Table 2.1: Geriatric risk concepts present in Medicare cohort, (FL 2010-
2014) 
  MA FFS Total 
n 975,134 2,123,235 3,098,369 
Fall 9.1% 10.5% 10.1% 
Difficulty Walking 2.8% 4.1% 3.7% 
Dementia 8.0% 11.8% 10.6% 
Malnutrition 0.8% 1.4% 1.2% 
Weight Loss 3.1% 4.3% 4.0% 
Vision Problems 0.6% 0.8% 0.7% 
Pressure ulcers 2.0% 3.4% 2.9% 
Urinary Incontinence 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Fecal Incontinence 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 
Social support issues 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Notes: Medicare discharges to home and postacute services in FL 2010-2014; excluded 
discharges in hospitals with <10 postacute discharges each year, discharge from patients who did 
not reside in Florida and who were less than 65 years of age. Geriatric risk markers are from the 




Appendix Table 2.2: Geriatric risk count in Medicare cohort, (FL 2010-2014) 
  MA FFS Total 
  n % n % n % 
0 764,237 78.4% 1,520,043 71.6% 2,284,280 73.7% 
1 169,057 17.3% 455,603 21.5% 624,660 20.2% 
2 35,681 3.7% 122,311 5.8% 157,992 5.1% 
3 5,480 0.6% 22,372 1.1% 27,852 0.9% 
4 630 0.1% 2,685 0.1% 3,315 0.1% 
5 47 0.0% 209 0.0% 256 0.0% 
6 2 0.0% 12 0.0% 14 0.0% 
Notes: Medicare discharges to home and postacute services in FL 2010-2014; excluded 
discharges in hospitals with <10 postacute discharges each year, discharge from patients who did 
not reside in Florida and who were less than 65 years of age. Geriatric risk markers are from the 
Johns Hopkins ACG risk adjustment methodology.  
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Appendix Table 2.3: Association of comorbidity and geriatric risk on postacute utilization and outcomes in disease specific 
cohorts of MA and FFS hospitalized patients (FL, 2010-2014) 
 
  All discharges Postacute discharges only 
 Stroke Discharge Home IP LOS (days) IP Cost ($) Readmissions 30 
 MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS 
n 22,276 42,032 15,416 30,779 15,416 30,779 15,416 30,779 
          
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index -0.0514*** -0.0460*** 0.425*** 0.394*** 736.9*** 639.3*** 0.0151*** 0.0150*** 
  (0.00177) (0.00137) (0.0238) (0.0158) (55.40) (36.42) (0.00198) (0.00171) 
R2 0.107 0.113 0.124 0.148 0.188 0.206 0.053 0.099 
RMSE 0.438 0.418 3.913 3.648 6656 6073 0.408 0.441 
          
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index -0.0508*** -0.0457*** 0.428*** 0.397*** 737.9*** 639.7*** 0.0150*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.00180) (0.00137) (0.0236) (0.0157) (54.94) (36.30) (0.00199) (0.00171) 
Geriatric risk = 1 -0.131*** -0.130*** 0.312*** 0.224*** 122.3 -74.45 -0.00601 -0.0206*** 
 (0.00646) (0.00473) (0.0797) (0.0568) (154.9) (80.63) (0.00741) (0.00616) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ -0.201*** -0.190*** 0.681*** 0.695*** 313.1 385.4** -0.0176 -0.0515*** 
 (0.0122) (0.00652) (0.146) (0.0989) (238.7) (170.9) (0.0128) (0.0117) 
Geriatric risk = 0 
(ref)                 
R2 0.125 0.135 0.125 0.15 0.187 0.206 0.053 0.1 






  All discharges Postacute discharges only 
 Joint 
Replacement Discharge Home IP LOS (days) IP Cost ($) Readmissions 30 
 MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS 
n 43,340 97,066 41,021 92,541 41,021 92,541 41,021 92,541 
          
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index -0.00618*** -0.00539*** 0.389*** 0.435*** 686.6*** 762.8*** 0.0152*** 0.0273*** 
  (0.00133) (0.00105) (0.0184) (0.0156) (40.80) (35.25) (0.00173) (0.00172) 
R2 0.139 0.158 0.146 0.18 0.359 0.35 0.082 0.114 
RMSE 0.209 0.194 2.009 1.981 4081 4007 0.294 0.321 
          
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index -0.00551*** -0.00471*** 0.324*** 0.350*** 635.8*** 696.9*** 0.0132*** 0.0217*** 
 (0.00122) (0.000962) (0.0165) (0.0138) (37.93) (32.13) (0.00179) (0.00142) 
Geriatric risk = 1 -0.0195*** -0.0144*** 1.724*** 1.698*** 1,346*** 1,304*** 0.0554*** 0.135*** 
 (0.00475) (0.00266) (0.0509) (0.0584) (150.1) (151.6) (0.00625) (0.0132) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ -0.0190*** -0.0164*** 2.423*** 2.368*** 1,979*** 1,885*** 0.0568*** 0.0892*** 
 (0.00561) (0.00418) (0.119) (0.0898) (290.5) (210.0) (0.00892) (0.00940) 
Geriatric risk = 0 
(ref)                 
R2 0.136 0.158 0.231 0.27 0.369 0.36 0.086 0.13 








  All discharges Postacute discharges only 
 Heart Failure Discharge Home IP LOS (days) IP Cost ($) Readmissions 30 
 MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS 
n 43,855 101,754 20,599 58,633 20,599 58,633 20,599 58,633 
         
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index -0.0293*** -0.0272*** 0.363*** 0.354*** 601.3*** 521.6*** 0.0110*** 0.0121*** 
  (0.00151) (0.000942) (0.0195) (0.0141) (41.10) (25.43) (0.00165) (0.00116) 
R2 0.087 0.086 0.089 0.081 0.181 0.177 0.02 0.02 
RMSE 0.478 0.473 3.97 4.042 6306 5648 0.42 0.425 
         
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index -0.0280*** -0.0265*** 0.363*** 0.356*** 600.5*** 524.5*** 0.0110*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.00148) (0.000913) (0.0197) (0.0139) (40.72) (25.32) (0.00164) (0.00116) 
Geriatric risk = 1 -0.204*** -0.198*** 0.813*** 0.613*** 1,139*** 876.7*** 0.00931 -0.000311 
 (0.00670) (0.00539) (0.0774) (0.0544) (129.7) (85.89) (0.00831) (0.00479) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ -0.322*** -0.295*** 1.541*** 1.278*** 2,262*** 1,725*** -0.0193 -0.000557 
 (0.0150) (0.00859) (0.241) (0.129) (388.3) (188.3) (0.0164) (0.00817) 
Geriatric risk = 0 
(ref)                 
R2 0.11 0.116 0.098 0.088 0.187 0.183 0.019 0.02 
RMSE 0.472 0.465 3.951 4.027 6280 5627 0.421 0.425 
 
Notes: Medicare discharges to home and postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All models adjusted for patient characteristics (age, race, 
gender) and patients’ county of residence information (poverty, median income, unemployment, married, metropolitan status, # of 
SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). Hospital-level and year fixed effects, robust SE clustered at hospital level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Abbreviations key: inpatient length of stay (IP LOS), inpatient total cost (IP total cost), root mean squared error (RMSE)  
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Appendix Table 2.4: Association of comorbidity and geriatric risk on postacute destination in disease specific cohorts of MA 
and FFS hospitalized postacute users (FL, 2010-2014) 
 
  SNF HHA IRF LTCH 
 Stroke MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS 
n 15,416 30,779 15,416 30,779 15,416 30,779 15,416 30,779 
          
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 0.0260*** 0.0135*** -0.0361*** -0.0251*** 0.00874*** 0.0101*** 0.00137*** 0.00151*** 
  (0.00233) (0.00148) (0.00222) (0.00158) (0.00182) (0.00158) (0.000395) (0.000375) 
R2 0.079 0.122 0.051 0.037 0.087 0.144 0.018 0.025 
RMSE 0.481 0.47 0.454 0.429 0.334 0.404 0.075 0.082 
          
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 0.0267*** 0.0147*** -0.0367*** -0.0259*** 0.00861*** 0.00964*** 0.00138*** 0.00155*** 
 (0.00237) (0.00144) (0.00221) (0.00158) (0.00184) (0.00157) (0.000394) (0.000378) 
Geriatric risk = 1 0.0821*** 0.115*** -0.0682*** -0.0805*** -0.0149** -0.0380*** 0.000955 0.00375** 
 (0.00947) (0.00717) (0.00883) (0.00591) (0.00727) (0.00658) (0.00132) (0.00157) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 0.140*** 0.180*** -0.119*** -0.110*** -0.0264** -0.0767*** 0.00465 0.00607*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0115) (0.0146) (0.00867) (0.0107) (0.0100) (0.00407) (0.00212) 
Geriatric risk = 0 
(ref)                 
R2 0.086 0.138 0.056 0.046 0.086 0.147 0.018 0.026 







  SNF HHA IRF LTCH 
 Joint 
Replacement MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS 
n 41,021 92,541 41,021 92,541 41,021 92,541 41,021 92,541 
          
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 0.0361*** 0.0298*** -0.0389*** -0.0487*** 0.00253 0.0176*** 0.000295** 0.00123*** 
  (0.00259) (0.00251) (0.00289) (0.00175) (0.00158) (0.00215) (0.000119) (0.000293) 
R2 0.214 0.192 0.283 0.25 0.143 0.179 0.004 0.013 
RMSE 0.44 0.45 0.407 0.424 0.233 0.265 0.019 0.038 
          
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 0.0305*** 0.0248*** -0.0323*** -0.0388*** 0.00161 0.0130*** 0.000251** 0.00101*** 
 (0.00234) (0.00202) (0.00254) (0.00144) (0.00159) (0.00171) (0.000104) (0.000241) 
Geriatric risk = 1 0.155*** 0.0929*** -0.184*** -0.217*** 0.0282*** 0.119*** 0.00120** 0.00475* 
 (0.0143) (0.0181) (0.0142) (0.0132) (0.00530) (0.0142) (0.000553) (0.00274) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 0.192*** 0.172*** -0.209*** -0.226*** 0.0146** 0.0488*** 0.00163 0.00563*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0168) (0.0162) (0.0158) (0.00723) (0.00984) (0.00109) (0.00130) 
Geriatric risk = 0 
(ref)                 
R2 0.224 0.199 0.298 0.274 0.144 0.196 0.005 0.015 









  SNF HHA IRF LTCH 
 Heart Failure MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS 
n 20,599 58,633 20,599 58,633 20,599 58,633 20,599 58,633 
         
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 0.00841*** 0.00831*** -0.0104*** -0.0104*** 0.000750 0.000520 0.00122*** 0.00157*** 
  (0.00220) (0.00130) (0.00221) (0.00140) (0.000465) (0.000518) (0.000330) (0.000359) 
R2 0.064 0.058 0.063 0.053 0.025 0.06 0.015 0.027 
RMSE 0.464 0.482 0.469 0.487 0.112 0.18 0.074 0.1 
         
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 0.00830*** 0.00886*** -0.0103*** -0.0110*** 0.000745 0.000532 0.00121*** 0.00159*** 
 (0.00218) (0.00128) (0.00219) (0.00136) (0.000464) (0.000517) (0.000330) (0.000360) 
Geriatric risk = 1 0.155*** 0.186*** -0.166*** -0.195*** 0.00598** 0.00447** 0.00522*** 0.00484*** 
 (0.0100) (0.00596) (0.0104) (0.00587) (0.00234) (0.00226) (0.00181) (0.00125) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 0.282*** 0.283*** -0.300*** -0.297*** 0.00696 0.00460 0.0107** 0.00958*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0105) (0.0205) (0.00993) (0.00553) (0.00496) (0.00467) (0.00247) 
Geriatric risk = 0 
(ref)                 
R2 0.087 0.092 0.089 0.09 0.025 0.06 0.015 0.027 
RMSE 0.458 0.474 0.463 0.478 0.112 0.18 0.075 0.0999 
 
Notes: Medicare discharges to postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All models adjusted for patients’ demographic information (age, 
sex, race/ethnicity) and patients’ county of residence information (poverty, median income, unemployment, married, metropolitan status, # of 
SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). Hospital-level and year fixed effects, robust SE clustered at hospital level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Abbreviation key: skilled nursing facility (SNF), home health agency (HHA), inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF), long-term care hospital 
(LTCH), root mean squared error (RMSE)
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Appendix Figure 2.1: Distribution of inpatient hospital spending (untransformed 




Appendix Table 2.5: Association of geriatric risk on log inpatient costs of MA and FFS hospitalized patients using postacute 
(FL, 2010-2014) 
 
 Postacute discharges only 
  All disease cohorts Stroke Joint Replacement Heart Failure 
 MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS MA FFS 
n 434,084 1,179,792 15,416 30,779 41,021 92,541 20,599 58,633 
         
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 0.0581*** 0.0450*** 0.0714*** 0.0671*** 0.0386*** 0.0429*** 0.0720*** 0.0676*** 
  (0.00273) (0.00230) (0.00277) (0.00173) (0.00183) (0.00160) (0.00237) (0.00181) 
R2 0.109 0.107 0.252 0.261 0.499 0.453 0.226 0.209 
RMSE 0.741 0.733 0.147 0.478 0.213 0.215 0.531 0.531 
         
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 0.0581*** 0.0451*** 0.0711*** 0.0670*** 0.0356*** 0.0390*** 0.0708*** 0.0670*** 
 (0.00276) (0.00231) (0.00277) (0.00174) (0.00168) (0.00139) (0.00239) (0.00177) 
Geriatric risk = 1 0.0983*** 0.0693*** 0.0508*** 0.0322*** 0.0833*** 0.0765*** 0.182*** 0.173*** 
 (0.00655) (0.00591) (0.00894) (0.00652) (0.00960) (0.00968) (0.00856) (0.00557) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 0.199*** 0.159*** 0.0920*** 0.0832*** 0.119*** 0.110*** 0.324*** 0.286*** 
 (0.0118) (0.00958) (0.0142) (0.0115) (0.0163) (0.0129) (0.0205) (0.0117) 
Geriatric risk = 0 
(ref)                 
R2 0.135 0.139 0.253 0.261 0.509 0.463 0.234 0.216 
RMSE 0.717 0.697 0.478 0.478 0.211 0.212 0.529 0.529 
Notes: Medicare discharges to postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All models adjusted for patients’ demographic information (age, 
sex, race/ethnicity) and patients’ county of residence information (poverty, median income, unemployment, married, metropolitan status, # of 
SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). Hospital-level and year fixed effects, robust SE clustered at hospital level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.   
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Appendix Table 2.6: Estimated differences in inpatient stay log cost between Medicare Advantage vs. FFS Medicare 
hospitalized beneficiaries (FL, 2010-2014) 
 
 Postacute discharges only 
Log Inpatient Costs  




Notes: Medicare discharges to postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All models adjusted for patients’ demographic information (age, 
race, gender, geriatric risk categories, condition specific severity & Charlson comorbidity index) and patients’ county of residence information 
(poverty, median income, unemployment, married, metropolitan status, # of SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). Hospital-level and year 
fixed effects, robust SE clustered at hospital level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table 2.7: Association of geriatric risk on readmissions in MA and FFS 
hospitalized patients by discharge destination (FL, 2010-2014) 
 
 Discharge to home 
 MA FFS 
n 541,050 943,443 
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 0.0176*** 0.0174*** 
 (0.000540) (0.000503) 
Geriatric risk = 1 0.0125*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.00172) (0.00131) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 0.0129*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.00428) (0.00296) 
Geriatric risk = 0 
(ref)   
 
 Discharge to SNF 
 MA FFS 
n 194,857 575,656 
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 0.0160*** 0.0145*** 
 (0.000637) (0.000398) 
Geriatric risk = 1 -0.00677*** -0.00487*** 
 (0.00231) (0.00146) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ -0.0105*** -0.0119*** 
 (0.00264) (0.00200) 
Geriatric risk = 0 
(ref)   
 
 Discharge to HHA 
 MA FFS 
n 218,830 509,349 
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 0.0176*** 0.0188*** 
 (0.000464) (0.000413) 
Geriatric risk = 1 0.00866*** 0.0114*** 
 (0.00241) (0.00167) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 0.0152*** 0.0223*** 
 (0.00433) (0.00308) 
Geriatric risk = 0 





 Discharge to IRF 
 MA FFS 
n 15,934 77,948 
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index 0.00766*** -0.00141 
 (0.00259) (0.00152) 
Geriatric risk = 1 -0.00432 -0.00133 
 (0.00958) (0.00437) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ -0.0242* -0.0326*** 
 (0.0146) (0.00718) 
Geriatric risk = 0 
(ref)   
 
 Discharge to LTCH 
 MA FFS 
n 4,463 16,839 
Charlson 
Comorbidity Index -0.00796*** -0.0148*** 
 (0.00292) (0.00156) 
Geriatric risk = 1 -0.00627 -0.0279*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0101) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ -0.0371 -0.0574*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0138) 
Geriatric risk = 0 
(ref)   
 
Notes: Medicare discharges to home and postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All 
models adjusted for patients’ demographic information (age, race, gender, geriatric risk 
categories, condition specific severity & Charlson comorbidity index) and patients’ county of 
residence information (poverty, median income, unemployment, married, metropolitan status, # 
of SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). Hospital-level and year fixed effects, robust SE 
clustered at hospital level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table 2.8: Estimated differences between Medicare Advantage vs. FFS Medicare in probability of 30-day 













30 Day Readmissions      
MA (vs. FFS) -0.0102*** -0.0121*** -0.00900*** -0.141*** -0.160*** 
 (0.00101) (0.00208) (0.00145) (0.0218) (0.0160) 
      
n 1,484,493 770,513 728,179 93,882 21,302 
 
Notes: Medicare discharges to home and postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All models adjusted for patients’ demographic 
information (age, race, gender, condition specific severity & Charlson comorbidity index) and patients’ county of residence information (poverty, 
median income, unemployment, married, metropolitan status, # of SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). Hospital-level and year fixed 







Appendix Table 2.9: Estimated relative risk ratios of geriatric risk on postacute 
destination in MA and FFS hospitalized postacute users using multinomial logit 
models (FL, 2010-2014) 
  Postacute discharges 
  MA FFS 
n 434,084 1,179,792 
   
SNF   
Geriatric risk = 1 2.378*** 2.393*** 
 (0.0520) (0.0579) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 3.711*** 3.761*** 
 (0.1191) (0.1608) 
Geriatric risk = 0 (ref)     
IRF   
Geriatric risk = 1 2.141*** 2.257*** 
 (0.1054) (0.0732) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 2.657*** 2.634*** 
 (0.1712) (0.145) 
Geriatric risk = 0 (ref)     
LTCH   
Geriatric risk = 1 2.544*** 2.512*** 
 (0.1575) (0.1095) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 4.892*** 4.722*** 
 (0.3538) (0.2983) 
Geriatric risk = 0 (ref)     
HHA (base)     
 
Notes: Medicare discharges to postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All models 
adjusted for patients’ demographic and clinical information (age, sex, race/ethnicity, Charlson 
comorbidity index) and patients’ county of residence information (poverty, median income, 
unemployment, married, metropolitan status, # of SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). 
Year fixed effects and robust SE clustered at hospital level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Abbreviations key: skilled nursing facility (SNF), home health agency (HHA), inpatient 
rehabilitation facility (IRF), and long-term care hospital (LTCH). Base category is HHA and 





Appendix Table 2.10: Estimated relative risk ratios in postacute destinations 
between Medicare Advantage vs. FFS Medicare hospitalized beneficiaries using 
multinomial logit models (FL, 2010-2014) 
 
 




MA (vs. FFS) 0.8961*** 
 (0.0288) 
IRF  
MA (vs. FFS) 0.4538*** 
 (0.0316) 
LTCH  
MA (vs. FFS) 0.5833*** 
 (0.0422) 
HHA (base)   
 
Notes: Medicare discharges to postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All models 
adjusted for patient characteristics (age, race, gender, geriatric risk categories, condition specific 
severity & Charlson comorbidity index) and patients’ county of residence information (poverty, 
median income, unemployment, married, metropolitan status, # of SNFs/HHA/physicians per 
1000 residents). Year fixed effects, robust SE clustered at hospital level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Abbreviations key: inpatient length of stay (IP LOS); inpatient total cost (IP total cost); 
skilled nursing facility (SNF); home health agency (HHA); inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF); 
long-term care hospital (LTCH). Base category is HHA and reference group is fee-for-service 
Medicare discharges; interpretations are relative risk ratios.  
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Appendix Table 2.11: Estimated odds ratios on discharge home and 30 day 
readmissions between MA and FFS Medicare hospitalized beneficiaries (FL, 2010-
2014) 
 
 All disease cohorts Discharge Home Readmissions 30 
 MA FFS MA FFS 
n 973,857 2,121,890 434,079 1,179,774 
      
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index 0.906*** 0.912*** 1.105*** 1.097*** 
  (0.00370) (0.00348) (0.00399) (0.00321) 
C-statistic 0.65 0.674 0.599 0.611 
      
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index 0.901*** 0.907*** 1.106*** 1.097*** 
 (0.00414) (0.00391) (0.00402) (0.00319) 
Geriatric risk = 1 0.329*** 0.326*** 1.055*** 1.119*** 
 (0.00563) (0.00550) (0.0139) (0.0167) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 0.138*** 0.140*** 1.021 1.045*** 
 (0.00433) (0.00470) (0.0170) (0.0164) 
Geriatric risk = 0 (ref)         
C-statistic 0.698 0.725 0.6 0.612 
 
 Stroke Discharge Home Readmissions 30 
 MA FFS MA FFS 
n 22,275 42,032 15,354 30,765 
      
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index 0.735*** 0.738*** 1.091*** 1.079*** 
  (0.00883) (0.00782) (0.0113) (0.00927) 
C-statistic 0.709 0.723 0.656 0.696 
      
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index 0.733*** 0.736*** 1.091*** 1.078*** 
 (0.00911) (0.00785) (0.0113) (0.00927) 
Geriatric risk = 1 0.471*** 0.444*** 0.962 0.898*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0151) (0.0435) (0.0280) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 0.234*** 0.225*** 0.893 0.759*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0174) (0.0731) (0.0450) 
Geriatric risk = 0 (ref)         
C-statistic 0.728 0.744 0.656 0.697 
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 Joint Replacement Discharge Home Readmissions 30 
 MA FFS MA FFS 
n 42,801 94,741 40,994 92,541 
      
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index 0.844*** 0.838*** 1.163*** 1.231*** 
  (0.0222) (0.0174) (0.0225) (0.0128) 
C-statistic 0.815 0.836 0.728 0.738 
      
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index 0.860*** 0.859*** 1.140*** 1.180*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0175) (0.0223) (0.0109) 
Geriatric risk = 1 0.478*** 0.463*** 1.721*** 2.719*** 
 (0.0678) (0.0450) (0.0900) (0.204) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 0.448*** 0.358*** 1.705*** 2.021*** 
 (0.116) (0.0875) (0.138) (0.134) 
Geriatric risk = 0 (ref)         
C-statistic 0.817 0.839 0.734 0.755 
 
 Heart Failure Discharge Home Readmissions 30 
 MA FFS MA FFS 
n 43,837 101,742 20,586 58,633 
      
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index 0.879*** 0.885*** 1.063*** 1.067*** 
  (0.00589) (0.00388) (0.00940) (0.00635) 
C-statistic 0.67 0.671 0.593 0.593 
      
Charlson Comorbidity 
Index 0.882*** 0.885*** 1.063*** 1.067*** 
 (0.00597) (0.00390) (0.00938) (0.00634) 
Geriatric risk = 1 0.403*** 0.383*** 1.054 0.998 
 (0.0122) (0.0103) (0.0499) (0.0268) 
Geriatric risk = 2+ 0.204*** 0.184*** 0.887 0.995 
 (0.0196) (0.0110) (0.0914) (0.0465) 
Geriatric risk = 0 (ref)         
C-statistic 0.692 0.701 0.594 0.593 
Notes: Medicare discharges to home and postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All 
models adjusted for patients’ demographic information (age, sex, race/ethnicity) and patients’ 
county of residence information (poverty, median income, unemployment, married, metropolitan 
status, # of SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). Hospital-level and year fixed effects, 
robust SE clustered at hospital level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table 2.12: Estimated odds ratios in discharge home and 30-day readmissions of Medicare hospitalized beneficiaries 
(FL, 2010-2014) 
 




















FFS) 1.345*** 0.784*** 1.121*** 0.568*** 1.332 0.561*** 1.392*** 0.877*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0183) (0.0314) (0.0273) (0.233) (0.0480) (0.0322) (0.0201) 
n 3,096,543 1,613,857 64,308 46,183 140,077 133,562 145,594 79,232 
 
Notes: Medicare discharges to home and postacute services in Florida during 2010-2014. All models adjusted for patient characteristics (age, race, 
gender, geriatric risk categories, condition specific severity & Charlson comorbidity index) and patients’ county of residence information (poverty, 
median income, unemployment, married, metropolitan status, # of SNFs/HHA/physicians per 1000 residents). Hospital-level and year fixed 
effects, robust SE clustered at hospital level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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THE EFFECT OF MEDICARE ADVANTAGE ENROLLMENT  







Background: Medicare Advantage (MA) has seen sharp increases in enrollment during 
the past decade and its enrollment is projected to grow even further as premiums continue 
to decline and benefits continue to expand. Previous research has demonstrated that 
increased enrollment in MA plans in a geographic area decreases the average rate of 
inpatient and outpatient health care spending and utilization incurred by fee-for-service 
(FFS) beneficiaries in that same region.  This suggests that there are significant positive 
spillover effects of MA. To date, little research has examined the potential impact of MA 
enrollment on postacute care service in an area, despite the fact that differences in 
postacute care patterns are known to be a key driver of geographic variation in per capita 
FFS spending.  
 
Methods: Hospital discharge abstract data from Florida from 2010 to 2014, along with 
Area Health Resource File, Dartmouth Atlas Medicare Spending files, and 
enrollment/payment data from CMS Medicare Rate Books are used for this study. 
Variation in MA county-level payment rates—an exogenous policy shock that influences 
MA enrollment—are used to test for effects in utilization and outcomes in Medicare 
postacute utilization; then separately within the FFS and MA cohorts.   
 
Results: Conditional on admission to the hospital and postacute use, there are no 
statistically significant relationships between MA enrollment on postacute use in 
Medicare. However, the direction of the estimates suggests that an increase in MA 
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enrollment led to increased use of skilled nursing and decreased use of home health 
across MA and FFS discharges. There were also no significant relationships, though the 
direction of effects remains robust, on postacute use and MA enrollment among all 
hospitalized patients not conditional on postacute discharge.  
 
Conclusion: These findings suggest that MA enrollment has little to no effect on 
postacute destinations in the overall Medicare market, at least in this large state with both 
high rates of MA enrollment and high payment rates. Further payment policy changes to 
the MA program should not only monitor inpatient utilization and outcome but other 




Medicare Advantage (MA) has seen sharp increases in enrollment during the past 
decade and its enrollment is projected to grow even further as premiums continue to 
decline and benefits continue to expand (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
[CMS], 2018). Currently, one in three Medicare beneficiaries is enrolled in these private 
managed care plans (Kaiser Family Foundation [KFF], 2017). Concurrently, postacute 
care services have been increasing among Medicare populations (Burke et al., 2015; 
Chandra, Dalton, & Holmes, 2013). Postacute care services represent rehabilitation 
services provided to Medicare beneficiaries after an acute (short term) hospital stay.  
Postacute services include care provided in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), home health 
agencies (HHAs), inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs), and long-term care hospitals 
(LTCHs). In 2013, 40% of all hospitalized fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare patients 
utilized postacute service after their inpatient stay (Tian, 2016).  
There is limited understanding on what the impact of MA enrollment is on 
postacute services in a region. Three studies have examined differential use between MA 
and FFS on postacute services and find that MA enrollees tend to utilize less postacute 
and at lower intensity (Huckfeldt, Escarce, Rabideau, Karaca-Mandic, & Sood, 2017; 
Kumar et al., 2018; Waxman et al., 2016). However, other research demonstrates that 
high cost patients (i.e. long-term, short-term nursing home care, and home health care 
users) enrolled in these private plans have an increased rate of leaving MA and joining 
FFS Medicare (Goldberg, Trivedi, Mor, Jung, & Rahman, 2017; Meyers et al., 2019; 
Rahman, Keohane, Trivedi, & Mor, 2015).  
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Literature in the inpatient and outpatient setting examining differential use 
between MA and FFS enrollees is mixed, mainly due to the concern of bias selection of 
healthier beneficiaries into MA. Some of the literature finds that MA patients utilize less 
intensive services and experience better outcomes (Basu & Mobley, 2007, 2012; 
Lemieux, Sennett, Wang, Mulligan, & Bumbaugh, 2012; Nicholas, 2013). Others find 
that controlling for self-selection into these plans to the extent feasible, MA patients 
experience higher readmission rates than FFS (Friedman, Jiang, Steiner, & Bott, 2012). 
Analogously, differences in postacute utilization between MA and FFS may be attributed 
to different care practices or to the characteristics of the population served by each 
program.   
If there are underlying differences in care received by MA and FFS patients, as 
suggested by some of the literature, MA enrollment could also impact postacute service 
utilization and quality in a number of direct and indirect ways. A market where there is 
higher MA enrollment would mean more providers work under contract to MA plans. 
These providers would also serve patients in other plans, potentially inducing spillover 
effects. For example, MA induced delivery practices might find their way into the 
broader Medicare market, given that most MA physicians also serve FFS enrollees. 
 To date, research estimating spillover effects of increased managed care 
penetration on overall utilization and spending among FFS Medicare beneficiaries has 
focused on hospital utilization and spending. This research has demonstrated positive 
spillover effects of MA enrollment on FFS Medicare; that is, increased enrollment of 
beneficiaries in a region into MA decreases the average cost and utilization of services by 
those Medicare patients in the region remaining in traditional FFS Medicare (Baicker, 
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Chernew, & Robbins, 2013; Baker, 1997, 1999, 2003; Bundorf et al., 2004; Chernew, 
Decicca, & Town, 2008; Robinson, 1996). No such studies have been undertaken to 
assess whether there are similar effects on postacute care services. 
We expand on previous literature that focusses on the intersection between 
Medicare Advantage and postacute care by examining the effect of MA enrollment on 
postacute utilization in the overall (including both MA and FFS) Medicare market and 
then separately within the FFS and MA beneficiary sub-groups. We exploited Medicare 
Advantage payment policy updates to account for the potentially confounding effects of 
MA enrollment and healthcare utilization and outcomes. By assessing whether MA 
enrollment has an impact on Medicare postacute care sector, our goal is to gain 
information that could potentially be relevant to policymakers, clinicians, and managers 
to more effectively design programs to meet the needs of the growing group of Medicare 
beneficiaries utilizing post-hospital care. 
 
Background 
Postacute utilization and outcomes in Medicare Advantage 
Medicare Advantage plans have greater flexibility in providing postacute services 
compared to fee-for-service Medicare providers. For example, MA plans have more 
discretion over cost-sharing levels. MA plans have also been found to use a preferred 
network of postacute providers for its enrollees (Meyers et al., 2018), and 71% of 
enrollees need prior authorization for skilled nursing stays and 62% for home health 
services (KFF, 2018; Meyers, Mor, & Rahman, 2018; Rahman, Meyers, & Mor, 2018). 
FFS Medicare skilled nursing facility (SNF) services are covered only after a three-day 
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inpatient hospital stay and covered for 20 days without cost-sharing, but some MA plans 
have chosen to waive the three-day hospital stay rule. Several studies have examined how 
benefit design in MA plans impact postacute care received by its enrollees. One study 
finds that there is no increase in use of hospital and SNF services among those enrollees 
who are covered in plans that eliminated three-day rule compared to plans that did not 
(Grebla et al., 2015). This suggests that a three-day requirement may be contributing to 
unwarranted additional inpatient spending and utilization. Other MA plans have instituted 
first-dollar cost-sharing for SNF and research finds that there is a significant reduction in 
the use of SNFs with no offsets in increased hospital use (Keohane et al., 2017). 
However, disenrollment rates are higher in plans that introduced first-dollar SNF cost-
sharing than in plans that did not. In home health (HH) services, traditional Medicare 
benefit is provided at no cost to the patient under the requirements that patients be 
homebound and assessed in a face-to-face encounter for every 60-day episode. Enrollees 
in MA plans that instituted cost-sharing have no difference in home health utilization, but 
disenrollment from MA is again higher in these plans (Li, Keohane, Thomas, Lee, & 
Trivedi, 2017).  
Nationally, differences in utilization and outcomes in postacute care for Medicare 
beneficiaries has been documented across coverage type. Three studies that examine 
postacute utilization and outcomes in Medicare Advantage all conclude that MA plans 
manage their patients more tightly—MA enrollees use less intense postacute care and 
suffer no worse outcomes than FFS patients (Huckfeldt et al., 2017; Kumar et al., 2018; 
Waxman et al., 2016). In these studies, patient demographic, clinical, and socioeconomic 
factors are adjusted to compare utilization and quality of postacute care between MA and 
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FFS patients. For example, Huckfeldt et al. (2017) control for diagnoses-based clinical 
characteristics (i.e. Elixhauser and condition-specific severity measures), dual eligible 
status, and Part D low-income subsidy status for cohorts of joint replacement, stroke, and 
heart failure discharges to SNF and IRF from hospitals receiving payments for 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) programs. They find that MA patients are less 
likely to be admitted to IRFs and have shorter lengths of stay in SNFs than FFS patients, 
while finding no differences in observable patient characteristics between the two MA 
and FFS cohorts. Both Kumar et al. (2018) and Waxman et al. (2016) find MA patients 
utilize less rehabilitation and home health use and are more likely to be discharged to the 
community. These findings suggest that MA plans may be delivering postacute care 
differently than FFS and enrollees suffer no worse outcomes.  
 
Medicare Advantage spillover literature 
There is strong evidence of Medicare managed care spillover effects impacting 
FFS care in inpatient and outpatient settings (Baicker et al., 2013; Chernew et al., 2008). 
Managed care practice styles may influence how providers care for all their patients. For 
example, managed care organizations employ a number of techniques to control 
utilization such as utilization review, prior authorization, restricted networks, and higher 
cost sharing. There is evidence that providers make decisions based on their overall mix 
of patients so that a change on the average can affect others (Newhouse & Marquis, 
1978).  
These mechanisms have motivated several papers to explore spillover effects of 
managed care on the broader healthcare market. Baicker et al. (2013) explore the 
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relationship of MA enrollment on hospitalizations and lengths of stay in Medicare and 
commercial markets. They find that greater Medicare managed care penetration is not 
associated with fewer hospitalizations, but is associated with lower costs and shorter 
stays per hospitalization. A 10% increase in MA penetration in a region is associated with 
a 4.5% decrease in FFS hospitalization costs and 0.2 shorter days of hospitalizations. 
Baker (1997, 1999, 2003) examine the effect of HMO penetration on spending and 
utilization on other beneficiaries with mixed results. He finds that there is a concave 
relationship between managed care penetration and FFS Medicare Parts A and B 
spending, where spending is increasing in HMO penetration until a maximum is hit at 
18% penetration, after which spending decreases with increasing penetration. Chernew et 
al. (2008) find that increasing MA penetration reduces spending by FFS beneficiaries, 
particularly those with chronic conditions. They find that in an OLS specification, a 1% 
increase in MA HMO penetration decreases FFS utilization by 0.3%, but when they 
account for endogenous penetration by using payments as an instrument they find a 
decrease of 0.9%. Robinson (1996) examines the spillover effect of managed care on 
healthcare expenditures and utilization. He finds that hospital expenditures grew 44% less 
rapidly in markets with high HMO penetration compared with low penetration, mostly 
due to reduction in the volume and mix of services. Bundorf et al. (2004) find that rates 
of revascularization and cardiac catheterization for FFS Medicare patients with acute 
myocardial infarction are lower in high HMO penetration markets than in low penetration 
ones. Johnson, Figueroa, Zhou, Orav, and Jha (2016) explore if MA enrollment has 
played a role in lowering spending growth in FFS Medicare. They find that counties in 
the highest quartile of baseline MA penetration had an associated decrease in FFS 
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Medicare spending growth at $154 annually per 10 percentage point increase in MA. 
These set of studies all suggest that Medicare Advantage influences the broader Medicare 
market at the inpatient utilization and spending level. However, none of these studies 
examine potential impacts of MA enrollment on postacute utilization and outcomes.  
 
New contribution 
This paper explores how MA enrollment in an area affects postacute care for all 
Medicare beneficiaries, and then separately within the FFS and MA cohorts, after an 
inpatient hospital stay. Thus, we explore both potential direct (within MA) and spillover 
(within FFS) effects. We exploited exogenous variation in county-level payments to MA 
plans over time driven by the program’s bidding policy to test the extent to which MA 
enrollment led to changes in postacute utilization and quality among Medicare 
beneficiaries. Answering this question can help policymakers evaluate the value of the 
MA program on postacute use and potential unmeasured spillover value into the overall 




We examine the effect of MA enrollment on Medicare postacute utilization and 
outcomes at the county-level, conditional on inpatient stay, for overall Medicare 
discharges and then separately for FFS and MA discharges. We begin with a baseline 
specification describing the relationship between Medicare Advantage penetration and a 
range of postacute related utilization.  
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𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽c + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡  (1) 
 
The basic specification (Equation 1) regresses utilization and outcome measures 
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑡 for individual i in county c in year 𝑡 on MA penetration in county c in year t, 
Medicare beneficiary demographics, 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡, county-level characteristics, 𝐶𝑐𝑡, and year 
dummies, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡. Beneficiary covariates include age, sex, race, Charlson comorbidity 
index, and frailty status. County-level covariates include number of 
SNFs/HHAs/physicians per capita in the county, MA and FFS beneficiary risk scores, 
and FFS spending.  
The main independent variable of interest is year-specific county level Medicare 
Advantage penetration where the beneficiary resides. Because MA plans tend to operate 
in markets where there are higher FFS Medicare spending, or markets where MA 
payment are more generous, to be more profitable, MA enrollment may be endogenous to 
the intensity of utilization and level of spending (Chernew et al., 2008). We may be also 
concerned with other unobserved market-level variables correlated with managed care 
entry decisions, penetration, and outcomes, which confound identification. Further, 
comparing use and outcome between MA and FFS is complicated by selection concerns. 
There is evidence that there is non-random sorting of beneficiaries into MA and that 
healthier patients are more likely to opt into MA (McWilliams, Hsu, & Newhouse, 2012; 
Newhouse & McGuire, 2014). Therefore, the cost and services provided in FFS will rise 
and be more intense because that population will be, on average, less healthy. We would 
expect that conditional on such sorting, greater intensity services will be higher in FFS 
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markets with high MA penetration, unless practice styles from MA spilled over into FFS. 
Because where managed care organizations operate is confounded by patient risk profiles 
and given expectations that healthier enrollees choose MA, ordinary least square 
estimates may be biased. 
 
Instrumental variables (IVs) 
To address this issue, CMS payments to MA plans at the county level are used as 
an instrument in two-stage least squares regressions. The key policy lever available to the 
government to influence plan premiums, benefits, and enrollment is the benchmark 
payment rate. Insurers have considerable flexibility in designing plans to offer on the MA 
market, as described above. Plans differ in the premium charged to consumers, the 
provider network, and the benefit generosity, provided the benefits are at least as 
generous as those in FFS Medicare (Stockley, McGuire, Afendulis, & Chernew, 2014). 
Prior studies have shown that higher benchmark payment rates are associated with higher 
enrollment and a greater number of plans participating in the MA market (McGuire, 
Newhouse, & Sinaiko, 2011; Nicholas, 2014). The relationship between these payment 
benchmarks and enrollment allows us to test for the effects of MA enrollment on 
postacute utilization in Medicare.  
 MA payment policy has evolved over time in an effort to maintain access to 
private plans while controlling costs (Baicker et al., 2013). From 2010-2011, payments to 
MA plans were calculated against a benchmark based on the highest of four statutory 
amounts: 1) urban or rural floor payment; 2) 100% of county risk adjusted lagged FFS 
costs; 3) an update based on the prior year’s national average growth in FFS costs; and 4) 
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a 2% update over prior year’s payment. A bidding process is compared to the county’s 
benchmark. If a plan’s bid is higher than the benchmark, it is required to collect the 
difference through a premium on its enrollees. If the bid is lower, 75% if the difference is 
returned to enrollees through increase benefits, while 25% is returned to Medicare.   
Payment post-ACA, starting in 2012, utilized a different benchmark scheme. Each 
county’s benchmark was a certain percentage (95%-115%) of the average per capita 
Medicare FFS spending for the county’s residents, relative to spending for other counties 
(MedPAC, 2012). Specifically, county benchmarks were set at specified percentages of 
the per capita FFS Medicare expenditures, ranked by FFS spending. Starting with the top 
quartile, benchmarks are set at 95%, then 100%, 107.5%, and 115% of FFS spending. 
Plans were also able to earn quality bonuses, with plans >=4 stars have county 
benchmarks increased by 1.5% points in 2012, 3% in 2013, and 5% in 2014.  
We take advantage of these statutory changes as exogenous shocks to MA 
enrollment to trace out the effects of managed care penetration on postacute utilization 
and outcome throughout the health care system, as similarly done in previous papers on 
inpatient services (Baicker et al., 2013; Chernew et al., 2008). We use 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑡, to 
identify the effect of MA penetration on outcomes (Equations 2 and 3). To the extent that 
these payment rate changes are correlated with penetration, but are orthogonal to 
postacute utilization and outcomes, IV estimates represent an improvement over 
corresponding OLS estimates.  
 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡   (2) 
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝑐 + 1𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛̂ 𝑐𝑡 + 2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 3𝐶𝑐𝑡 + 4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑐𝑡  (3) 
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Robustness checks 
We test that MA enrollment changes induced by MA payments do not alter the 
composition of the FFS patient population (Appendix Table 1). There is the concern that 
enrollment shifts induced by payment changes are related to the health status or other 
traits that may affect utilization. For example, if the FFS beneficiaries who are induced 
by payment changes to leave the FFS system for MA are healthier than the typical FFS 
beneficiary, then the remaining FFS population may become less healthy on average. We 
address this issue in several ways. First, we estimated models with health status 
especially pertinent to older adults using nursing homes (Kan et al., 2018). Additionally, 
we investigate the association between payment changes and changes in the composition 
of our FFS sample. We estimate models that replace utilization with health status 
measures in order to test whether payment-induced changes in MA enrollment affected 
the composition of this group. We find that there is no association between FFS health 
status and changes in MA enrollment in our sample, consistent with previous finding of 
no systematic evidence of an association between favorable selection into MA and 
county-level penetration (Chernew et al., 2008; Mello, Stearns, Norton, & Ricketts, 
2003). 
We also conduct several robustness checks to test our conclusion of MA 
enrollment effect on postacute utilization in Medicare. We model changes in payment 
rates using year-specific payment instruments (Baicker et al., 2013). We also test the 
robustness of our binary outcomes using probit models to test our linear probability 
assumptions and report the marginal effects. We finally conduct analyses at the hospital 




Healthcare cost and utilization project’s (HCUP) state inpatient databases (SID) 
Healthcare cost and utilization project’s (HCUP) state inpatient databases (SID) 
includes the universe of all discharges, including information on insurance provider and 
discharge destination. We use data for Florida 2010-2014. There are several advantages 
to using Florida. First, Florida accounts for 10% of all Medicare Advantage enrollees 
nationally (KFF, 2017). Second, a high percentage of Medicare beneficiaries (42%) are 
enrolled in Medicare Advantage in Florida in 2017. Third, Florida SID reports whether 
Medicare enrollees are in FFS or an MA plan and their discharge destination, including 
post-acute facilities. Finally, Florida datasets include visit links to allow for identification 
of readmissions to inpatient hospitals.  
We focused on Florida hospitals 2010-2014 for Medicare beneficiaries with an 
inpatient hospital stay discharged either to home or to a postacute facility. We excluded 
discharges from patients who did not reside in Florida and who were less than 65 years of 
age. We determined whether beneficiaries were enrolled in traditional FFS Medicare or 
in Medicare Advantage for the inpatient stay through the state inpatient discharge data by 
primary payer type. In our Florida sample, more than 45% of all inpatient discharges are 
attributable to Medicare patients, and 31% of those were in MA. Of these Medicare 
discharges, 89% are to home and postacute facilities, with hospice care as the next most 
popular discharge destination (4%) and inpatient death accounting for 3% of discharges. 
 
MA payments and enrollments 
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 We use data from CMS to quantify MA enrollment, payment rates, and plans 
characteristics from 2010-2014. The main independent and instrumental variables are 
created from these datasets. First, we construct the county-level MA penetration. 
Enrollment data come from CMS State/County/Contract Enrollment data file. Penetration 
come from the number of enrollees in HMO and local PPO plans out of the total number 
of eligible Medicare beneficiaries in the county. Second, we construct the instrument 
using county-level MA payment rates. County-level payment rates come from the 
Medicare Rate Book and the State/County/Plan database. We use aged rates from HMO 
and local PPO plans, weighted by the number of enrollees in these plans out of the total 
number of MA enrollees in the county. We use HMO and local PPO data because 
regional PPO and PFFS plans operate in different bidding schemes. We present variation 
in payment across our study years in Figure 1. 
 
Outcome variables 
We construct several outcome measures using the HCUP data. First, we examine 
among all hospitalized Medicare beneficiaries in our sample the probability of discharge 
home (versus to a postacute facility) using discharge destination variable available in the 
dataset. To test whether the average hospitalized patient would have received more care 
intensive services, we also construct the probability of each discharge destination type 
(home, skilled nursing, home health, inpatient rehab, long-term care hospital). The HCUP 
data also allows for the calculation of quality of care through revisit links, which allows 
for measure of readmissions after a discharge to postacute care. We construct these 
quality measures by first excluding planned inpatient readmissions, and then linking 
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revisit variables within the calendar year to calculate 30-day readmissions from the 
discharge of an inpatient hospital stay. 
We also examine the above outcomes for postacute users only, a relatively higher 
risk margin of hospitalized patients. For discharge destination, we examine the 
probability of going to one of the four types of postacute facilities (skilled nursing, home 
health, inpatient rehabilitation, and long-term care hospital). All models are binary 
outcomes where we use linear probability models. 
 
Covariates 
The Area Health Resource File (AHRF) provides county-level economic and 
demographic covariates by year, which we merged to patients’ county of residence. The 
AHRF provides county-level hospital and postacute care characteristics, including the 
number of skilled nursing facilities and home health agencies. We calculate the per capita 
SNF and HH agencies and the number of physicians in the county. We also control for 
county-level MA and FFS health risk scores, obtained from the MA plan enrollment files 
and FFS Medicare geographic variation files, and county FFS spending adjusted for 
price, age, sex, and race, obtained from the Dartmouth Atlas Medicare Spending files.  
Patient-level controls include age, race, and sex, derived from the HCUP hospital 
discharge file. In addition to demographics, Charlson comorbidity index was constructed 
from diagnoses codes of the inpatient hospitalization (Deyo, Cherkin, & Ciol, 1992). We 
utilize the Charlson because of its construction using only inpatient claims codes 
compared to other comorbidity measures that utilize both outpatient and inpatient 
information (i.e Elixhauser, HCC). We also include a measure of geriatric risk scores that 
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captures conditions related to frailty, functional status, and other conditions common 
among high risk users of the elderly more likely to use additional post-hospital care (Kan 
et al., 2018). 
 
Results 
3.1 million discharges are included in our final sample based on restrictions 
described above. Thirty-seven percent of discharges were covered by Medicare 
Advantage. MA discharges tended to be younger, more likely to be Black or Hispanic 
and less frail (Table 1). They also tended to be in counties with higher MA payments and 
higher FFS spending.  
 
First stage 
 Table 2 shows the results of our first stage estimations for our instrumental 
variable model. All regressions include county and year fixed effects as well as other 
covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. The results suggest that an 
increase in benchmark payment of $100 increases penetration by about 3 percent, all 
significant at the p<0.01 level, which are comparable to estimates reported elsewhere in 
the MA literature at 3-5% (Baicker et al., 2013; Chernew et al., 2008).   
 
OLS and IV estimates 
We begin by analyzing outcomes at the county level for postacute users (Table 3). 
Recall that this will only capture care conditional on having been admitted to the hospital 
and discharged to postacute. Both the OLS and IV estimates suggest that there is no 
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statistically significant relationship between MA enrollment and outcomes among 
postacute users. We do consider the magnitude and direction of these estimates (Figure 
2). In our OLS estimates for discharge probability to SNFs, there is an increase by one 
percentage point (s.e. 0.01) among all FFS Medicare postacute users with every 10% 
increase in MA enrollment in the county, but the direction is negative for MA. In 
contrast, our OLS estimates for discharge probability to HHAs decreases for FFS 
Medicare postacute users but the direction is positive for MA. As discussed above, there 
are several reasons why ordinary least squares regressions results indicating relationships 
of enrollment and utilization may be biased. Because SNFs are more care intensive and 
costly Medicare services, these OLS estimates could suggest that MA plans tend to 
operate in counties with higher FFS spending. The increased use of HHA among MA 
patients in greater MA enrollment counties could also suggest that healthier patients who 
use less intensive services are more likely to be managed care enrollees.  
Our IV estimates are also not significant at the 0.05 level but we see the direction 
of some of our estimates change. In particular, IV estimates for the probabilities of 
discharge to SNF and HHA change for MA enrollees. These estimates suggest that a 10% 
increase in MA enrollment in a county leads to a five percentage point (s.e. 0.03) increase 
in the probability of being discharged to SNF (p<0.1) and a five percentage point (s.e. 
0.03) decrease in the probability of being discharged to HHA for MA discharges. These 
IV estimates suggest that FFS and MA may use postacute services similarly, where 
increased MA enrollment is associated with increased probability in discharge to SNF for 
both coverage types and decreased probability in discharge to HHA. The magnitude of 
these estimates is consistent with findings in previous studies. A 10% increase in MA 
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enrollment led to a five percentage point decline in hospitalization costs among all 
hospitalized Medicare patients and three percentage point decline in expected 
expenditures among FFS patients (Baicker et al., 2013; Chernew et al., 2008).   
Table 4 shows the effect of MA penetration on utilization among all hospitalized 
Medicare patients. These estimates are only conditional on inpatient stay rather than both 
an inpatient and postacute use. Again, we show both the OLS and IV estimates and they 
are nonsignificant at the 0.05 level. Our ordinary least squares estimates remain robust in 
direction but are smaller in magnitude. Our IV estimates for the probability of being 
discharged to SNFs is still significant at the 0.1 level, suggesting that a 10% increase in 
MA enrollment leads to a two percentage point (s.e. 0.01) increase in the probability of 
being discharged to SNF and a two percentage point (s.e. 0.01) decrease in the 
probability of being discharged to HHA for MA discharges. When we examine outcome 
of 30-day readmissions related to a postacute discharge, we see no relationship between 
MA enrollment on 30-day readmissions among postacute discharges nor all hospitalized 
discharges and the magnitude is small.  
 
Robustness checks 
In probit models (Appendix Table 2) and year specific payment instruments 
(Appendix Table 3) we see our results hold. In both of these specifications, increase in 
county MA enrollment leads to an increase in probability of discharge to SNF across MA 
and FFS discharges and a decrease in probability of discharge to HHA. We also see these 
results hold in hospital fixed effect models (Appendix 4-6). Some estimates become 
statistically significant, suggesting that FFS discharges are more likely to be discharged 
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to skilled nursing facilities with increases in MA penetration, accounting for hospital 
level factors.   
 
Discussion 
In this context, we find that MA enrollment has little effect on postacute use and 
quality (as we are able to measure it) both within the overall Medicare market and 
separately within FFS and MA. Counties with higher MA enrollment did not have 
statistically different postacute discharge destinations or 30-day readmissions for either 
MA discharges, FFS discharges, or combined overall Medicare discharges. Results 
suggest that counties with higher MA enrollment potentially have higher probability of 
being discharged to more intensive postacute services (i.e. skilled nursing) among both 
MA and FFS discharges and lower probability of being discharged to less intensive 
services (i.e. home health and home).  
Although results were not significant, the change in direction of these estimates 
are interesting to note. The OLS specifications suggest that there are potential selection 
biases into MA, as discussed above, and that accounting for these effects through the 
instrument is important when considering the effect of payment programs on healthcare 
utilization. When accounting for confounding factors, at least in the state of Florida, it 
appears that MA plans may not be offering postacute services as divergently from the 
FFS sector as previously suggested using some national databases (Huckfeldt et al., 2017; 
Kumar et al., 2018; Waxman et al., 2016). For example, in counties with higher MA 
enrollment, the IV specification suggests that there is a positive relationship with the 
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probability of being discharged to higher intensity services (i.e. skilled nursing) and 
negative relationship with lower intensity services (i.e. home health and home).  
Some qualitative work suggests that discharge planning processes between 
hospitals and MA are heavily dependent on hospitals for deciding the site of postacute 
care, and MA plans become involved in choosing which specific SNF once SNFs are 
selected as the appropriate discharge setting (Gadbois et al., 2018). Similar work done to 
examine skilled nursing use among accountable care organization (ACO) participants 
reveal that reductions in SNF use were largely due to within-SNF changes specifically for 
ACO patients, rather than different SNF use (McWilliams et al., 2017). These findings 
may explain why we find null results in site of care in testing for intensity of services 
provided. Further research should examine that within each site of care, the intensity of 
services delivered to both FFS and MA discharges with increasing MA enrollment.  
We also do not know what mechanisms MA plans are utilizing their postacute 
services in markets with high MA enrollment. For example, it may be that in counties 
with high MA enrollment, limited managed care resources and capacity to appropriately 
discharge patients to lower intensity services lead to discharges to more resource rich 
settings. Thus, counties with higher MA enrollment see increased probabilities of 
discharge to skilled nursing facilities because arranging home health services become too 
time- and resource-intensive for managed care organizations. If this is the case, it may be 
important to monitor the effects of these higher intensive care practices on FFS 
discharges to ensure that ‘negative’ care patterns are not spilled over. 
 
Implications for policy and practice 
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 These findings from one large state during the period 2010 to 2014 suggest that 
the presence of MA plans in a market do not significantly alter the utilization of postacute 
services, unlike previous findings in the inpatient and outpatient setting. Proponents of 
MA cite that higher payments to MA may be justified if MA indeed offered better care 
delivery to their enrollees or if their care delivery altered the care delivery of FFS 
beneficiaries. Recent regulations have steadily increased MA payment rates (3.4% rate 
hike in 2019 and proposed 1.6% in 2020). Regulators and policymakers should consider 
the value of these rates hikes on benefits offered and healthcare utilization, especially for 
the growing population of older Americans in need of post-hospital care. Despite 
nonsignificant effects of high MA enrollment and Medicare postacute utilization in this 
study, policymakers should continue to evaluate its potential effects on access, utilization, 
and quality of postacute for both MA enrollees and FFS beneficiaries.  
 Further, as MA plans continue to expand nonmedical benefits that may reduce 
utilization among high risk group of older Americans, payers and providers will need to 
evaluate the efficiency of those services. First, policymakers should monitor the uptake of 
these supplemental benefits by MA plans and the uptake of enrollees gravitating toward 
these plans. A recent study finds that only 10% of plans are offering caregiver support 
services in 2019 and even less for in-home support and personal care services, although 
they are allowable benefits (Creighton & Young, 2018). Research has also demonstrated 
plan characteristics significantly impact beneficiaries’ decisions to enroll in MA and 
individuals sort themselves systematically into plans based on their health characteristics 
(Atherly, Dowd, & Feldman, 2004; Dowd, Feldman, & Coulam, 2003). If high need 
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patients continually disenroll from MA plans, additional federal payments and expanded 
benefits may not be helping those most at need.  
 
Limitations 
There are limitations to this work. First, we examine only the Florida Medicare 
market, which is a unique high-cost Medicare environment given its prior high growth 
rates (Large & Sear, 2005). Results may not be generalizable to other Medicare markets. 
Second, these estimates are conditional on an inpatient hospital stay; this may bias our 
results given that MA enrollees are less likely to be admitted to the inpatient setting in the 
first place (Afendulis, Chernew, & Kessler, 2017). Thus, MA patients in need of inpatient 
stays are a higher risk group that also need higher intensity post-hospital care (i.e. skilled 
nursing). This may contribute to the increased probability of being discharged to skilled 
nursing among MA discharges in counties with high MA enrollment. We also cannot 
interpret our findings as a causal mechanism; that is, higher MA enrollment did not cause 
different probabilities of utilization. Further research should explore the mechanisms that 
cause differential utilization. Finally, data comes from the HCUP State Inpatient 
Databases, sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Databases are 
derived from administrative data and contain encounter-level, clinical and nonclinical 
information. There may be concerns on the accuracy of reporting but because of limited 
access to MA information, using the HCUP SIDs have been common to explore MA 





To our knowledge, this is the first paper that examines the impact of growing MA 
enrollment on the probability of receiving postacute services in both the MA and FFS 
setting. Previous research in other contexts suggest that MA enrollment has an effect on 
utilization and spending in the Medicare market and spillovers from Medicare managed 
care are substantial in the inpatient setting. We extend the literature by examining 
utilization in Medicare postacute and take advantage of the changes in payment policy to 
gauge the causal effect of MA enrollment on system-wide postacute care and find little 
effect. We hope these negative findings will motivate continued research in other states 
and during more recent time periods. With the growing coverage of MA enrollees and 
greater use of post-hospital services, further payment policy changes to the MA program 
should not only monitor inpatient utilization and outcome but other types of utilization, 
access, and quality.  
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of Medicare beneficiary hospital discharges from Florida: 
All Medicare, Fee-For-Service (FFS) only, and Medicare Advantage (MA) only, 
2010-2014 
 Medicare FFS MA 
n 3,100,841 2,125,287 975,554 
Beneficiary characteristics    
Age 78.1 (8.1) 78.7 (8.3) 77.0 (7.8) 
Female 55.9% 56.5% 54.6% 
Race    
White 76.6% 81.7% 65.7% 
Black 8.7% 7.2% 12.1% 
Hispanic 13.1% 9.7% 20.5% 
Asian/PI 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
Native American 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Other 1.0% 0.9% 1.2% 
Clinical Characteristics    
Charlson comorbidity 2.1 (2.1) 2.1 (2.1) 2.0 (2.0) 
ACG Frailty category    
0 73.7% 71.6% 78.4% 
1 20.2% 21.5% 17.3% 
2+ 6.1% 7.0% 4.3% 
Discharged home 47.9% 44.4% 55.5% 
30-day readmissions 17.5% 18.3% 15.7% 
Among postacute users, discharged to    
SNF 47.8% 48.8% 44.9% 
HHA 45.1% 43.2% 50.4% 
IRF 5.8% 6.6% 3.7% 
LTCH 1.3% 1.4% 1.0% 
County characteristics     
Number of SNFs/capita 0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 
Number of HHAs/capita 0.08 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06) 0.09 (0.07) 
Number of physicians/capita 0.06 (0.07) 0.06 (0.07) 0.06 (0.06) 
    
MA payment (PMPM), $ 562 (201) 531 (197) 630 (193) 
FFS risk score 1.1 (0.10) 0.96 (0.36) 1.14 (0.10) 
MA risk score 1.0 (0.35) 1.10 (0.09) 1.14 (0.30) 
MA enrollment (HMO/PPO), % 28.0 (14.6) 25.5 (14.3) 33.5 (13.9) 









Notes: Data comes from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State Florida Inpatient 
Database (2010-2014), CMS Medicare public use files, Area Health Resource File, Dartmouth 
Atlas Medicare Spending File. Sample excludes inpatient discharges <65 year of age, not covered 
by Medicare, and not residing in Florida. Frailty category is constructed based on the Johns 
Hopkins ACG Risk Adjustment Methodology using hospital discharge diagnoses. County 
characteristics are average rates based on the patients’ county of residence. MA payment is 
defined as aged payment of HMO and local PPO plans, weighted by the number of enrollees. MA 
enrollment is defined as HMO and local PPO plan enrollment out of the total number of Medicare 
beneficiaries in the county. FFS risk scores come from the FFS aged HCC score from CMS 
Medicare public use files; MA risk scores come from the weighted HMO and local PPO plan risk 
score from CMS Medicare public use files. FFS spending is defined as the price, age, sex, and 
race adjusted total spending in the county for FFS Medicare. Abbreviations are as follows: skilled 
nursing facility (SNF); home health agency (HHA); inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF); long-




Table 3.2: First stage estimates of county Medicare Advantage (MA) payments on MA enrollment among Medicare 
hospitalized patients by enrollment type (FL, 2010-2014) 
 
Outcome: MA Enrollment (1-100%) 
 Home and postacute discharges Postacute discharges only 
 Medicare FFS MA Medicare FFS MA 
MA Payment ($100 PMPM) 3.392*** 3.206*** 3.84*** 3.385*** 3.233*** 3.839*** 
 (0.527) (0.507) (0.601) (0.535) (0.530) (0.572) 
F statistics 41.4 39.9 40.8 40.0 37.3 45.1 
       
n 3,100,841 2,125,287 975,554 1,615,460 1,181,156 434,304 
Notes: Left panel includes discharges to home and postacute in Florida 2010-2014 study sample. Right panel includes discharges to postacute only 
in FL 2010-2014 study sample. Models are run in counties (based on patients’ county of residence) where Medicare (both FFS and MA) 
discharges occur in the sample, in counties where FFS discharges occur, and in counties where MA discharges occur. Dependent variable is MA 
enrollment defined as MA HMO and PPO enrollment, with units in percentages (1-100). MA payments are defined as unit increases of $100 per-
member-per-month (PMPM) in HMO and local PPO payments, weighted by enrollment. Models adjust for age, sex, race, Charlson comorbidity, 
frailty status, #SNFs/HHA/physicians per capita, county risk scores (FFS and MA), county FFS Medicare spending, and county and year FE. 




Figure 3.1: County Medicare Advantage payment in Florida 2010-2014 
 
Notes: County payment rate data are aged rates from the CMS Ratebook files for counties in 
Florida study sample. Payments are weighted by the HMO and local PPO enrollees of total MA 
enrollees in the county.  
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Table 3.3: Estimated effect of increase in MA enrollment in county on the 
probability of postacute destination and outcome among hospitalized Medicare 
postacute users by enrollment type, OLS vs IV results (FL, 2010-2014) 
 
Independent variable: MA enrollment 
 OLS IV 
 Medicare FFS MA Medicare FFS MA 
n 1,615,460 1,181,156 434,304 1,615,460 1,181,156 434,304 
 SNF 
 0.00116 0.00145 -0.000588 0.00331 0.00275 0.00512* 
 (0.000959) (0.00101) (0.00111) (0.00214) (0.00212) (0.00307) 
        
 HHA 
 -0.000935 -0.00127 0.000168 -0.00324 -0.00301 -0.00476 
 (0.00111) (0.00120) (0.00117) (0.00261) (0.00266) (0.00313) 
        
 IRF 
 -0.000233 -0.000164 0.000201 0.000624 0.00105 -0.000100 
 (0.000744) (0.000931) (0.000492) (0.00159) (0.00195) (0.000910) 
        
 LTCH 
 5.60e-06 -1.87e-05 0.000218 -0.000691 -0.000788 -0.000260 
 (0.000262) (0.000351) (0.000203) (0.000777) (0.00100) (0.000354) 
        
 30-day readmissions 
 -0.00120* -0.00144 -6.37e-05 -0.000263 -0.000293 4.77e-05 
 (0.000688) (0.000912) (0.000653) (0.00124) (0.00160) (0.00112) 
Notes:  
a. Estimates reflect probability of increase or decrease in utilization or readmission rates with a 
1% change in MA enrollment; robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on county). 
Outcomes are coded as binary linear probability models (=1 for discharge to a destination or 
experiencing readmissions; =0 otherwise). MA enrollment is defined as MA HMO and PPO 
enrollment, with units in percentages (1-100). Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates in left 
panel. Instrumental variables (IV) estimates in right panel and utilize MA county payment per-
member-per-month (PMPM) as the instrument. Models are run in Medicare (both FFS and MA) 
discharges, in FFS discharges, and in MA discharges.   
b. Sample excludes home discharges of inpatient Medicare patients in Florida 2010-2014 study 
sample. Models adjust for age, sex, race, Charlson comorbidity, frailty status, 
#SNFs/HHA/physicians per capita, county risk scores (FFS and MA), county FFS Medicare 
spending, and county and year FE.  
c. Abbreviations are as follows: skilled nursing facility (SNF); home health agency (HHA); 
inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF); long-term care hospital (LTCH). *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * 
p<0.1  
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Table 3.4: Estimated effect of increase in MA enrollment in county on the 
probability of post-hospital destination and outcome among hospitalized Medicare 
postacute users and patients discharged home by enrollment type, OLS vs IV results 
(FL, 2010-2014) 
 
Independent variable: MA enrollment 
 OLS IV 
 Medicare FFS MA Medicare FFS MA 
n 3,100,841 2,125,287 975,554 3,100,841 2,125,287 975,554 
 Discharge home 
 0.000800 0.00135 -0.000366 -0.000129 -0.000627 0.000533 
 (0.000788) (0.000915) (0.000676) (0.00167) (0.00192) (0.00145) 
        
 SNF 
 0.000167 0.000163 -0.000198 0.00179* 0.00186 0.00207* 
 (0.000535) (0.000607) (0.000537) (0.00107) (0.00130) (0.00115) 
        
 HHA 
 -0.000832 -0.00136 0.000357 -0.00152 -0.00130 -0.00234 
 (0.000708) (0.000821) (0.000714) (0.00187) (0.00199) (0.00197) 
       
 IRF 
 -0.000125 -0.000115 9.99e-05 0.000236 0.000527 -0.000140 
 (0.000391) (0.000530) (0.000221) (0.000800) (0.00106) (0.000381) 
        
 LTCH 
 -9.51e-06 -3.86e-05 0.000107 -0.000376 -0.000460 -0.000125 
 (0.000137) (0.000198) (9.30e-05) (0.000393) (0.000535) (0.000164) 
       
 30-day readmissions 
 -0.000868** -0.000952 -0.000422 9.69e-05 0.000132 0.000435 
 (0.000407) (0.000577) (0.000407) (0.000879) (0.00112) (0.000710) 
Notes:  
a. Estimates reflect probability of increase or decrease in utilization or readmission rates with a 
1% change in MA enrollment; robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on county). 
Outcomes are coded as binary linear probability models (=1 for discharge to a destination or 
experiencing readmissions; =0 otherwise). MA enrollment is defined as MA HMO and PPO 
enrollment, with units in percentages (1-100). Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates in left 
panel. Instrumental variables (IV) estimates in right panel and utilize MA county payment per-
member-per-month (PMPM) as the instrument. Models are run in Medicare (both FFS and MA) 
discharges, in FFS discharges, and in MA discharges.   
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b. Sample includes home and postacute discharges of inpatient Medicare patients in Florida 2010-
2014 study sample. Models adjust for age, sex, race, Charlson comorbidity, frailty status, 
#SNFs/HHA/physicians per capita, county risk scores (FFS and MA), county FFS Medicare 
spending, and county and year FE.  
c. Abbreviations are as follows: skilled nursing facility (SNF); home health agency (HHA); 
inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF); long-term care hospital (LTCH).  
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Figure 3.2: Estimated percentage point change in probability of outcome with 10% 
increase in county MA enrollment among fee-for-service Medicare and Medicare 
Advantage hospitalized discharges (FL, 2010-2014) 
 
 Fee-for-Service Medicare 
 
 
 Medicare Advantage 
 
Notes: Outcome of discharge to home is among hospitalized Medicare beneficiaries discharged to 
home and postacute. Outcome of discharge to SNF and HHA is among hospitalized Medicare 
postacute users only. Fee-for-service (top) and Medicare Advantage (bottom) discharges are 
presented in different panels. Blue indicates ordinary least squares (OLS) models and red 
indicates instrumental variable (IV) models. On the x-axis, probability of outcome ranges from -
10 to 10 percentage points. Abbreviations are as follows: skilled nursing facility (SNF); home 
health agency (HHA). See Tables 3 and 4 for more description of model specification.   
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Appendix Table 3.1: Estimated effect of increase in MA enrollment in county on 
selected health-related characteristics of fee-for-service Medicare sample 
 
 FFS risk score Charlson Index 
     
MA enrollment -0.000172 0.00426 
 (0.00146) (0.0042) 
   
n 2,125,287 2,125,287 
Notes: Estimates reflect increase or decrease in health-related characteristics in fee-for-service 
Medicare population; robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on county). Charlson index 
estimate is the Charlson comorbidity index for FFS Medicare hospitalized beneficiaries in the 
study sample excluding <65 years old, not discharged to home or postacute, and those not 
residing in Florida. FFS risk score estimate is the county-level FFS risk scores where the FFS 
Medicare hospitalized beneficiaries in the study sample reside in. County MA enrollment is 
defined as MA HMO and PPO enrollment, with units in percentages (1-100). Models utilize MA 
PMPM county payment as the instrument. Models adjust for age, sex, race, 
#SNFs/HHA/physicians per capita, county FFS Medicare spending, and county and year FE. *** 




Appendix Table 3.2: Estimated marginal effect (probit model) of increase in MA 
enrollment in county on the probability of postacute destination and outcome 
among hospitalized Medicare patients by enrollment type, OLS vs IV results (FL, 
2010-2014) 
 
Independent variable: MA enrollment 
 OLS IV 
 Medicare FFS MA Medicare FFS MA 
n 1,615,460 1,181,156 434,304 1,615,460 1,181,156 434,304 
 SNF 
 0.00306 0.00381 -0.00155 0.00895 0.00745 0.00745 
 (0.00256) (0.00268) (0.00300) (0.00583) (0.00580) (0.00580) 
       
 HHA 
 -0.00250 -0.00345 0.000461 -0.00884 -0.00833 -0.0128 
 (0.00300) (0.00325) (0.00313) (0.00714) (0.00729) (0.00846) 
       
 IRF 
 -0.00223 -0.00248 0.00756 0.00514 0.00778 0.00263 
 (0.00682) (0.00742) (0.00745) (0.0147) (0.0162) (0.0165) 
       
 LTCH 
 -0.000852 -0.00159 0.00780 -0.0306 -0.0321 -0.0166 
 (0.00978) (0.0120) (0.00857) (0.0311) (0.0370) (0.0192) 
       
 30-day readmissions 
 -0.00426* -0.00497 -0.000205 0.00347** 0.00397** 0.00554*** 
 (0.00242) (0.00315) (0.00247) (0.00141) (0.00160) (0.00877) 
Notes:  
a. Estimates reflect the marginal probability of increase or decrease in utilization or readmission 
rates with a 1% change in MA enrollment; robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on 
county). Outcomes are coded as binary probit models (=1 for discharge to a destination or 
experiencing readmissions; =0 otherwise). MA enrollment is defined as MA HMO and PPO 
enrollment, with units in percentages (1-100). Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates in left 
panel. Instrumental variables (IV) estimates in right panel and utilize MA county payment per-
member-per-month (PMPM) as the instrument. Models are run in Medicare (both FFS and MA) 
discharges, in FFS discharges, and in MA discharges.   
b. Sample excludes home discharges of inpatient Medicare patients in Florida 2010-2014 study 
sample. Models adjust for age, sex, race, Charlson comorbidity, frailty status, 
#SNFs/HHA/physicians per capita, county risk scores (FFS and MA), county FFS Medicare 
spending, and county and year FE.  
c. Abbreviations are as follows: skilled nursing facility (SNF); home health agency (HHA); 
inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF); long-term care hospital (LTCH). *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * 
p<0.1  
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Appendix Table 3.3: Estimated effect of increase in MA enrollment (using year-
specific payment instrument) in county on the probability of postacute destination 
and outcome among hospitalized Medicare patients by enrollment type, OLS vs IV 
results (FL, 2010-2014) 
 
Independent variable: MA enrollment 
 IV 
 Medicare FFS MA 
n 1,615,460 1,181,156 434,304 
 SNF 
 0.00330 0.00275 0.00505* 
 (0.00213) (0.00211) (0.00306) 
    
 HHA 
 -0.00323 -0.00301 -0.00470 
 (0.00260) (0.00264) (0.00312) 
    
 IRF 
 0.000623 0.00105 -8.94e-05 
 (0.00158) (0.00194) (0.000907) 
    
 LTCH 
 -0.000689 -0.000785 -0.000259 
 (0.000773) (0.000995) (0.000353) 
    
 30 day readmissions 
 -0.000255 -0.000282 5.32e-05 
 (0.00123) (0.00159) (0.00112) 
Notes:  
a. Estimates reflect the marginal probability of increase or decrease in utilization or readmission 
rates with a 1% change in MA enrollment; robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on 
county). Outcomes are coded as binary linear probability models (=1 for discharge to a 
destination or experiencing readmissions; =0 otherwise). MA enrollment is defined as MA HMO 
and PPO enrollment, with units in percentages (1-100). Instrumental variables (IV) estimates 
utilize MA county year-specific payment per-member-per-month (PMPM) as the instrument. 
Models are run in Medicare (both FFS and MA) discharges, in FFS discharges, and in MA 
discharges.   
b. Sample excludes home discharges of inpatient Medicare patients in Florida 2010-2014 study 
sample. Models adjust for age, sex, race, Charlson comorbidity, frailty status, 
#SNFs/HHA/physicians per capita, county risk scores (FFS and MA), county FFS Medicare 
spending, and county and year FE.  
c. Abbreviations are as follows: skilled nursing facility (SNF); home health agency (HHA); 
inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF); long-term care hospital (LTCH). *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * 
p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 3.4: First stage estimates of county Medicare Advantage (MA) payments on MA enrollment among Medicare 
hospitalized patients, hospital fixed effects 
 
 
Outcome: MA Enrollment (1-100%) 
 Home and postacute discharges Postacute discharges 
 Medicare FFS MA Medicare FFS MA 
MA Payment ($100 PMPM) 3.305*** 3.330*** 3.312*** 3.314*** 3.357*** 3.259*** 
 (0.3854) (0.379) (0.460) (0.353) (0.358) (0.390) 
F statistics 73.6 77.1 51.9 88.1 87.8 69.8 
       
n 3,097,522 2,123,704 973,818 1,614,248 1,180,436 433,812 
Notes: Left panel includes discharges to home and postacute in Florida 2010-2014 study sample. Right panel includes discharges to postacute only 
in FL 2010-2014 study sample. Models are run in hospitals where Medicare (both FFS and MA) discharges occur in the sample, in hospitals where 
FFS discharges occur, and in hospitals where MA discharges occur. Dependent variable is MA enrollment defined as MA HMO and PPO 
enrollment, with units in percentages (1-100). MA payments are defined as unit increases of $100 per-member-per-month (PMPM) in HMO and 
local PPO payments, weighted by enrollment. Models adjust for age, sex, race, Charlson comorbidity, frailty status, #SNFs/HHA/physicians per 
capita, county risk scores (FFS and MA), county FFS Medicare spending, and hospital and year FE. Robust SE clustered at hospital. *** p<0.01; 
** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 3.5: Estimated effect of increase in MA enrollment in county on the 
probability of postacute destination and outcome among hospitalized Medicare 




Independent variable: MA enrollment 
 OLS IV 
  Medicare FFS MA Medicare FFS MA 
n 1,614,248 1,180,436 433,812 1,614,248 1,180,436 433,812 
 SNF 
 0.00173** 0.00187** 0.000818 0.00279** 0.00355** 0.00176 
 (0.000690) (0.000818) (0.000693) (0.00127) (0.00160) (0.00142) 
        
 HHA 
 -0.00205*** -0.00238*** -0.00134** -0.00236* -0.00269* -0.00249* 
 (0.000689) (0.000798) (0.000663) (0.00129) (0.00157) (0.00137) 
        
 IRF 
 0.000279 0.000445 0.000495 -0.000327 -0.000717 0.000569 
 (0.000335) (0.000399) (0.000301) (0.000689) (0.000899) (0.000556) 
        
 LTCH 
 4.05e-05 6.93e-05 2.52e-05 -0.000105 -0.000142 0.000161 
 (0.000120) (0.000151) (0.000100) (0.000295) (0.000391) (0.000256) 
        
 30-day readmissions 
 -0.000263 -8.42e-05 -8.91e-05 -0.0019*** -0.0023*** -0.00063 
 (0.000420) (0.000514) (0.000379) (0.00067) (0.00081) (0.00085) 
Notes. 
a. Estimates reflect probability of increase or decrease in utilization or readmission rates with a 
1% change in MA enrollment; robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on hospital). 
Outcomes are coded as binary linear probability models (=1 for discharge to a destination or 
experiencing readmissions; =0 otherwise). MA enrollment is defined as MA HMO and PPO 
enrollment, with units in percentages (1-100). Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates in left 
panel. Instrumental variables (IV) estimates in right panel and utilize MA county payment per-
member-per-month (PMPM) as the instrument. Models are run in Medicare (both FFS and MA) 
discharges, in FFS discharges, and in MA discharges.   
b. Sample excludes home discharges of inpatient Medicare patients in Florida 2010-2014 study 
sample. Models adjust for age, sex, race, Charlson comorbidity, frailty status, 
#SNFs/HHA/physicians per capita, county risk scores (FFS and MA), county FFS Medicare 
spending, and hospital and year FE.  
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c. Abbreviations are as follows: skilled nursing facility (SNF); home health agency (HHA); 




Appendix Table 3.6: Estimated effect of increase in MA enrollment in county on the 
probability of post hospital destination and outcome among hospitalized Medicare 
postacute users and patients discharged home by enrollment type using hospital 
fixed effects, OLS vs IV results (FL, 2010-2014) 
 
Independent variable: MA enrollment 
 OLS IV 
 Medicare FFS MA Medicare FFS MA 
n 3,097,522 2,123,704 973,818 3,097,522 2,123,704 973,818 
 Discharge home 
 0.00130** 0.00159** 0.000123 0.00015 -0.000058 0.00052 
 (0.000615) (0.000726) (0.000672) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0011) 
        
 SNF 
 0.000283 0.000305 0.000220 0.00107 0.00169* 0.000340 
 (0.000399) (0.000510) (0.000420) (0.000720) (0.000940) (0.000777) 
        
 HHA 
 -0.00166*** -0.00206*** -0.000551 -0.00103 -0.00127 -0.00111 
 (0.000537) (0.000620) (0.000474) (0.000946) (0.00117) (0.000846) 
        
 IRF 
 4.82e-05 0.000124 0.000184 -0.000159 -0.000318 0.000168 
 (0.000160) (0.000196) (0.000135) (0.000335) (0.000461) (0.000240) 
        
 LTCH 
 2.76e-05 4.04e-05 2.44e-05 -3.50e-05 -4.87e-05 8.19e-05 
 (5.69e-05) (7.46e-05) (4.34e-05) (0.000142) (0.000198) (0.000110) 
        
 30-day readmissions 
 -0.000259 -0.000139 -0.000136 -0.0012*** -0.0014*** -0.00045 
 (0.000257) (0.000292) (0.000261) (0.00046) (0.00051) (0.00057) 
Notes:  
a. Estimates reflect probability of increase or decrease in utilization or readmission rates with a 
1% change in MA enrollment; robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on hospital). 
Outcomes are coded as binary linear probability models (=1 for discharge to a destination or 
experiencing readmissions; =0 otherwise). MA enrollment is defined as MA HMO and PPO 
enrollment, with units in percentages (1-100). Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates in left 
panel. Instrumental variables (IV) estimates in right panel and utilize MA county payment per-
member-per-month (PMPM) as the instrument. Models are run in Medicare (both FFS and MA) 
discharges, in FFS discharges, and in MA discharges.   
b. Sample includes home and postacute discharges of inpatient Medicare patients in Florida 2010-
2014 study sample. Models adjust for age, sex, race, Charlson comorbidity, frailty status, 
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#SNFs/HHA/physicians per capita, county risk scores (FFS and MA), county FFS Medicare 
spending, and hospital and year FE.  
c. Abbreviations are as follows: skilled nursing facility (SNF); home health agency (HHA); 
inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF); long-term care hospital (LTCH).  
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ASSOCIATION BETWEEN QUALITY AND MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 






Background: The characteristics of nursing homes serving Medicare Advantage (MA) 
patients is not well understood. With increasing coverage of older Americans by MA, 
there is little understanding whether MA plans, and consumers with MA coverage, 
concentrate in high quality nursing facilities aided by public reporting to guide their 
decisions on nursing home selection. The study first aims to examine the quality 
measures associated with a facility with a high percentage of MA patients. Second, the 
study aims to examines whether the relationship between quality and percentage of MA 
patients changes after the introduction of national nursing home quality reporting 
programs: Nursing Home Compare in 2002 and the updated “5-star” rating program in 
2008. 
 
Methods: Using nursing home facility level Long-Term Care Focus datasets developed 
by Brown University, longitudinal trends of nursing home use by Medicare Advantage 
enrollees were examined over the period 2000 to 2010. Logistic regressions were used to 
examine the association between quality metrics of nursing homes and the percentage of 
MA patients served. Finally, an interrupted time series design was used to examine the 
relationship between changes in MA patients and quality metrics after national public 
reporting. 
 
Results:  Nursing homes with high percentage (>25%) of MA patients are more likely to 
have greater total registered nurse (RN) hours per resident day and worse clinical quality.  
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During the study period, total nursing staffing hours increased during the study period, 
but high MA facilities saw greater increases of RN hours. Specifically, higher RN hours 
are associated with greater odds of being a high MA facility. The introduction of the first 
round Nursing Home Compare reporting program and then the transition to the simpler 
star rating reporting program had mixed or minimal associations with changes in 
percentage of MA patients and quality metrics.  
 
Conclusion: MA patients may be receiving different nursing care compared to other 
Medicare beneficiaries. Public reporting of quality measures may not have great 
influences on where MA patients receive their care. Other indicators may be driving 
provider networks, collaboratives, and other formal and informal relationships. As MA 
plans continue to attract a larger share of the Medicare population relative to FFS 
Medicare, more information on the nursing home decisions made by MA plan enrollees 




Medicare has promoted enrollment in private capitated plans for Medicare 
beneficiaries for the past 25 years. Currently known as Medicare Advantage (MA), the 
goal of these private Medicare plans has been to incentivize closer management of 
healthcare and innovation through at-risk contracts. For example, starting in 2019 MA 
plans can offer health related supplemental benefits such as in-home support services and 
other newly allowable benefits that could benefit an aging population. Due to the appeal 
of these and other benefits, 33% of all Medicare beneficiaries chose to enroll in MA in 
2017 and the program is expected to grow to 40% by 2025 (Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission [MedPAC], 2015). During this high MA growth period, there has also been 
an increasing use of nursing homes among Medicare beneficiaries. The proportion of MA 
enrollees in nursing homes more than doubled between 2000 and 2013, increasing 125% 
during the past two decades (Jung, Li, Rahman, & Mor, 2018).  
Nursing home quality has long been a contentious policy issue (Zhang & 
Grabowski, 2004).  There has been disagreement as to which indicators are appropriate 
and which initiatives for improving quality are effective (Bostick, Rantz, Flesner, & 
Riggs, 2006; Castle & Ferguson, 2010). Public reporting of quality measures has been 
used as one approach to facilitate direct consumer choice of high-quality facilities and 
thus offer incentives to lower-quality facilities for improvement. Quality of care and 
safety information in these public reports have typically include staffing levels, discrete 
clinical quality measures, and results from state-run health inspections. In 2002, the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) launched Nursing Home Compare 
(NHC) to document and report quality measures intended to offer consumers information 
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to guide their care decisions. Previous to this program, there were no systematic 
mechanism to inform consumers regarding quality of nursing homes. In 2008, CMS 
converted the reporting of individual measures on NHC to a 1 to 5-star rating system to 
simplify and present a global measures of nursing home quality.  
Previous research has documented the effects of nursing home public reporting; 
finding that quality improved after implementation, where consumer demand resulted in 
loss of market share for lower quality facilities, patient sorting occurred such that high-
risk patients were more likely to be in higher-quality facilities, and quality improved for 
the care received by dual-eligible nursing home residents (Grabowski & Town, 2011; 
Konetzka, Grabowski, Perraillon, & Werner, 2015; Mukamel, Weimer, Spector, Ladd, & 
Zinn, 2008; Werner, Stuart, & Polsky, 2010; Werner, Konetzka, & Kim, 2013; Werner, 
Konetzka, & Kruse, 2009; Werner, Konetzka, & Polsky, 2016; Werner, Konetzka, Stuart, 
& Polsky, 2011; Werner, Norton, Konetzka, & Polsky, 2012). There is limited research 
examining the quality of care received by Medicare Advantage nursing home residents 
and the existing findings are mixed. Among all nursing home residents (including both 
postacute and long-term patients), facilities with higher share of MA residents tend to 
have better quality indicators (Jung et al., 2018). However, among those admitted on a 
postacute basis, findings suggest that MA patients are more likely to enter lower quality 
facilities compared to their fee-for-service Medicare counterparts (Meyers, Mor, & 
Rahman, 2018). 
The previous studies examining public reporting have not examined its impact on 
beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans, where there are strong financial 
incentives to avoid unnecessary care. With increasing coverage of older Americans by 
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Medicare Advantage, there is little understanding whether MA plans, and consumers with 
MA coverage, concentrate in high quality nursing facilities potentially aided by public 
reporting to guide their decisions on nursing home selection. This study aims to expand 
our understanding of the MA program and its use of nursing homes by examining the 
association between nursing home quality levels and share of Medicare Advantage 
residents. In particular, the study first aims to examine the quality measures associated 
with a facility with a high percentage of MA patients. Subsequently, the study aims to 
examines whether the relationship between quality and percentage of MA patients 
changes after the introduction of each of CMS’ nursing home quality reporting programs: 




The primary dataset used for this analysis was developed by Brown University, 
which collates publicly available nursing home metrics available from CMS and other 
federal sources over time. This dataset, known as “Long-Term Care Focus” 
(http://ltcfocus.org/), combines nursing home information from Online Survey 
Certification and Reporting (OSCAR), Minimum Data Set (MDS), Area Health Resource 
File, and Medicare enrollment and claims data to build the residential history file (RHF). 
The RHF is a per-person chronological history of all persons who had either an MDS 
assessment or a skilled nursing facility (SNF) claim during the calendar year (Intrator, 
Hiris, Berg, Miller, & Mor, 2011). Then using the first Thursday in April in each of the 
study years, the sample contains people who had a nursing home episode that covered 
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that date, which includes a SNF stay, a non-SNF stay, or receiving hospice care in 
nursing homes. We use the facility-level dataset which aggregates the residential history 
file up to the institution as our main data source.  
 
Study population 
We include all nursing homes certified by Medicare and Medicaid from 2000-
2010. From LTCFocus, 18,049 facilities, contributing 177,987 observations, were present 
for the 2000-2010 timespan. We restricted the sample to facilities reporting percentage of 
MA residents, which reduced our sample to 15,651 unique facilities and 96,667 facility-
year observations from 2000-2010. Data from 2010 were used to identify characteristics 
of nursing homes.  
 
Main independent variables 
The main variables of interest are staffing levels and clinical quality measures of 
nursing homes. We include several measures of staffing from LTCFocus that calculates 
staffing hours during the two weeks prior to the annual OSCAR survey divided by the 
number of residents in the facility. This is the standard staffing measures reported in the 
literature and was used in Nursing Home Compare. The staff categories include 
registered nurse (RN) per resident day, licensed practical nurse (LPN) per resident day, 
certified nursing assistant (CNA) per resident day, and total nurse staff hours (RN + LPN 
+ CNA) per resident day.  
We use a mix of short- and long-stay clinical quality measures reported in 
Nursing Home Compare. These include postacute care measure—improvements in 
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walking—and chronic care measures—catheter use, bladder or bowel incontinence, 
urinary tract infection (UTI), and activities of daily living (ADL)—for the population of 
residents in nursing facilities on the first Thursday in April, drawn from the most recent 
MDS assessment. Improvement in walking is the facility’s proportion of residents who 
can walk independently down a corridor. Residents with a catheter represents the 
facility’s proportion of residents with an indwelling catheter. The residents with bladder 
or bowel incontinence measures are the facility’s proportion of residents who are bladder 
or bowel incontinent in the past 14 days of the most recent MDS. Residents with UTI 
represents the facility’s proportion of residents with a UTI in the last 30 days of the most 
recent MDS. Finally, the average ADL is the facility’s residents’ average ADL score 
calculated from seven ADLs – bed mobility, transfer, locomotion on unit, dressing, 
eating, toilet use, and personal hygiene. The ADL score range is 0-28, where 0 indicates 
complete independence. Walking quality is reverse coded in our analyses so that all 
quality measures can be interpreted such that lower percentages and scores indicate better 
quality. For more information regarding these individual measures and which MDS 
questions were used to derive measures, please refer to the LTCFocus data page 
(http://ltcfocus.org/).  
 
Main dependent variable 
The main outcome of interest is facility’s percentage of Medicare Advantage 
residents. This number is derived for each facility in LTCfocus based on Medicare 
enrollment files for the proportion of residents covered by Medicare Health Maintenance 
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Organization on the 1st Thursday of April each year. Again, refer to the LTCFocus data 
page (http://ltcfocus.org/) for more information.  
 
Covariates 
Facility-level covariates are added to the model to explore the association of these 
factors and the percentage of MA patients and to help isolate the relationship between 
facility quality and MA. Facility-level covariates include structural characteristics 
(occupancy rate, total number of beds, profit status, hospital-based facility, chain-based 
facility), patient demographics (average age, percent female residents, percent White, 
Black, and Hispanic residents), patient case mix (percent of residents admitted directly 
from hospitals, percent that are skilled nursing days, and % Medicaid). We also include 
the county-level Medicare Advantage penetration rate for the facility, to control for the 
growth in MA enrollment in the mid-2000s, and geographic region. For missing 
observations on these covariates, the mean was calculated for each variable by year and 
this was applied for the missing indicator in all models. Sensitivity analyses were done 
without missing covariates (Appendix Tables 1 - 2). 
 
Statistical analyses 
We first describe the characteristics of nursing homes in the sample using 2010 
characteristics by categorizing facilities to high share of MA (>25%), low share of MA 
(1-24%), and no MA residents (0%). Then we create longitudinal panels to examine the 
quality and staffing trend over the 11-year period stratified by these MA categories.  
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Next, we used logistic regressions models to evaluate the adjusted associations 
between staffing and quality characteristics and the likelihood of being a high percentage 
MA facility compared to low and no MA facility. For ease of interpretation, continuous 
variables in staffing, quality, structural characteristics, patient demographics, and patient 
case mix are categorized as “high” if they are above the median and “low” if they are 
below. To evaluate the associations, we run several models. First, we run a base model 
including only facility structural characteristics, patient demographics, patient case mix, 
and geographic characteristics (Model 1). Second, we run a model without the base 
covariates but with staffing and quality (Model 2). Then, we run models that include base 
plus staffing levels (Model 3), and then separately base plus quality measures (Model 4). 
Finally, we run the full model using base plus staffing and quality (Model 5).  
Finally, we test for changes in the percentage of MA patients after the initial 
introduction of Nursing Home Compare (NHC) in 2002 and its transition into 5-star 
rating in 2008. Specifically, we test whether changes in percentage of MA residents 
differed as a function of staffing and quality measures in the pre-NHC period compared 
with the post-NHC period. We estimate the following:  
 
% MAjt =1IndVarjt + 2NHCt + 3IndVar jt * NHCt + 4Facilityjt + 5Countyjt 
+ Year + Facility + jt 
 
where percentage of Medicare Advantage residents is a function of independent variable 
(staffing or quality measures), pre- or post-NHC indicator variables, interaction of 
independent variable and NHC indicator, time-varying covariates, and facility and year 
fixed effects. The main variable of interest is 3IndVar jt * NHCt , where the coefficient 
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represents the differential change in the percent of MA patients after Nursing Home 
Compare relative to staffing (or quality) compared to before Nursing Home Compare. 
For the first set of analyses examining the introduction of NHC, 2NHCt is coded as 0 for 
years 2000-2001 and 1 for 2003-2005. For the second set of analyses examining the 




Nursing home characteristics by percentage of MA patients 
Characteristics of nursing homes are summarized in Table 1. Facilities are 
categorized as having greater than 25% Medicare Advantage residents, 1-24% MA 
residents, and no MA residents. High MA facilities tend to have greater total RN hours 
per resident day compared to no or low MA facilities (0.49 vs. 0.38 and 0.38, p<0.01). 
High MA facilities also tend to have higher total nursing hours compared to low MA 
facilities but not facilities with no MA residents (3.49 vs. 3.19 and 3.57; p<0.01). High 
MA facilities tend to have worse quality measures than no and low MA facilities, though 
the differences are small. For example, percent with UTI is 12.0% for high MA vs. 11.8% 
for low MA and 10.7% for no MA (p<0.01). Lower percentages indicate better quality. 
Residents in high MA facilities were somewhat older on average, more likely to be 
female, more likely to be White than racial/ethnic minorities, and were less likely to be 
Medicaid beneficiaries. High MA facilities were also more likely to have patients 
admitted from the hospital and patients with more skilled nursing covered days than no or 
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low MA facilities. They were also more likely to be located in the Northeast or West 
region and in markets with high MA penetration.   
 
Trend of staffing and quality measures in nursing homes by percentage of MA patients 
Figure 1 shows the trend of staffing levels in nursing homes by the percentage of 
MA patients from 2000 to 2010, with vertical indicating the introduction of Nursing 
Home Compare in 2002 and transition into star rating in 2008. Facilities with greater than 
25% of MA residents saw a greater increase in RN hours than facilities with low (1-24%) 
or no MA residents starting from 2008. The trend of LPN hours per resident day remain 
similar across different percentage of MA facilities, though a general increase in hours 
during the time period. Facilities with no MA residents saw an increase in CNA hours per 
resident day starting from 2007 compared to facilities with low or high MA, which saw 
general decrease in CNA levels. This all translated into greater increase of total nurse 
staff hours in no MA facilities compared to low or high MA facilities.  
Figure 2 shows the trend of quality measures in nursing homes by the percentage 
of MA patients. For all quality measures, no MA facilities tend to have lower percentages 
or scores (indicating better quality) than low and high MA facilities. There is also a 
general trend of worsening quality among all facilities across the study years.  
 
Adjusted relationship of staffing and quality measures on likelihood of being high 
percentage MA facility 
Table 2 shows the adjusted odds ratio of being a high percentage MA patient 
facility versus low and no percentage of MA facility. In particular, we focus on various 
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measures of staffing and quality. Model 1 is our base model excluding staffing and 
quality measures; the odds ratios on structural, demographic, case mix, and geographic 
remain consistent even when we add in staffing and quality measures, suggesting that 
staffing and quality play an independent role in predicting the likelihood of being a high 
MA facility. Model 2 suggests that without accounting for other facility characteristics, 
the relationship between staffing and quality on likelihood of being high MA is 
overestimated. For example, high RN increases the odds of being a high MA facility by 
1.92 (p<0.01). When accounting for other characteristics in models 3 and 5, the odds 
ratios decrease to 1.29 – 1.32 times (p<0.01) in models 3 and 5.  
Overall the models show consistent associations. High RN increases the odds of 
being a high MA facility by 1.3 times (p<0.01). High LPN is positively associated 
whereas high CNA is negatively associated with high MA facility, but both are 
nonsignificant. High catheter use (OR=1.3, p<0.01), high levels of UTI (OR=1.4, 
p<0.01), and high ADL scores (OR=1.2, p<0.05), all indicating worse quality, increase 
the odds of being a high MA facility. Walking and incontinence issues are not associated 
with the odds of being a high MA facility. 
 
Adjusted relationship of staffing and quality measures and percentage of MA residents 
after public reporting  
Table 3 presents changes in the percentage of MA residents after Nursing Home 
Compare was initially introduced in 2002. The mean of RN hours is 0.33 so a 1-unit 
increase would mean almost quadrupling of RN time to 1.34 hours per resident-day. A 
more realistic change that allows staffing measures to vary might be a 50 or 10 percent 
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increase in staffing level. We present these interpretations. A 50 percent increase in RN 
hours was associated with a 0.08% (p<0.01) greater increase in MA patients after the 
introduction Nursing Home Compare in 2002 compared to before. There were no 
significant results for LPN or CNA hours on the percentage of MA residents before and 
after public reporting. Table 4 suggests that the transition into star rating in 2008 resulted 
in significant associations with CNA levels. A 50 percent increase in CNA hours was 
associated with a 0.70% (p<0.01) greater decrease in MA patients after 2008 than before. 
A 50 percent increase in RN hours was still associated with a greater increase in MA 
patients (0.13%, p<0.05). Taken together, a 50 percent increase in total nurse staff hours 
was associated with a 0.52% (p<0.01) greater decrease in MA patients after 2008 than 
before.  
Quality measures also yield mixed results. With the introduction of public 
reporting, a 50 percent increase in patients who had urinary incontinence was associated 
with a 0.65% (p<0.01) greater increase in MA patients than before public reporting. In 
contrast, a 50 percent increase in patient with UTI was associated with greater decrease in 
MA patients (-2.36%, p<0.01). In 2008, worse quality was associated greater increase of 
MA patients. A 50 percent increase in patients whose walking did not improve was 
associated with 2.3% greater increase (p<0.01), with catheter use a 5.4% greater increase 
(p<0.01), with UTI a 3.6% greater increase (p<0.05), and worsening ADL a 1.6% greater 




We explored the relationship between facility staffing and quality measures and 
the percentage of Medicare Advantage enrollees who are residents in US nursing home 
facilities. We find that nursing homes that are “high MA” facilities are more likely to 
have greater total RN hours per resident day and worse clinical quality. They are also less 
likely to serve racial and ethnic minority residents or Medicaid beneficiaries and more 
likely to be in markets with greater Medicare managed care penetration. High MA 
nursing homes also tend to serve more patients admitted directly from the hospital and 
those Medicare beneficiaries with skilled nursing covered days. We also find that among 
the US cohort of nursing homes in the database, total nursing staffing hours increased 
during the study period, but different types of nursing staff appeared to have been added 
differentially at high MA facilities vs those with no or low MA use levels.  Most quality 
measures tended to worsen over the study period and no MA facilities consistently scored 
better. Specifically, we find that higher RN hours are associated with greater odds of 
being a high MA facility. Worsening catheter use, UTI, and ADL were also associated 
with greater odds of being a high MA facility. The introduction of the first round Nursing 
Home Compare reporting program and then the transition to the simpler star rating 
reporting program had mixed or minimal relationship with changes in the percentage of 
MA patients associated with improved metrics.  
We find mixed results in the relationship between a facility’s percentage of MA 
residents and its staffing and quality level. These results suggest that the intensity of 
nursing hours matters—high proportion of MA residents tended to be in and react with 
higher intensity nursing staff (i.e. RN hours) compared to lower intensity nursing staff. 
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There were also minimal changes in the percentage of MA residents by type of nursing 
staff after the introduction of Nursing Home Compare and its star rating system, even 
though these programs were aimed at enhancing sharing information directly to 
consumers and their families to increase the likelihood that higher quality facilities might 
attract more patients. The study also suggests that MA patients tend to be admitted to 
facilities with lower quality. Decreasing quality measures appear to be associated with 
being a higher MA facility, and there was no evidence that the implementation of the two 
public reporting initiatives lead to an increased use of higher quality facilities among MA 
patients. Whether or not the actual underlying quality was inferior at these facilities, or 
whether the documentation of quality problems was better due to increased scrutiny 
associated with MA plan is not known and should be the subject of future study. 
The findings of this study are line with previous research that find that high MA 
facilities serve patients who were older, more likely to be female, less likely to be 
racial/ethnic minorities or Medicaid beneficiaries, and in the Northeast and West regions 
and in markets with high Medicare managed care penetration (Jung et al., 2018). We 
extend the work by examining additional quality measures and potential responses by 
MA patients (and potentially plans) to enhanced public reporting of nursing home 
metrics. Similar to Werner et al. (2012), we find significant but mixed and small response 
changes after public reporting. While prior work has described an increase in nursing 
home patients being covered by MA and nursing home characteristics associated with 
high proportion of MA residents, to our knowledge, we are the first to directly examine 
changes in the share of MA residents in response to public report card changes on 
Nursing Home Compare. While there is a vast literature on public reporting and patient 
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sorting by risk type, there is less research on insurance coverage type (i.e. dual-eligibles) 
and none on Medicare Advantage (Konetzka et al., 2015; Rahman, Grabowski, Gozalo, 
Thomas, & Mor, 2014).  
 
Implications for policy and practice 
The role of private plans has become increasingly important, considering that the 
proportion of MA enrollees in nursing homes increased to 20% of nursing home residents 
(Jung et al., 2018). These findings, coupled with research by Meyers et al. (2018) and 
Chang et al. (2016) that suggest MA patients are more likely to utilize lower quality 
skilled nursing facilities than FFS Medicare patients or find no differences in nursing 
home quality between MA and FFS Medicare enrollees, suggest that there are nuances in 
how MA plans are steering or placing their patients in nursing homes for postacute care 
or long-term care. Because this analysis did not have access to costs of care, MA plans 
may be steering their covered patients to less costly providers. Recent research has 
suggested that MA plans appear to steer patients to specific skilled nursing facilities but 
find no improvement in patient outcomes (Rahman, Meyers, & Mor, 2018). MA plans 
also may be more influenced by past relationships with SNFs and physicians who 
practice there and might not be as strongly influenced by quality when making network 
decisions.  
CMS could more strongly incentivize MA plans to contract with efficient nursing 
facilities. CMS could require MA plans to be more transparent in the type nursing homes 
in their networks when Medicare beneficiaries make enrollment decisions or include 
nursing facility utilization and outcome measures in the Healthcare Effectiveness Data 
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and Information Set (HEDIS). Including nursing home outcomes in MA star ratings, 
where star ratings determine bonus payments from CMS, might encourage MA plans to 
contract with higher-quality facilities. However, if patient steering in MA does not result 
in improved outcomes and may actually lead to patients entering poorer quality nursing 
homes, should steering patients be encouraged? Future research should examine patient 
steering along with cost data to assess the trade-off between quality and cost. 
Additionally, as nursing homes are increasingly held accountable for the care they 
provide through payment programs such as the skilled nursing value-based purchasing 
policy, it will also be important to assess patient selection by insurance type from the 




There are several limitations to this study. First, the relationship we estimate 
between a facility’s staffing and quality level and percentage of MA patients may be 
endogenous, particularly in the presence of inadequate risk adjustment where the severity 
of patients admitted influences a facility’s decision on staffing levels. Because high MA 
facilities tend to serve more skilled nursing days and patients admitted from the hospital, 
we do not know whether MA patients go to worse quality facilities or facilities that have 
lower quality indictors (which mainly reflect a patient’s functional challenges) care for 
higher risk patients. Second, staffing measures used in this analysis are self-reported by 
the nursing home facility, which may vary in accuracy across type of facility (Castle, 
2008). To address this issue, future research should use staffing measures derived from 
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payroll information to more accurately reflect staffing levels in nursing homes. We also 
do not distinguish between short-stay and long-stay nursing home residents, who have 
very different clinical needs and outcomes. One recent study suggested that 30% of all 
MA nursing home patients were long-stayers, with the remainder being postacute short 
term patients (Chang et al., 2016). This suggests that examining quality across both short- 
and long-stayers is important when gauging the relationship of MA enrollment and the 
choice of nursing facility by quality. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite these limitations, our findings have important implications. MA patients 
may be receiving differential care compared to other Medicare beneficiaries. Public 
reporting of certain quality measures may not have great influences on where MA 
patients receive their care. Other indicators may be driving provider networks, 
collaboratives, and other formal and informal relationships. As MA plans continue to 
attract a larger share of the Medicare population relative to FFS Medicare, more 
information on the nursing home decisions made by MA plan enrollees and the outcomes 




Table 4.1: Nursing home characteristics by percentage of MA patients served by nursing home facilities in 2010 
 
 High MA (>25%) Low MA (1-24%)  No MA (0%) All NH 
(n) 2,691 2,215 2,029 6,935 
 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Staffing levels (high is better)         
Total RN hours/resident day 0.49 0.38 0.38 0.23 0.38 0.43 0.42 0.36 
Total LPN hours/resident day 0.84 0.34 0.84 0.29 0.80 0.48 0.83 0.38 
Total CNA hours/resident day 2.17 0.81 1.97 0.73 2.40 1.11 2.17 0.9 
Total nurse hours/resident day 3.49 1.04 3.19 0.84 3.57 1.39 3.42 1.11 
         
Quality measures (lower is better)         
% walking not improved 84.8 9.4 84.0 9.0 78.6 17.5 82.7 12.5 
% bowel incontinence 52.9 13.8 53.2 12.7 50.2 15.1 52.2 13.9 
% urinary incontinence 65.6 12.2 65.2 11.3 62.0 14.9 64.4 12.9 
% catheter use 8.4 5.2 7.9 2.9 6.1 3.7 7.6 4.3 
% UTI 12.0 3.6 11.8 3.2 10.7 3.9 11.3 3.6 
Average ADL (0-28) 17.3 2.5 17.0 2.4 15.0 4.2 16.5 3.2 
         
Facility structural characteristics         
% occupied 86.2 12.1 87.2 10.4 79.8 16.7 84.7 13.5 
Total beds in facility 121.8 70.5 153.5 75.9 80.5 47.0 119.8 72.3 
For profit 66%   71%   66%   68%   
Hospital based 5%  2%  8%  5%  
Part of a chain 58%   58%   48%   55%   
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 High MA (>25%) Low MA (1-24%)  No MA (0%) All NH 
(n) 2,691 2,215 2,029 6,935 
Patient demographics 
Average age, years 81.2 6.1 80.1 5.8 78.4 10.2 80.0 7.6 
% White 83.9 20.6 81.8 22.0 83.3 21.6 83.0 21.4 
% Black 7.8 17.4 11.6 20.5 9.2 20.2 9.4 19.3 
% Hispanic 2.5 8.6 3.0 10.0 2.9 12.1 2.8 10.2 
% Female 70.5 10.5 69.9 11.1 68.0 15.0 69.6 12.2 
         
Patient case mix         
% SNF (postacute) days 21.7 13.9 17.4 9.4 14.0 11.0 18.1 12.2 
% admitted from hospital 84.1 13.5 81.6 13.9 73.9 16.7 80.3 15.3 
% Medicaid 57.1 21.4 63.3 17.1 65.9 23.0 61.7 21.0 
         
Geographic characteristics         
Medicare managed care penetration 35.4 12.4 26.6 10.1 12.5 10.9 25.9 14.6 
Region         
Northeast 25%   27%   12%   22%   
Midwest 31%  31%  36%  33%  
South 15%   29%   39%   26%   
West 29%   13%   13%   19%   
Notes. All p-values for categories of nursing homes based on the percentage of Medicare Advantage (MA) patients are statistically significant at p-
value <0.01, except for % Hispanic (p-value = 0.16). One-way ANOVA tests were used to see if at least one group mean was statistically different 
from the other group means. Sample includes nursing homes in 2010 with reported percentage of Medicare Advantage (MA) residents. Quality 
measure % walking improved was reverse coded for ease of interpretation (lower is better). Abbreviations: Registered nurse (RN), Licensed 
practical nurse (LPN); Certified nursing assistant (CNA); Urinary tract infection (UTI); Activities of daily living (ADL); Skilled nursing facility 
(SNF). Definitions: total nurse staff hours/resident day is the total of RN, LPN, and CNA hours/ resident day.  
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Figure 4.1: Trend of staffing levels in nursing homes by percentage of MA patients from 2000-2010 
 
 
Notes. Categories of MA residents based on percentages in 2010. n=2,691 for High MA (>25%); n=2,215 for Low MA (1-24%); n=2,029 for No 
MA (0%). Vertical lines indicate the initial start of Nursing Home Compare in 2002 and its transition into 5-star rating system in 2008  
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Figure 4.2: Trend of quality measures in nursing homes by percentage of MA patients from 2000-2010 
 
 
Notes. Categories of MA residents based on percentages in 2010. n=2,691 for High MA (>25%); n=2,215 for Low MA (1-24%); n=2,029 for No 
MA (0%). Vertical lines indicate the initial start of Nursing Home Compare in 2002 and its transition into 5-star rating system in 2008. For all 
quality measures, lower means better.  
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Table 4.2: Adjusted odds ratios (OR) for being a high percentage MA facility by nursing home characteristics, 2010 
 
 Odds of being high percentage MA facility 
Independent variables 
("High" = above median) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Staffing levels (higher is better)           
High RN hours/resident day  1.920*** 1.324***  1.293*** 
   (1.730 - 2.131) (1.165 - 1.506)  (1.136 - 1.471) 
High LPN hours/resident day   1.126** 1.125*   1.088 
    (1.015 - 1.249) (0.993 - 1.274)   (0.959 - 1.234) 
High CNA hours/resident day  1.050 0.990  0.985 
   (0.949 - 1.162) (0.876 - 1.120)  (0.871 - 1.115) 
Quality measures (lower is better)           
High % walking not improved  1.044  0.936 0.928 
   (0.932 - 1.169)  (0.820 - 1.069) (0.813 - 1.061) 
High % bowel incontinence   0.945   1.016 1.018 
    (0.841 - 1.063)   (0.872 - 1.184) (0.873 - 1.186) 
High % urinary incontinence  1.115*  1.117 1.115 
   (0.996 - 1.248)  (0.970 - 1.288) (0.968 - 1.285) 
High % catheter use   1.737***   1.282*** 1.246** 
    (1.502 - 2.009)   (1.079 - 1.524) (1.047 - 1.482) 
High % UTI  1.432***  1.375*** 1.375*** 
   (1.247 - 1.645)  (1.168 - 1.618) (1.168 - 1.619) 
High average ADL   1.669***   1.177** 1.158** 
    (1.482 - 1.879)   (1.020 - 1.359) (1.002 - 1.337) 
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 Odds of being high percentage MA facility 
Independent variables 
("High" = above median) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Facility structural characteristics           
High occupancy rate 0.873**   0.883* 0.856** 0.865** 
  (0.769 - 0.991)   (0.778 - 1.003) (0.753 - 0.972) (0.761 - 0.984) 
High number of total beds 0.786***  0.784*** 0.707*** 0.710*** 
  (0.688 - 0.898)  (0.685 - 0.898) (0.614 - 0.814) (0.616 - 0.819) 
For profit 0.827**   0.844** 0.827** 0.841** 
  (0.713 - 0.959)   (0.728 - 0.979) (0.713 - 0.960) (0.724 - 0.976) 
Hospital based 1.192  1.120 1.189 1.128 
  (0.889 - 1.600)  (0.834 - 1.505) (0.885 - 1.598) (0.839 - 1.516) 
Part of a chain 1.195***   1.191*** 1.201*** 1.196*** 
  (1.054 - 1.356)   (1.049 - 1.352) (1.058 - 1.363) (1.053 - 1.358) 
Patient Demographics      
High average age, years 1.523***   1.528*** 1.504*** 1.506*** 
  (1.296 - 1.790)   (1.299 - 1.796) (1.276 - 1.774) (1.277 - 1.777) 
High % White 0.958  0.958 0.945 0.944 
  (0.810 - 1.134)  (0.809 - 1.133) (0.797 - 1.121) (0.795 - 1.120) 
High % Black 1.308***   1.317*** 1.312*** 1.320*** 
  (1.095 - 1.563)   (1.102 - 1.575) (1.097 - 1.570) (1.103 - 1.580) 
High % Hispanic 0.525***  0.539*** 0.517*** 0.531*** 
  (0.428 - 0.644)  (0.439 - 0.662) (0.421 - 0.636) (0.431 - 0.653) 
High % Female 0.898   0.903 0.866* 0.872* 
  (0.777 - 1.037)   (0.782 - 1.043) (0.748 - 1.002) (0.753 - 1.009) 
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 Odds of being high percentage MA facility 
Independent variables 
("High" = above median) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Patient Case Mix      
High % SNF (postacute) days 1.732***   1.666*** 1.645*** 1.596*** 
  (1.498 - 2.002)   (1.439 - 1.930) (1.420 - 1.907) (1.375 - 1.852) 
High % admitted from hospital 1.543***  1.499*** 1.478*** 1.448*** 
  (1.344 - 1.772)  (1.304 - 1.723) (1.285 - 1.700) (1.257 - 1.666) 
High % Medicaid 0.681***   0.699*** 0.688*** 0.703*** 
  (0.595 - 0.781)   (0.609 - 0.801) (0.600 - 0.789) (0.612 - 0.806) 
Geographic characteristics           
Medicare managed care penetration 1.098***  1.098*** 1.097*** 1.097*** 
  (1.092 - 1.104)  (1.092 - 1.104) (1.091 - 1.103) (1.091 - 1.103) 
Midwest (ref: Northeast) 1.117   1.172* 1.132 1.180* 
  (0.941 - 1.327)   (0.985 - 1.394) (0.949 - 1.351) (0.988 - 1.410) 
South (ref: Northeast) 0.583***  0.631*** 0.563*** 0.608*** 
  (0.481 - 0.707)  (0.516 - 0.770) (0.463 - 0.684) (0.496 - 0.744) 
West (ref: Northeast) 1.208*   1.233** 1.131 1.158 
  (0.986 - 1.479)   (1.006 - 1.511) (0.922 - 1.388) (0.942 - 1.422) 
       
Number of Observations 6,935 6,935 6,935 6,935 6,935 
Notes. "High" versus reference group of low has cut-off at the median for each characteristic. Sample of nursing homes (NH) in 2010 with 
reported share of Medicare Advantage (MA).  95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Abbreviations: Registered nurse (RN); Licensed practical 
nurse (LPN); Certified nursing assistant (CNA); Urinary tract infection (UTI); Activities of daily living (ADL); Skilled nursing facility (SNF).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 4.3: Changes in percentage of Medicare Advantage (MA) residents after Nursing Home Compare (NHC) was initially 
introduced in 2002 
  
Changes in percentage of MA after 
NHC vs. before NHC with an 
independent variable increase of: 
Independent Variables Mean 50% 10% 
Staffing levels (higher is better)    
RN hours/resident day 0.33 0.08%*** 0.02%*** 
LPN hours/resident day 0.73 0.02% 0.01% 
CNA hours/resident day 2.16 0.16%* 0.03%* 
Total nurse staff hours/resident day 3.19 0.18%* 0.04%* 
    
Quality measures (lower is better)    
% walking not improved 75.8 -0.04% -0.01% 
% bowel incontinence 50.8 -0.30% -0.06% 
% urinary incontinence 61.4        0.65%***        0.13%*** 
% catheter use 7.43 0.11% 0.02% 
% with UTI 10.6       -2.36%***       -0.47%*** 
Average ADL 15.4 0.01%    0.002% 
Notes. n=49,653 nursing home years. Sample of nursing homes (NH) with reported share of Medicare Advantage (MA) from 2000-2005, 
excluding 2002 (introduction of Nursing Home Compare). Variable of interest the interaction of the continuous independent variable and a binary 
pre- or post-Nursing Home Compare introduction (See equation in Methods). Multivariate linear regression model control for the independent 
variable, indicator pre-post NHC introduction, facility structural characteristics (occupancy rate, total beds, for profit status, hospital based facility, 
part of chain), facility's patient demographics (average age, % White, % Black, % Hispanic, % female), facility's patient case mix (% NH days 
covered by skilled nursing days, % admitted from hospital, % Medicaid), and facility's geographic characteristics (Medicare managed care 
penetration), with facility and year fixed effects. Abbreviations: Registered nurse (RN), Licensed practical nurse (LPN); Certified nursing assistant 
(CNA); Activities of daily living (ADL). Definitions: total nurse staff hours/resident day is the total of RN, LPN, and CNA hours/resident day. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 4.4: Changes in percentage of Medicare Advantage (MA) residents after Nursing Home Compare (NHC) transitioned to 
Star Rating in 2008 
  
Changes in percentage of MA after 
NHC vs. before NHC Star Rating 
with an independent variable increase 
of: 
Independent Variables Mean 50% 10% 
Staffing levels (higher is better)    
RN hours/resident day 0.36 0.13%** 0.03%** 
LPN hours/resident day 0.81 0.07% 0.014% 
CNA hours/resident day 2.2 -0.70%*** -0.14%*** 
Total nurse staff hours/resident day 3.4 -0.52%*** -0.10%*** 
    
Quality measures (lower is better)    
% walking not improved 80.5 2.33%*** 0.47%*** 
% bowel incontinence 51.8 -0.15% -0.03% 
% urinary incontinence 63.4 0.59% 0.12% 
% catheter use 8.5 5.35%*** 1.07%*** 
% with UTI 11.5 3.59%** 0.72%** 
Average ADL 16.1 1.6%*** 0.32%*** 
Notes. n=29,975 nursing home years. Sample of nursing homes with reported share of Medicare Advantage (MA) from 2006-2010, excluding 
2008 (introduction of Nursing Home Compare Star Rating). Variable of interest the interaction of the continuous independent variable and a 
binary pre- or post-Nursing Home Compare star rating. Multivariate linear regression model control for the independent variable, indicator pre-
post NHC transition to star rating, facility structural characteristics (occupancy rate, total beds, for profit status, hospital based facility, part of 
chain), facility's patient demographics (average age, % White, % Black, % Hispanic, % female), facility's patient case mix (% NH days covered by 
skilled nursing days, % admitted from hospital, % Medicaid), and facility's geographic characteristics (Medicare managed care penetration), with 
facility and year fixed effects. Abbreviations: Registered nurse (RN), Licensed practical nurse (LPN); Certified nursing assistant (CNA); Activities 
of daily living (ADL). Definitions: total nurse staff hours/resident day is the total of RN, LPN, and CNA hours/resident day. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Appendix Table 4.1: Nursing home characteristics by missing and non-missing covariate observations, 2010 
 
 Non-missing Missing  
(n) 5,727 1,208   
 mean sd mean sd p-value 
Staffing levels (higher is better)      
Total RN hours/resident day 0.4 0.26 0.52 0.64 <0.01 
Total LPN hours/resident day 0.82 0.3 0.85 0.61 0.05 
Total CNA hours/resident day 2.1 0.78 2.6 1.2 <0.01 
Total nurse hours/resident day 3.3 0.91 3.9 1.7 <0.01 
      
Quality measures (lower is better)      
% walking not improved 83.6 10.4 78.5 19.1 <0.01 
% bowel incontinence 52.4 13.3 51.4 16.4 0.02 
% urinary incontinence 64.5 12.2 63.9 15.6 0.13 
% catheter use 7.8 3.7 6.0 6.3 <0.01 
% UTI 11.8 3.4 10.6 4.4 <0.01 
Average ADL (0-28) 16.8 2.7 15.3 4.7 <0.01 
      
Facility structural characteristics      
% occupied 85.3 12.5 81.5 17.3 <0.01 
Total beds in facility 130.6 71.9 68.6 48.5 <0.01 
For profit 71%   50%   <0.01 
Hospital based 3%  16%  <0.01 
Part of a chain 59%   39%   <0.01 
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 Non-missing Missing  
(n) 5,727 1,208   
Patient demographics 
Average age, years 80.5 6.2 77.6 11.7 <0.01 
% White 82 21.9 87.8 17.7 <0.01 
% Black 9.4 18.2 9.7 24.2 0.58 
% Hispanic 2.7 9.1 3.4 14.2 0.02 
% Female 70.2 11.2 66.5 15.9 <0.01 
      
Patient case mix      
% NH days were SNF covered days 19.2 12.1 17.4 9.4 <0.01 
% admitted from hospital 80.5 15.6 81.6 13.9 0.08 
% Medicaid 61.3 18.9 63.3 17.1 <0.01 
      
Geographic characteristics      
Medicare managed care penetration 26.1 14.1 24.9 16.7 <0.01 
Region     <0.01 
Northeast 24%   13%     
Midwest 31%  40%   
South 27%   21%     
West 18%   26%     
Notes. Sample includes nursing homes in 2010 with reported percentage of Medicare Advantage (MA) residents. Missing category includes 
observations with any missing variable. T-tests are performed to compared the mean between the two groups, except for Region where one-way 
ANOVA tests were used to see if at least one group mean was statistically different from the other group means; p-values are reported. Quality 
measure % walking improved was reverse coded for ease of interpretation (lower is better). Abbreviations: Registered nurse (RN), Licensed 
practical nurse (LPN); Certified nursing assistant (CNA); Urinary tract infection (UTI); Activities of daily living (ADL); Skilled nursing facility 
(SNF). Definitions: total nurse staff hours/resident day is the total of RN, LPN, and CNA hours/ resident day.  
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Appendix Table 4.2: Adjusted odds ratios for being a high percentage MA facility by nursing home characteristics without 
missing covariate observations, 2010 
 Odds of being high percentage MA facility 
Independent variables 
("High" = above median) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
       
Staffing levels (higher is better)           
High RN hours/resident day  2.029*** 1.334***  1.303*** 
   (1.805 - 2.280) (1.160 - 1.536)  (1.131 - 1.501) 
High LPN hours/resident day   1.167*** 1.187**   1.143* 
    (1.040 - 1.310) (1.037 - 1.359)   (0.997 - 1.311) 
High CNA hours/resident day  1.063 1.025  1.025 
   (0.949 - 1.189) (0.897 - 1.171)  (0.896 - 1.172) 
Quality measures (lower is better)           
High % walking not improved  1.100  1.021 1.016 
   (0.973 - 1.244)  (0.887 - 1.175) (0.883 - 1.170) 
High % bowel incontinence   0.991   0.967 0.971 
    (0.872 - 1.126)   (0.821 - 1.138) (0.824 - 1.143) 
High % urinary incontinence  1.070  1.090 1.089 
   (0.944 - 1.212)  (0.935 - 1.271) (0.934 - 1.270) 
High % catheter use   1.772***   1.262** 1.225** 
    (1.523 - 2.062)   (1.057 - 1.508) (1.024 - 1.465) 
High % UTI  1.462***  1.384*** 1.384*** 
   (1.266 - 1.688)  (1.172 - 1.633) (1.172 - 1.635) 
High average ADL   1.719***   1.201** 1.172** 
    (1.508 - 1.959)   (1.029 - 1.402) (1.003 - 1.370) 
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 Odds of being high percentage MA facility 
Independent variables 
("High" = above median) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Facility structural characteristics           
High occupancy rate 0.932   0.942 0.913 0.924 
  (0.812 - 1.070)   (0.820 - 1.083) (0.795 - 1.050) (0.803 - 1.063) 
High number of total beds 0.952  0.952 0.857** 0.864* 
  (0.822 - 1.101)  (0.821 - 1.104) (0.735 - 0.998) (0.740 - 1.009) 
For profit 0.861*   0.879 0.855* 0.871* 
  (0.732 - 1.013)   (0.747 - 1.035) (0.726 - 1.007) (0.739 - 1.026) 
Hospital based 1.023  0.971 0.990 0.951 
  (0.677 - 1.546)  (0.641 - 1.469) (0.653 - 1.501) (0.626 - 1.442) 
Part of a chain 1.056   1.051 1.066 1.062 
  (0.920 - 1.211)   (0.915 - 1.207) (0.928 - 1.225) (0.924 - 1.220) 
Patient Demographics           
High average age, years 1.423***   1.423*** 1.420*** 1.416*** 
  (1.194 - 1.696)   (1.193 - 1.696) (1.187 - 1.698) (1.184 - 1.694) 
High % White 0.947  0.949 0.932 0.934 
  (0.789 - 1.138)  (0.790 - 1.140) (0.773 - 1.122) (0.775 - 1.125) 
High % Black 1.379***   1.389*** 1.392*** 1.401*** 
  (1.138 - 1.670)   (1.146 - 1.684) (1.147 - 1.689) (1.155 - 1.701) 
High % Hispanic 0.551***  0.567*** 0.544*** 0.559*** 
  (0.442 - 0.687)  (0.455 - 0.708) (0.436 - 0.679) (0.447 - 0.699) 
High % Female 0.930   0.935 0.897 0.904 
  (0.795 - 1.089)   (0.798 - 1.095) (0.765 - 1.052) (0.770 - 1.060) 
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 Odds of being high percentage MA facility 
Independent variables 
("High" = above median) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Patient Case Mix           
High % SNF (postacute) days 2.284***   2.183*** 2.189*** 2.111*** 
  (1.953 - 2.672)   (1.863 - 2.558) (1.867 - 2.566) (1.798 - 2.478) 
High % admitted from hospital 1.409***  1.368*** 1.343*** 1.314*** 
  (1.213 - 1.636)  (1.177 - 1.590) (1.155 - 1.562) (1.129 - 1.530) 
High % Medicaid 0.696***   0.716*** 0.710*** 0.727*** 
  (0.599 - 0.808)   (0.616 - 0.832) (0.611 - 0.825) (0.625 - 0.845) 
Geographic characteristics           
Medicare managed care penetration 1.092***  1.091*** 1.090*** 1.090*** 
  (1.085 - 1.098)  (1.085 - 1.098) (1.084 - 1.097) (1.083 - 1.097) 
Midwest (ref: Northeast) 1.034   1.075 1.034 1.070 
  (0.860 - 1.243)   (0.893 - 1.294) (0.856 - 1.249) (0.885 - 1.295) 
South (ref: Northeast) 0.540***  0.574*** 0.523*** 0.556*** 
  (0.441 - 0.661)  (0.465 - 0.709) (0.427 - 0.642) (0.450 - 0.688) 
West (ref: Northeast) 1.321**   1.344*** 1.234* 1.259** 
  (1.061 - 1.644)   (1.079 - 1.675) (0.990 - 1.540) (1.008 - 1.573) 
       
Observations 5,724 5,724 5,724 5,724 5,724 
Notes. "High" versus reference group of low has cut-off at the median for each characteristic. Sample of nursing homes (NH) in 2010 with 
reported share of Medicare Advantage (MA) and with non-missing covariates.  95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Abbreviations: 
Registered nurse (RN); Licensed practical nurse (LPN); Certified nursing assistant (CNA); Urinary tract infection (UTI); Activities of daily living 
(ADL); Skilled nursing facility (SNF).  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Overview and Synthesis of Findings 
This dissertation has examined the role of privately administered, Medicare 
Advantage (MA) health plans on postacute and nursing home care. Overall, we find that 
risk factors pertinent to the frail elderly captured in administrative claims data are 
predictive of postacute utilization in both MA and FFS Medicare, and that controlling for 
these risk factors explains away some of the unadjusted observed differences in MA and 
FFS postacute utilization. There is no evidence that greater MA penetration in a county 
impact the postacute destination in the FFS Medicare or overall Medicare market. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that MA patients (or their plans) differentially selected 
higher quality nursing homes after public reporting programs were introduced to help 
consumers select providers.  
In the first two papers, we explore the interaction between the MA program and 
traditional fee-for-service Medicare providers in Florida, a state with one of the largest 
number of Medicare enrollees in the nation. Using state wide hospital discharge data, first 
we compare utilization and quality patterns of relevance to postacute care across MA and 
FFS, and second we examine the impact of MA enrollment on utilization patterns at the 
county level among FFS beneficiaries. Prior studies have focused on adjusting for clinical 
factors when estimating the differences between MA and FFS postacute utilization and 
outcomes. Chapter 2 expands our understanding of currently available administrative 
based non-clinical data in prediction. Prior studies have also largely focused on inpatient 
and outpatient services when examining the effects of MA enrollment on FFS utilization 
in the same market. Chapter 3 focuses on a different set of services, which have expanded 
in use and costs in the Medicare program for the last decade and addresses concerns in 
 166 
non-random selection into MA. In combination, chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate the need to 
address risk selection in health systems and suggest the potential drawbacks of not doing 
so – potentially overestimating the benefits that may be associated with private managed 
care plans. 
Risk adjustment in Medicare Advantage has strengthened over the years by 
transitioning from adjusting for basic demographic information to the CMS Hierarchical 
Conditions Category (HCC) system that includes both inpatient and outpatient diagnostic 
information (Newhouse, Price, McWilliams, Hsu, & McGuire, 2015). However, there is 
still concern of favorable risk selection into MA plans from FFS Medicare among high-
need populations. In particular, recent research has demonstrated that beyond HCCs, 
beneficiaries with complex chronic conditions, worse activities of daily living, and frailty 
diagnoses have higher disenrollment rates from MA when compared with non-high-need 
patients (Li, Trivedi, et al., 2018; Meyers, Mor, & Rahman, 2018; Rahman, Keohane, 
Trivedi, & Mor, 2015; Riley, 2012). Chapter 2 demonstrated that adjusting for geriatric 
risk is important when assessing differences in utilization and quality between MA and 
FFS hospitalized patients. Chapter 3 further demonstrated that, at the county level, when 
we attempted to control for MA plan entry and enrollment, we did not see significant 
decreased use of high intensity postacute services. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that when interpreting the value add of private Medicare plans, we should not only assess 
the care that is delivered to its enrollees but also the care that is influenced by the 
program to non-enrollees.  
In the third paper, using a comprehensive compilation of national data on nursing 
homes, we elucidate the association between the percentage of patients in a facility 
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covered by Medicare Advantage and the care quality and staffing characteristics of those 
facilities. Prior studies have focused on patient selection by clinical risk after public 
reporting in nursing homes but relatively few have focused on patient insurance 
coverage. Chapter 4, leveraging the different incentives that exist by payer source, 
focuses on patient selection by MA coverage after public reporting. In this analysis, we 
also include information on patients receiving both postacute care and long-term nursing 
home care. We find that MA patients (and plans) are not influenced by national public 
reporting programs in directing their enrollees to nursing home care. In combination, 
chapters 2 and 4 suggest that the MA program may be guiding post-hospital care 
differently compared to FFS but that the program may not be using quality information 
available to the public.   
Previous work in Medicare Advantage examine where and why insurers choose to 
enter the MA market (Frakt, Pizer, & Feldman, 2012), the structure of the MA market 
(Pizer & Frakt, 2002) the costs and quality of plan offerings (Ayanian et al., 2013; 
Johnson, Lyon, & Frakt, 2017), and the variation in service use between MA and FFS 
Medicare (Li, Rahman, et al., 2018). There is little understanding in the mechanisms 
through which Medicare Advantage contracts with providers and establishes their 
networks (Feyman, Figueroa, Polsky, Adelberg, & Frakt, 2019). That is, how do MA 
plans weigh quality and costs of providers when negotiating their networks? Chapter 2 
demonstrated that, controlling for observable patient characteristics, MA appears to be 
using less intense postacute settings than FFS. Chapter 4 demonstrated that there were no 
significant effects of quality reporting on where MA enrollees received nursing home 
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care. Taken together, these findings suggest that MA plans may be establishing their care 
patterns reliant on cost structures more so than quality metrics.  
 
Overall Limitations and Strengths 
The findings from these three studies should be considered in the context of their 
limitations and strengths. We use abstracted inpatient data from the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project (HCUP) state databases for Florida to identify the experience of 
Medicare Advantage patients. Although data from Florida is arguably one of the best 
single state database to use for this type of analysis, it may not be fully generalizable to 
the entire MA program. The HCUP state inpatient databases have been previously used to 
identify the experiences of MA patients, but they are limited in scope to patients having 
had an inpatient hospital stay and residing in one of the five states that distinguish MA 
from FFS Medicare coverage (Baicker, Chernew, & Robbins, 2013; Nicholas, 2011).  
Because MA is administered by private firms, utilization and cost data is more 
difficult to obtain compared to fee-for-service Medicare. For example, past research into 
MA rely on convenience sampling of one or several major insurers administering MA 
plans. Researchers also obtain information from Medicare Beneficiary Enrollment 
Summary File for demographic information, Medicare’s Healthcare Effectiveness Data 
and Information Set (HEDIS) on plan information, and assessment data in each setting 
(i.e. Minimum Data Set [MDS] for skilled nursing or Outcome and Assessment 
Information Set [OASIS] for home health) for limited utilization and risk adjustment 
measures. More recently, researchers have used “information-only” MA claims from 
hospitals receiving disproportionate-share hospital or medical education payments from 
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Medicare to abstract limited information on utilization (Huckfeldt, Escarce, Rabideau, 
Karaca-Mandic, & Sood, 2017). Currently, there are efforts to release Medicare 
Advantage encounter data, with its limitation partly contributing to limited public 
knowledge on the value of MA to its beneficiaries. As MA encounter data continues to be 
released and strengthened, additional information on the experience of all MA enrollees 
will help policymakers design efficient and effective programs.  
Second, quality measures used in Paper 3 are mainly self-reported by nursing 
homes. In particular, staffing levels used in public reporting have traditionally been levels 
reported by an administrator who provides information that is representative of the prior 
two weeks in the Online System for Certification and Administrative Reporting 
(OSCAR). There is limited ability to verify these staffing characteristics. The Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) required facilities to electronically submit direct care staffing 
information based on payroll and other auditable data through the Payroll-Based Journal 
(PBJ), which will improve the accuracy of these measures and the assessment of their 
relationship on quality and other outcomes. Furthermore, because we do not observe the 
actual contracts negotiated with private managed care plans, we can only infer these 
relationships related to reported quality and staffing based on the nursing homes MA 
enrollees actually use.  
 
Directions for Future Research 
This thesis raises a number of important questions that could not be answered in 
the current research. One area for further study is the intensity of postacute services 
provided to MA and FFS patients. Chapters 2 and 3 only explore the probability of 
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entering each destination but not the intensity of services provided at each destination. 
Past research has demonstrated that MA patients with hip fractures admitted to skilled 
nursing facilities (SNF) after a hospital stay spent fewer days in the SNF and received 
fewer minutes of total rehabilitation therapy than their FFS counterparts (Kumar et al., 
2018). We do not know if this difference in the level of intensity once admitted to a 
postacute setting holds across clinical cohorts and settings. While studies have shown that 
the choice of setting, rather than the intensity, has played a large role in the variation of 
postacute spending, studying the intensity can paint a fuller picture of the care provided 
in MA plans versus FFS Medicare (Chen et al., 2017).  
The large variation that occurs among postacute use raises the question of what is 
the most appropriate setting and level of care for post-hospital discharge (Kane, Lin, & 
Blewett, 2002). A number of patient-, provider-, and area-level factors affect the use of 
postacute and choice of postacute settings, but it appears that, in addition to financial 
incentives, practice styles and supply play a dominant force (Kane et al., 2002). Research 
should continue to develop best-practices and treatment protocols for postacute and this 
information should also be incorporated into a rational payment policy for Medicare 
postacute based on the costs of the most effective modes of care.   
An important question we could not answer in this thesis is whether geriatric 
factors identified can be used for risk identification prior to inpatient stay. Rather than 
assessing risk after a patient has been admitted, risk identification can be used prior to 
admission by health systems to limit exposure of unnecessary inpatient and postacute 
stays. Linking longitudinal outpatient and inpatient data, rather than the use of cross-
sectional inpatient data, may be helpful in this exploration. Further, the advancement of 
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other types of data sources, such as electronic health records, may be a fruitful endeavor 
to pursue by using real-time information to identify high risk patients in large health 
systems.  
Additionally, an important issue to consider is to examine which quality of care 
measures are most meaningful in nursing homes. In the context of payment reform 
initiatives, quality measures that accurately reflect the process and outcomes provided by 
nursing homes are important. However, nursing home residents and their families may 
value other important aspects of care currently not captured in administrative claims and 
MDS assessments on Nursing Home Compare. For example, accountable care 
organizations performance standards and Medicare Advantage star ratings incorporate 
patient experience and satisfaction metrics, which are used in part to determine payments 
and bonuses.  
This study also raises a number of broader research themes that should be 
explored in the future. The healthcare system has become increasingly concentrated in 
the past few years and consolidations are projected to continue. While prior research has 
studied the effects of insurer and hospital consolidation, future research should also 
examine the effects of other types of integration – both formal and informal (Dafny, 
Duggan, & Ramanarayanan, 2012; Gaynor, Ho, & Town, 2015; Ho & Lee, 2017; Moriya, 
Vogt, & Gaynor, 2010; Trish & Herring, 2015). In particular, prior research in MA and 
postacute context has demonstrated that hospital and skilled nursing referral linkages 
reduce rehospitalizations but that MA concentration in nursing homes do not improve 
patient outcomes (Rahman, Foster, Grabowski, Zinn, & Mor, 2013; Rahman, Meyers, & 
Mor, 2018). Exploring private managed care relationships with hospital providers and 
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non-physician group based providers may elucidate areas for policy and regulatory 
interventions aimed at controlling costs and improving quality. 
A second broad area of research should investigate the data needs in care 
transitions that occur between hospitals and postacute providers. The Improving 
Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation (IMPACT) Act of 2014 addressed issues 
related to standardization of data and submissions of data across postacute providers and 
exchange of data between other providers. Standardized data may help with determining 
appropriate postacute use when comparing outcomes across settings; exchange of data 
between providers may help with errors and continuity of care. These new data sources 
will be beneficial in conducting future research in the value add of postacute services.  
Implications for Practice and Policy 
These three papers in this dissertation represent some of the first studies 
examining additional risk factors in predicting postacute utilization and differences 
between MA and FFS patients, exploring the relationship of MA enrollment on county 
level effects of postacute utilization, and testing whether MA plans and consumers 
responded to public reporting of quality measures in nursing homes.  
This dissertation research has several important practice and policy implications. 
As policymakers continually reform the healthcare delivery system, risk adjustment will 
be important in ensuring equitable and fair access to and payment across a range of care 
models. While this study does not answer the debate whether to include ‘social risk 
factors’ in risk adjustment for Medicare payment models, it does demonstrate that certain 
non-clinical factors can be conceptualized using existing administrative data, are 
predictive of utilization, and do narrow differences across payment models when 
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assessing utilization and costs. A more salient tool that this study provides may be for 
health systems to utilize the proposed risk factors to identify high-risk patients for 
additional targeted care management support.  
 Second, the role of capitated payment models will most likely continue to expand 
given the urgent need to reduce healthcare system costs while maintaining or improving 
quality. Understanding the impact of enrollment into capitated programs on patients with 
other types of insurance coverage is an important social welfare and public policy 
question. Not only is it important to assess the efficient delivery of patient care in 
capitated systems (within system), it is also important to assess the impact of that care 
delivery on other patients (between systems). In effect, should the federal government 
encourage enrollment in these types of plans because they offer better care to its own 
patients and provide positive externalities to other patients? If not, what are the costs and 
benefits policymakers are willing to accept of enrolling in these plans, relative to 
remaining in non-capitated plans? This study begins to elucidate some of the impacts of 
managed care enrollment on non-acute care services and provides some evidence as to 
whether MA offers better care for its own patients and provide positive spill over into 
FFS patients. These issues are especially pertinent when risk selection can occur between 
capitated and non-capitated systems that impact fiscal expenditures by the government 
and access to providers by patients.   
 Third, the impact of quality reporting on different healthcare stakeholders should 
be detangled. The two main objectives of the public release of performance data are to 
increase the accountability of providers and to maintain standards or improve the quality 
of care provided (Marshall, Shekelle, Leatherman, & Brook, 2000). The former offers 
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patients, payers, and purchasers of healthcare more informed basis of treatment or 
purchasing decisions. Much of the focus has been on the effects of selecting high-quality 
providers by patients and less has been on the effects of physician referral to or 
purchasers contracting with high quality providers (Werner & Asch, 2005). Although 
limited, available evidence suggests that public report cards have had a minor influence 
on purchasing decisions by managed care contracts, despite an explicit preference for 
high quality providers (Erickson, Torchiana, Schneider, Newburger, & Hannan, 2000; 
Mukamel et al., 2000; Mukamel, Weimer, Zwanziger, & Mushlin, 2002). We provide 
another context to examine if managed care plans respond to public reporting and find 
results consistent with the literature that there is minimal influence. Because the use of 
network providers is so salient in managed care, understanding how contracts and 
networks are negotiated and established based on quality may achieve the actual 
objectives of public reporting programs.  
More broadly, this research emphasizes the role of privately administered plans 
for seniors and their emerging care needs in the broader healthcare reform debates. 
Current policy and legislative actions that call for a premium support system or varying 
types of public option in Medicare will need to carefully consider the popularity of 
private plans among seniors and the quality of care these plans deliver to them. For 
example, most premium support proposals would treat traditional Medicare in a similar 
manner as private plans where the federal government makes a capitated payment on 
each beneficiary enrolled in traditional Medicare. The impact of these large scale 
capitated payments on care delivery can, and should, be explored in the current Medicare 
Advantage program to help design more sustainable policies. Second, the range of public 
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plan options will need to examine the feasibility of and impacts from eliminating or 
decreasing the role of private plan options in Medicare. Furthermore, the study focuses 
on the different providers that care for older adults outside the traditional inpatient 
setting. More and more seniors with complex health needs will require care in addition to 
that setting. How the federal public insurance program is designed and equipped to 
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